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Abstract 
The notion that different ownership types may create a divergence in outcome 
naturally led to an appraisal of the performance of the Nigerian electricity industry 
and to the investigation of the influence of ownership structures upon performance as 
a way of explaining the disappointing state of electricity production in Nigeria. This 
research is primarily concerned with the factors that influence performance, the 
estimation of efficiency and productivity of the National Electric Power Authority 
(NEP A) - the integrated public utility responsible for electricity in Nigeria. 
The first part of the thesis is concerned with developing a conceptual framework for 
the performance assessment of the public enterprise focusing on transformation of 
inputs to outputs. The various principles and methods of measuring efficiency are 
considered. And consequently, an appropriate methodology for the appraisal of 
NEP A's performance and an examination of how NEP A's production efficiency can 
be improved is outlined. This provides the basis for the empirical and data analysis, 
which forms the second part of the thesis. 
The empirical analyses use the two popular approaches for measuring efficiency. 
These are the non-parametric (data envelopment analysis and Malmquist productivity 
index approach) and parametric (stochastic frontier method) approaches. The third 
part of the thesis investigates the issues pertaining to the reform of the electricity 
industry from an ownership perspective. Attention is given to privatisation and 
regulation. Given the state of the industry in Nigeria, and the fact that reform is 
imminent, a modelling approach is used to examine the impact on performance of 
changes in ownership type and the organisational structure of the electricity industry. 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the research findings and draws policy 
implications of the study for the reform of the electricity industry in Nigeria. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Since the late 1980s, a wave of economic deregulation and privatisation has been 
sweeping through most countries. The electricity industry has been caught in this 
wave. Yet, this sector in Nigeria, along with some other developing countries, has not 
been touched by reform despite the significant problems faced by the industry as a 
whole. Considerable pressure is now mounting on the government and the electricity 
authority, in particular, of Nigeria to reform the institutional and structural 
arrangement of the electricity supply industry (ESI) as a means of improving the 
performance of the industry. 
The integrated utility, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) is a statutory 
monopoly, and since Nigeria's independence in 1960, various governments have 
given prominence to electricity in planning and co-ordinating the economic and social 
development of the country. Currently, the industry is publicly owned, and controlled 
directly, by the government through the Ministry of Power and Mines. 
Frequent and often lengthy blackouts that characterise the services provided by the 
NEPA have led to imaginative reinterpretations of the organisation's acronym: 'Never 
Expect Power Always' is one of the more reverent. The disappointing performance of 
NEP A is exacerbated by the government's delay in instituting the necessary changes 
that have become increasingly inevitable. The preference for piecemeal approach, 
such as changing the objective of NEPA from a "public good" perspective to 
commercialisation (without the necessary autonomy to pursue the stated objective). 
falls short of the wide-reaching reform required to address the issues and problems 
faced by NEP A. 
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The contribution of a well functioning electricity system to economic growth cannot 
be overstated. Typically, the electricity industry is characterised by four main 
activities: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. The performance of the 
electricity industry over the past two decades can only be described as unreliable. 
The World Bank (1983, 1993) in an ESMAP study identified the causes of poor 
performance in the electricity supply industry of Nigeria as both operational and 
structural. The factors isolated include inadequate attention to operations and 
maintenance, unavailability of sufficient capital inputs in the various activities 
involved in production and supply, a lack of human resource development, and 
deficient investment in transmission and distribution network which undermines the 
security of the system. l In addition to problems specific to the electricity sector, 
inappropriateness of pricing and financing policy, and misguided macro-economic 
policies are also noted. 
Thus, the problems in the electricity industry of Nigeria can be classed into four 
different categories. The first relates to the modes of production, and the deficient 
maintenance of generating, transmitting and distributing capacities. Of the different 
modes of production, generating technologies requiring fossil fuels and hydro-
facilities offer most potential for accelerated electricity development given the 
resource endowment of Nigeria. Paradoxically, thermal-generating facilities that 
requires more routine maintenance is preferred to hydro- facilities that offers more 
reliability. 
The present electricity generating plant mix in Nigeria is the result of the structural 
change that occurred in the 1960s to mitigate the system's exposure to climatic 
variability. The preference for more capital intensive means of production is due 
inappropriate decision making. The advances in economic theories particularly on 
public choice, principal-agent and regulation have reopened the ownership debate. 
The theoretical development crystallises the case of the imperfect government which 
I Deficient maintenance and lack of spare parts and inadequate working capital are among the 
shortcomings blamed for the fact that at least half ofNEPA's installed operations with a capacity of 
6000 MW have been routinely out of order for the best part of the decade. 
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maximises political goods such as patronage or simply the Income of politicians 
through bribes (Schleifer, 1998). 
The second problem area is the low level of generating capacity and structural 
imbalance in the system vis-a.-vis technology. This problem was instituted by the 
over-investment in generation at the expense of supply network that occurred in the 
1970s. (This is further discussed in Chapter 2.) Part of the problems that will 
necessarily have to be considered is how best to improve the security of supply by 
reinforcing the existing system. An issue that constraints the expansion of the system, 
which will directly increase security of supply, is the dearth of investment capital - a 
situation exacerbated by the poor macroeconomic performance of the Nigerian 
economy. In short, this dearth compounds the activity of NEP A on two counts. First, 
it is the lack of investment to expand system, and the second is the lack of resources 
to maintain existing system. 
The third problem area is the pervasive inefficiencies in electricity production and 
supply. Allocative inefficiencies are significant, arising from government policies that 
distort both factor (fuel subsidy and investment subvention) and product markets 
(inappropriate tariffs) (Anas and Lee, 1996). Given the precarious state of the 
Nigerian economy, energy resources, the main stay of the economy, should be used in 
the most efficient way. There is no doubt that NEPA's has been far from efficacious 
in the use of resources at its disposal (World Bank, 1993). 
Some of the other evidence as reported in the joint study be NEPA and BEl, include a 
tendency towards highly capital intensive production technique, reliant on imported 
inputs, and returns to capital are negative. Further, the revenue earned from electricity 
sales have made little contribution to capital accumulation and growth in the past 
NEPA's large deficits represents negative savings and the industry has absorbed 
significant resources generated by other sectors (NEPA-BEI, 1991). 
Inefficiencies in production are also considered substantial in electricity production. 
Lack of appropriate incentives to induce the pursuit of cost minimisation, the absence 
of technical know-how. and poor maintenance are among the factors listed as 
contributing to operational inefficiencies. In short, all the above factors and the 
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structural imbalances in the electricity system have exacerbated technical 
inefficiencies considerably. On the question of organisational structure, whether or 
not the economies of scale argument is sufficient for the centralisation of the various 
activities and vertical integration of the industry as a whole, as argued by Ogunkola, is 
also examined. 
The fourth problem is the pervasIve involvement of the government in the 
management ofNEPA and the politicisation of the industry. Government involvement 
increased drastically after 1960, and more so after 1970, a period that coincided with 
the leading economists' preference of government ownership in the face of market 
inequalities or imperfections, such as monopoly power or externalities (Shleifer, 
1998). Although prima facie government involvement in electricity production is 
regarded as antithetical to efficient operation, the ownership issue seems insufficient 
in explaining the disappointing performance that has come to characterise NEP A. 
This is buttressed by the fact that despite the change of the main objective ofNEPA in 
1992, from pure public good approach to commercialisation, the performance of 
NEP A has scarcely improved. 
While the problems that are impeding electricity development need to be tackled on a 
number of fronts, including efficiency in production, the impact of institutional and 
structural changes form an integral part of the reform program, and hence, one of the 
cornerstones of this study. It is imperative that the electricity authority takes 
cognisance of the disappointing performance of electricity production and provision if 
a reliable system is to be built. Although there have been several indications that the 
government is contemplating the privatisation of NEP A, a through analysis of the 
structure of the industry along with a comprehensive performance evaluation are 
prerequisite to a successful reform programme. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the aim 
and objective of this research. In order to become familiar with the various concepts. 
the terminology used throughout this study are defined in Section 1.3. The following 
section gives a brief account of the theoretical background of this thesis. This is 
developed further in Chapter 3 in which the both theoretical literature and empirical 
literature pertinent to this study are thoroughly reviewed. A simple exposition of the 
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methodology adopted for the performance assessment in this study is outlined in 
Section 1.5. Again, detailed exposition is given in Chapter 4. The purpose of this 
section is to put the operational and conceptual of efficiency into perspective 
(considering that both have developed largely independently of each other). Finally, 
the structure of thesis is given in Section 1.6. 
1.2 Research Objective 
The Nigerian electricity supply industry is an interesting sector to study. Not least 
because of the investment that has gone into the industry, and the reduction of losses 
that a positive analysis may elicit, but because a country that is incapable of 
generating sufficient electricity to meet economic activities can be expected to have 
problems with economic growth and development. In explaining the state of 
infrastructure and public sector enterprises in developing countries, and Nigeria in 
particular, the importance of the influence of ownership type has to be considered 
alongside the structure of the industry and the motivational factors that influence the 
behaviour of the various agents in the industry. 
There are two questions that form the core of this enquiry. First, is public ownership 
or the lack of competition the cause ofNEPA's disappointing performance? Second, 
which organisational structure will lead to more efficient outcome in the electricity 
industry of Nigeria? These questions are sine qua non to the new structure that will 
emerge with the reform programme that is required to improve the performance of 
NEP A. In the order of things, the issues revolving around the organisational and 
institutional aspects of NEP A come after the performance assessment. The latter is to 
ascertain whether the situation of NEP A is as dire as believed by the populace and the 
World Bank (1993). 
As mentioned above, there are a number of trajectories that policy-makers can pursue 
in attempting to correct the performance of the electricity industry. The main ones 
relate to operational aspect and the structure of the electricity industry in Nigeria. 
Attempt to improve the perfomlance of NEP A can be made by embarking on a 
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wholesale reform programme that tackles the institutional and organisational structure 
of the industry. Alternatively, an ad hoc approach that enables NEPA to improve 
operating performance by devising appropriate means of improving technical 
efficiencies where substantial technical inefficiencies of production are identified can 
be adopted. 
While the first alternative is likely to yield more long-term benefits, it will take a long 
time, considerable political will, effort and resources to yield significant results. The 
second alternative, which is directly aimed at improving operational efficiency by 
addressing operational issues, offers more immediate gains at modest costs if it can be 
shown that substantial technical inefficiencies are present in electricity production. 
This alternative has its limitation; namely, the size of the system for one is a major 
constraint. If the industry is not attractive, no matter how efficient NEP A is prepared 
for reform, the difficulty to attract necessary funds will remain a real problem. 
The contribution of this analysis to the reform programme that the Nigerian electricity 
industry is about to go through will be more meaningful if we systematically 
investigate issues pertaining to the technical efficiency that attends electricity 
production in Nigeria. This is then followed by an analysis of the different ownership 
types on performance, and how the industry can be reformed accordingly. Herein lie 
the objectives of this thesis, namely, the investigation of the factors that affect 
performance of public enterprises, the evaluation of the performance of NEP A, and 
the investigation of how the provision of electricity in Nigeria can be improved. 
1.3 Definitions 
Economic efficiency reqUIres, first, productive efficiency, so that, gIven state of 
technology, output is measured at the lowest possible cost. The second component is 
allocative efficiency, which means that resources are devoted to the production of 
goods and services desired by society. And, finally, distributional efficiency, that is, 
output is distributed in such a way that society would not wish, given income and 
market prices, to spend resources in any different way. 
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Allocative efficiency is said to exist when it would be impossible to make someone 
better off without making someone else worse off. In standard economic theory, 
productive efficiency is taken as given, and allocative efficiency, taken to mean 
Pareto efficiency, is equated with economic efficiency. In a two-person, two-good 
economy with two factors of production, the three types of efficiency are achieved 
when the following three conditions hold. First, productive efficiency demands that 
the marginal rate of transformation of the two factors of production should be equal. 
Second, the marginal rate of substitution of the two consumers must be equal. And, 
third, allocative efficiency requires the marginal rate of transformation and the 
marginal rate of substitution to be equal. Economic efficiency will exist in an 
economy in which perfect competition characterises every sector. 
It is generally shown that under certain conditions, economIC efficiency will be 
achieved when all markets are perfectly competitive. However, the assumption that is 
required to demonstrate this is highly limiting, and the analysis is static, ignoring the 
dynamics of the process of economic change. Given the existence of economies of 
scale, productive efficiency may involve concentrating with perfectly competitive 
model. 
There is a need to make the distinction between the two concepts of efficiency that are 
prevalent in the literature, namely, non-allocative inefficiency and technical 
efficiency. Leibenstein (1966) introduced the former in his famous X-efficiency 
theory, and the latter by Farrell (1957) in his attempt to measure efficiency. 
Leibenstein attempted to explain, theoretically, why firms might not be minimising 
their production cost. Farrell on the other hand, was concerned with the measuring 
efficiency. This explains his decomposition of efficiency into price and technical 
efficiency. 
The fundamental proposition of Leibenstein's X-efficiency theory is maximising/non-
maximising behaviour. The prevailing behaviour is informed by the level of pressure 
emanating from both the internal (for instance, monitoring) and external (competition) 
pressures on decision-makers. The lower the pressure, the higher the probability that 
non-maximising behaviour will prevail, and consequently, the lower the effort 
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exerted. Button and Weyman-Jones summarised the proposition of X-efficiency as 
follows: The looser the effort-responsibility consequences, the greater the degree of 
X-inefficiency (the excess of actual over minimum cost, or the difference between 
maximal effectiveness of utilisation and actual utilisation. (Button and Weyman-
Jones, 1992). 
The concern over inefficiency is not just a theoretical one, the drive to capture 
potential efficiency, productive and allocative, have contributed to the design of 
economic policies. For instance, increased efficiency is often cited as the rationale for 
the pursuit of privatisation and the adoption of various regulatory regimes that 
emphasise incentive mechanisms, particularly the shift away from cost-plus regulation 
to price-cap regulation. The consequence or the expectation of these is the pursuit of 
cost minimisation. Although it can be argued that private ownership has a better 
disposition to addressing the problems attributable to principal-agent relationships and 
the lack of pressure to induce maximising behaviour, information asymmetry, 
however, ensures that the issues are not just a problem exclusive to public ownership. 
Given that the conditions required for the economic efficiency to hold do not readily 
exist in developing countries, in this study we concentrate on productive efficiency. 
From the above definition, we can infer that this efficiency type implies the ability to 
avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage allows, or by using as little 
input as output production allows. Thus, the analysis of technical efficiency can have 
an output augmenting orientation or an input-conserving orientation. 
F or the purpose of this research, we adopt the formal definition of technical efficiency 
introduced by Koopmans (1951, p.60). A producer is technically efficient if an 
increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an increase 
in at least one input, and if a reduction in any input requires an increase in at least one 
other input or a reduction in at least one output. Thus a technically inefficient 
producer could produce the same outputs with less of at least one input, or could use 
the same inputs to produce more of at least one output. 
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1.4 Theoretical Background 
Although a detailed exposition of the theory surrounding efficiency is gIven In 
Chapter 3, a summary is given in this section for the purpose of completeness 
required for this introductory chapter. Second, this summary is necessary to put the 
research methodology into perspective. Pertinent questions to develop this section are 
What causes sub-optimal performance? What does the literature say? What can we 
infer from the literature about public provision of electricity services in Nigeria? 
As mentioned above, standard theory is premised on the existence and conditions of 
competitive markets, and as neither these conditions exists in Nigeria nor does the 
standard economic model directly apply to the analysis of NEP A, a broad framework 
capable of explaining the performance of firms at different levels is required. The 
justification for this approach is that the problem ofNEPA can be regarded as a multi-
dimensional, and certainly not exclusive to the electricity industry but to public 
enterprises in general. Bhattacharyya (1995) suggested that the problems that beset 
public enterprises should not be analysed in isolation from the other macroeconomic 
issues and objectives of a country. 
When we take the precepts of public choice theory into consideration, direct 
government involvement in electricity production, and the management of NEP A by 
civil servants, we find that the scope for sub-optimal behaviour is considerable given 
the number of conflicting objectives. In this respect, the persistence of electricity 
policy based on current practices can only make things worse. 
Although privatisation of the publicly utility may be appealing as a way of changing 
the organisation of the industry, ownership change alone may not be sufficient to 
guarantee an improvement in performance. Ownership change has implications for 
motivation as it alters the residual claims on the enterprise (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988). Thus, an understanding of motivation and incentives, be it under private or 
public ownership is perforce to the analysis of electricity provision in Nigeria. 
Liberalisation, which needs to be taken into consideration, as a way of increasing 
competition is discussed in the next chapter. (Sub-section 2.2.2 Policy Question.) 
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Following in the tradition set by Leibenstein, some writers have identified the 
following possible sources for failure of pressure to ensure maximal effort. These are 
difficulties in principal-agent relationships in hierarchies within an organisation.2 
Second, entrepreneurial structure may be critical, with the classic issue of the 
separation of ownership from control being regarded as most important source of 
inefficiency. Third, market structures aspects are also important in determining the 
extent to which constraints from the operating environment may affect decision-
makers. Overall, the degree of competition, the extent to which the enterprise is 
incorporated into a bureaucratic structure, and the prevailing regulatory regime may 
be sources of inefficiency. 
Leibenstein was not the only one that was not entirely convinced by the basic 
assumptions of the neo-classical theory. Using Franz's (1992) taxonomy, the various 
alternatives considered could be grouped under the following categories: These are 
the non-profit objective function, rent seeking, and X-inefficiency theory. These 
alternatives are outlined in chapter 3. 
So given that the electricity industry in Nigeria is purely owned and controlled by the 
state, what sort of performance analysis can we undertake? 
1.5 Performance Assessment 
Efficiency and productivity measurements form the cornerstone of the empirical 
analysis. Performance assessment is gaining in popularity particularly in the analysis 
of public enterprises. This trend is facilitated by development in both theoretical and 
empirical methods. 
Efficiency of a firm is of importance as it is influenced both by economic forces that 
act at the macro level and impose themselves on the individual firm as well as internal 
2 Leibenstein seemed to have been one of the first to explicitly identify principal-agent relationships as 
a source of inefficiency. Holmstrom (1979) raises an interesting point, he argues that the separation of 
ownership from control is vital in the principal-agent context. 
18 
factors that result from decisions and processes that take place within the matrix of an 
economic organisation. Kilby (1969) referred to this as internal or organisational 
inefficiency in which the condition for Pareto efficiency, that is, the equality of 
marginal rate of transformation and marginal rate of substitution is not met. Efforts on 
reform of the poor performance of public enterprises towards increasing the 
productivity level of firms need to be based on a sound understanding of efficiency 
and productivity. 
The focus of this analysis revolves around the twin concept of cause and effect, 
namely, motivation and performance. The purpose is to address the issues why 
economic agents may not achieve the maximum output from given inputs. Although 
Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) state that it is possible for inefficiency to be a 
failure of the observer to realise what is actually being maximised, the examination of 
such non-falsifiable hypothesis will be avoided. Especially as many studies have 
shown that inefficiency is too significant to be ignored. 
Measuring the performance of an enterprise like NEP A raises issues. What do we 
compare the performance with, if there are no other enterprises in the industry? Which 
objectives should form the basis of performance analysis? Perelman and Pestieau's 
(1988) methodology of performance approach, provide a useful insight. Basically, 
their approach states that the public interest should form the central hypothesis 
objective of performance. 
Of the many social and economic objectives of NEPA, such as universal access to 
electricity and its production at minimum cost, one objective that is not in conflict 
with the other objectives is productive efficiency. For this reason, and the fact that 
policy-makers are interested in this for its cost implications, the issue of ownership 
and performance will centre on productive efficiency. This point is further 
strengthened by the fact that the electricity industry in Nigeria being publicly owned, 
and controlled, does not permit a direct analysis of public-private ownership 
dichotomy. 
The efficiency and productivity evaluations are based on the non-parametric and 
parametric frontier approaches. The non-parametric approach is based on data 
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envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity indices. DEA is a bounding 
technique that estimates the best practice frontier from a given sample, and hence. 
relative efficiency estimation. Malmquist index, as well, is based on distance 
functions (Shephard, 1953) and used in calculating efficiency and productivity, from 
an inter-temporal perspective. These techniques enable us to estimate the level of 
NEPA's performance. By decomposing efficiency into its various components using 
Farrell's (1957) taxonomy, the sources of efficiency changes can be identified. The 
second approach, that is parametric technique, is based on the stochastic frontier 
analysis. This approach enables us to estimate capacity utilisation and economies of 
scale. From this, the impact of organisational structure and government policies on 
performance can be examined. 
These three techniques demarcate the empirical analysis conducted in this study. In 
the following section, we outline the methodological basis of performance 
assessment. This serves two purposes, it shows how efficiency is measured and it 
helps to put the empirical studies that we will be referring to into perspective. 
1.6 Methodology 
Although the literature on efficiency in production is becoming extensive, it is only 
since the 1980s that systematic effort has been devoted to developing different 
empirical techniques. The two most popular approaches to measuring efficiency are, 
as implied above, the econometric (Aigner and Chu, 1968; Aigner et ai, 1977) and the 
non-parametric programming (Charnes et al. 1978 and Banker et al. 1984). Various 
taxonomies and categorisation exist for the above techniques. For instance, a key 
difference between the two approaches relates to their assumption regarding 
maximising behaviour. 
The various techniques implicitly or explicitly draw on the measurement of efficiency 
concepts introduced by Farrell (1957). The measurement of an efficiency frontier is 
based on the distance of the firm under observation from the frontier. The 
econometric approach requires the postulation of a parametric frontier based on a 
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behavioural maximisation hypothesis. Profit, cost or production usually defines this 
frontier. 
Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) contended that in concentrating on the issue of 
measurement, many of the efficiency studies that use econometric approach failed to 
highlight the importance of Leibenstein's ideas on the causes of sub-optimal 
performance. They attributed this to limitation in empirical methodology. Attempts 
have since been made by various authors, such as Button and Weyman-Jones (1992), 
Leibenstein and Maital (1992), to see whether it is possible to relate efficiency 
measures to X-inefficiency. 
It is assumed that a production function reflects the existence of a functional 
relationship, j(x), describing the maximum output that can be obtained from a given 
input vector, x. The observed output of the typical firm falls short of the obtainable 
maximum output by an amount 8, which is equal to the firm's technical inefficiency. 
Thus can be represented as, 
lny = lnf(x) + & &~o 1.1 
Invoking duality, a parametric cost frontier for given input prices, W, or the parametric 
profit frontier for given input, w, and output prices, p, can be constructed. In either 
case, there is an implicit assumption of maximising behaviour. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that this behaviour holds, at least, for the efficient firms in the sample. 
Inefficiency is measured by the size of the error between observed cost or profit 
performance and the parameterised maximum given by the relationship: 
W'x = C(y,W) + & &2.0 1.2 
or 
PY-W'x = 1r(W,p) + & &~o 1.3 
In the case of parametric stochastic frontier measurement, not all of the deviation of 
observed from maximal performance is attributed to inefficiency. Instead, a composed 
error assumption is made that decomposes 8 into an asymmetrically distributed 
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inefficiency term, u, and a symmetrically distributed noise term, v. For different 
estimation methods, Fried et al., (1993) and Khailrajan and Shand (1999) outlined 
some. 
Empirical studies using these techniques do not give justification for the a priori 
assumption of optimising behaviour. It is almost universally true that researchers 
choose an industry-wide data set that is of intrinsic interest to their study. They then 
investigate the degree of measured inefficiency against an optimised frontier without 
setting any controls on the nature of the constraint pressures that Leibenstein had 
argued will determine the degree of inefficient behaviour. For example, in the 
composed-error cost frontier, measured inefficiency is: 
u= 8- V 1.4 
= (observed cost - parameterised frontier minimum cost) - noise. 
The parameterised frontier, however, may contain considerable unmeasured X-
inefficiency, depending on the degree to which constraints concerning pressures are 
operating. In this respect, the non-parametric programming approach may have 
additional attraction. 
The non-parametric programmIng approach, DEA in particular, proceeds by 
constructing the convex hull of the observed input-output observations for a given set 
of firms or organisations, under different assumptions about free disposability and 
returns to scale. For example, if X and Yare all observations on inputs and outputs in 
an industry-wide sample of n firms, and x and y are the corresponding observations of 
a typical firm, then the efficiency index, 0, assuming free disposability and variable 
returns to scale, is the solution to the linear program: 
choose {e, A} to min e such that 
ex ~A'X 
y~A'Y 
LAi = 1 i = 1, ... , n 
l.5 
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As such, the technique constructs a frontier based on the distance of the firm under 
observation compared to the best practice firms in the sample. There is no implicit 
assumption of maximising behaviour on the part of any of the firms, including the 
best-practice firms on the frontier. It is still the case, though, that many DEA or non-
parametric efficiency studies ignore the nature of the efficiency pressure likely to be 
operating on any given sample. It is generally regarded that the imposition of 
stochastic assumptions is necessary to give good properties. Further, these can be 
tested statistically. 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The thread of enquiry will progress as follows. First, I address the central question: Is 
NEP A 's problem an organisational problem or one of plurality of objectives? This is 
due to the fact that one is disinclined to believe that the problem is simply the result of 
lack of competition. Put different, the lack of competition may be necessary but 
insufficient condition for the disappointing performance of NEP A. Consideration will 
be given to the plethora of objectives in the theoretical chapter. Thus, if the argument 
that ownership and performance is accepted at face value, then a lot stands to be 
gained by considering the various theoretical perspectives including public 
enterprises, principal-agent theories, X-inefficiency hypothesis. Before the theoretical 
exposition, review of the Nigerian electricity industry is the subject of Chapter 2. 
In chapter 2, we outline the issues and problems of the electricity supply industry in 
Nigeria, with an examination of the development of electricity in Nigeria. Attention is 
paid to the organisational and institutional structure that emerged after the integrated 
public monopoly, NEPA, was established. Consideration is given to issues including 
whether the industry is influenced by economic or political consideration, the issues 
and problems faced by the industry, the performance of NEP A is also examined. The 
intention is that this chapter will set the background for the various analyses in this 
thesis. 
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A review of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, pertinent to this study is 
presented in Chapter 3. Taking into consideration the fact that the industry is owned 
and controlled by the government, the theoretical review starts with an inquiry into 
the rationale for public involvement. This inquiry is premised on public choice 
literature and the economics of public sector enterprises. Following the rationale for 
public involvement, the causes of inefficiency are examined. Modern economic 
theories based on property rights and principal-agent relationships are examined to 
elucidate behaviour of firms. 
The limitations of these theories due to the incongruous assumptions and unrealistic 
objectives of public enterprises in developing countries, necessitate the search for 
alternative analytical framework capable of explaining the disappointing performance 
of NEP A whilst taking into consideration the idiosyncratic nature of the Nigerian 
electricity industry. Thus, the theoretical section of the chapter concludes with X-
efficiency theory developed by Leibenstein. 
The second part of the chapter is the survey of empirical studies. A number of studies 
that have analysed the electricity industry in Nigeria are considered. The deficiency 
observed in the data regarding relevant analysis to inform the required reform 
programme is revealed. The dearth of studies on developing countries, and Nigeria in 
particular, extended the survey to include studies on the electricity industries of 
developed countries focusing on performance assessment. The justification for this is 
that it provides the methodological blueprint for the empirical analysis of this study. 
The operational aspect of efficiency, that is, the methodology of efficiency 
measurement used in this thesis is developed in Chapter 4. The various definitions of 
efficiency mentioned in Section 1.3 are given further treatment. In addition to the 
definition, how the various measurement techniques for efficiency and productivity 
are considered. 
Given the paucity of data and information and the diverse source of data on the 
activities of the Nigerian electricity industry, a section is designated to the discussion 
of the pertinent issues. Drawing from the existing literature. heuristics for the 
empirical analyses, vis-a.-vis input and output specification, for Chapters 5 and 6 are 
developed. 
Chapter 5 is the first of the empirical chapter that analyses performance of NEP A 
using non-parametric approach. The chapter starts with a summary of the theoretical 
issues. This is followed by a detailed exposition of the empirical models, namely data 
envelopment analysis and Malmquist productivity index. Two different approaches 
are adopted in investigating the performance of NEP A. The first entails a cross-
sectional study of the electricity industries of a sample of developing countries. The 
second approach examines the performance ofNEPA form a longitudinal perspective. 
The efficiency and productivity results obtained are discussed. This is followed by an 
investigation of the sources of inefficiency. Using a truncated Tobit regression model, 
the efficiency results obtained using non-parametric techniques are regressed against a 
number of explanatory variables to determine which factors influence efficiency of 
electricity production. 
The second empirical analysis is presented in Chapter 6. Contrary to the technique 
used in Chapter 5, parametric methodology is used. A description of the relatively 
new technique of stochastic frontier method is given. The parametric model is 
introduced. This is followed by a discussion of the results obtained and the hypotheses 
tested. The advantage of this technique is that it enables us to directly test some 
hypotheses regarding the production technology. Another feature of this technique is 
that it has the potential to generate more efficient estimates than the two-stage 
procedure (used in Chapter 4). This chapter culminates in a comparison of the one-
and two-stage efficiency estimation. 
Chapter 7 is the last of the substantive chapters and it focuses on finding the 
appropriate structure for the electricity industry in Nigeria. The premise is premised 
on the results of Chapters 5 and 6. Given the performance and the realisation that the 
existing structure of NEPA has to be change, we extend the model by Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988). This model examines impact of ownership on economic efficiency. 
By modifying the modeL we are able to infer about the expected outcomes, should the 
government choose to privatise NEP A. 
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The theoretical exposition is followed by a consideration of the structural alternatives. 
Another consideration that is implicit in the Vickers and Yarrow model is 
privatisation and regulation. Nomer et al. (1997) introduced this into the analysis in 
an extension of the model. Inferences about the two models and their usefulness to the 
reform programme required for improvement in the performance ofNEPA are made. 
Chapter 8 summaries the thesis and concludes, based on the empirical findings, with 
policy implications. Areas for further research are also outlined. 
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Chapter 2 The Electricity Industry In Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
The government's policy to nationalise the electricity industry in Nigeria was 
announced with the creation of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) in 1963. 
The accompanying structural reform of the industry was far reaching, bringing all the 
activities involved in electricity production and supply under the aegis of one 
organisation. The resultant industrial structure was defined by a vertically integrated 
monopolist, which contrasted sharply with the previous structure of several 
organisations. In brief, the new structure effectively saw the vertical integration of 
electricity production and supply, the horizontal integration of generation, and the 
establishment of a national structure for distribution and retail supply. 
The organisation of the electricity industry in Nigeria that emerged with the structural 
change was, essentially, an administrative structure. Given the general inclination for 
public ownership in industries where externalities and market imperfections were 
generally perceived (Schleifer, 1998), it is neither surprising nor uncommon at that 
time for the electricity industry to be seen as requiring tight control, particularly 
between generation and transmission.3 The current structure of the Nigerian electricity 
industry came into effect in 1972 when the ECN and Niger Dam Authority (NDA) 
were merged, following the Shaman Recommendation in 1971. 
After twenty-six years of operation, NEPA's activities have not been appraised fully 
from an analytical perspective. Now is the time to judge whether the approach 
pursued thus far has been a success or a failure. More so the case considering some 
controversies that have arisen, for example, whether the monopoly structure have not 
blunted conditions for internal efficiency, and the implications of public involvement 
in the production and supply of electricity. 
3 Similar argument explains the creation of the Central Electricity Generating Board in England and 
Wales. 
27 
The Nigerian electricity industry presents an interesting case study in industrial 
organisation and policy, not only because of the opportunity it creates in the 
assessment of public or private provision and implication of government involvement, 
but also because of the diverse issues that the analysis requires. These include the 
behaviour of the firm, the role of the state, regulatory issues, and economic planning 
in the context of a developing country. 
These issues arise in electricity industries because of the economic characteristics of 
the industry, which are discussed in Section 2.2 along with the main policy options for 
organising the industry. Then the institutional and structural framework that prevail in 
the Nigerian electricity industry today, established with the creation ofNEPA in 1972, 
are described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines performance of NEP A. The chapter 
then concludes (Section 2.5) with an overall assessment ofNEPA's operations and the 
factors that affect performance. 
To summarise, this chapter reviews the development of the electricity industry in 
Nigeria focusing on the structure of the industry, the evolution of NEP A and its 
performance. An exploration into the institutional and organisational framework of 
industry is essential to understanding the performance of NEPA. We can confidently 
speculate about the distortionary effects of the policies pursued regarding the industry 
by the government. For instance, on the demand side, there is no inclination on the 
part of the consumers to ration their consumption of electricity given the social 
dimensions of public provision. 
The economic adversities that ensued in the 1980s, however, meant that the original 
government undertaking of meeting NEP A's financial shortfall and factor and product 
subsidisation were compromised. The fact that the conflicting plethora of social and 
economic objectives has exacerbated the poor performance of NEPA is in no doubt, 
thus the pertinent issue is to ascertain the extent of it, and how it can be rectified. 
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2.2 Electricity Supply Industry and its Characteristics 
In this section, we outline the technical and economic characteristics of electricity. 
The purpose of this is to highlight the various activities involved in electricity 
industry and the complexities of the industry, particularly the scope for deviation from 
efficient practices. The overall aim is to show how the industry has evolved in Nigeria 
and to highlight the technological and organisational issues that have constrained the 
activities ofNEPA. 
2.2.1 Technical And Economic Characteristics 
Generally speaking, electricity is a peculiar good in the sense that it cannot be stored 
except for pump storage in hydroelectric facilities. Electricity supply is subject to 
unpredictable outages not to mention demand fluctuations with temporal, seasonal 
and stochastic components. Demand management is no less formidable. But as 
demand side issues are beyond the scope of this research, it will suffice to say that 
equilibrium between demand and supply must be maintained at all times to prevent 
the system from collapsing. This combination of circumstances poses considerable 
difficulties for the organisation of electricity supply. 
Strictly speaking, electricity production and supply is comprised of five vertically 
integrated activities or stages of production: supply of energy inputs, generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply. The main energy inputs are fossil fuels (coal, 
gas, oil), and renewable (water, nuclear fuels, solar and wind). These energy inputs all 
have their respective ecological and environmental implications. 
Given the technological know-how and the resource endowment development of the 
Nigerian economy, only a few of the various generating technologies are available to 
Nigeria. The mode of electricity production is, by and large, determined by the 
resource endowment of the country. Nigeria has substantial natural endowment of 
fossil fuels and hydro. The fact that fossil fuel is the mainstay of the Nigeria economy 
adds to the importance of such a performance assessment as undertaken in this thesis. 
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The electricity industry is capital intensive, and investment costs are, generally, sunk 
costs. The capital intensity that attends the different mode of electricity generation 
varies between fuel sources. Nuclear generating capacity has the highest fixed capital 
cost not to mention the unquantifiable cost of decommissioning and the longest lead-
time, but with the lowest running cost. Although nuclear plants do not emit pollutants 
the fallout of an accident are immense. The high cost of nuclear power installation 
precludes this mode of electricity generation from the Nigerian electricity industry. 
The argument put in favour of nuclear electricity is the low operating cost. The 
implication of this is that it is cheaper to run continuously, which is why they are 
classified as base load plants in mature, stable systems. The premise of this argument 
has been severely questioned. 
Gas, on the other hand, was regarded for a long time as a 'premium' fuel due to its 
low noxious content. This perception has changed somewhat with increasing concern 
of environmental issues and technological progress. In line with the global 
observation, there is an echo of 'dash for gas' as characterised by the contract signed 
in 1999 between Lagos State and Enron, Inc., to develop an 900 MW combined cycle 
gas turbine (CCGT) based power plant to serve the Lagos metropolis. Gas had one of 
the lowest fixed-variable cost ratios because of the higher premium attached to the 
relatively "clean" fuel status it was ascribed. For this reason, it was used, in matured 
systems, primarily to meet peak demand. The economics of gas gathering and 
transporting, however, has changed that. In terms of cost, coal as an energy source 
comes somewhere between gas and nuclear electricity. 
Towards the end of the 1980s preference for gas-fired thermal plants over coal-fired 
stations manifested itself in the development of the Delta and Egbin generating 
stations. The use of gas as a primary fuel and the construction of new CCGT plants 
are expected to continue given the discoveries of substantial gas deposits and the 
various advantages of CCGT technology, such as higher thermal efficiency, lower 
minimum efficiency scale, and shorter construction time. 
Juxtaposed against the resource endowment of a country the primary energy required 
for electricity generation is the issue of plant mix. This is an important consideration 
30 
when addressing the issue of security of supply. The determinants of the optimal mix 
include the variability of demand, relative energy costs, and capital cost. Changing 
technology, sunk costs and long lead times associated with the construction of 
stations, may cause actual mix to be different from ex post optimal outcome. 
The preponderance of public involvement, the lack of political stability and the 
general incoherence in economic policies basically mean that diversity in the plant 
mix of the Nigerian electricity industry is limited. This is further exacerbated by the 
industry's lack of financial resources and the non-existent technological development 
in Nigeria. Electricity production and supply are severely constrained by the capacity 
limits of electricity system. 
In the long run, theory and evidence indicate increasing returns at low levels of 
production and approximately constant returns otherwise. Prior to CCGT technology, 
small generating units were generally considered to be inefficient in exploiting scale 
economies. In fact 10skow and Schmalensee (1983) estimated minimum efficient 
scale for thermal units to be approximately 400 MW4 and 800 MW for multiple-unit 
operation (economies of scale). 
In addition to the constraint on generating capacities, the cost of transmitting and 
distributing electricity is non-trivial. The effectiveness of the generating activity is 
sine qua non on the supply network. If the latter is inadequate, a bottleneck that 
threatens the stability of the whole system arises. This brings us directly into the 
issues of transmission and distribution. The distinction between transmission and 
distribution is that the former entails the conveyance of high voltage while the latter, 
low voltage electricity. Like generation, transmission is a capital-intensive activity. It 
requires substantial investment in high, medium and low voltage networks and 
transformers for reducing the voltage of electricity suitable to consumption. Again, 
investment costs are sunk costs. 
Of the various activities involved in electricity production and supply, transmission is 
the only activity regarded as possessing true "national" monopoly characteristics. This 
4 1 kilowatt (kW) = 1000 watts, 1 megawatt (MW) = 1000 kW, 1 gigawatt (GW) = 1000 MW, 1 
terawatt (TW) = 1000 gigawatt. 
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monopoly characteristics derives from the fact that the duplication of network 
amounts to a misallocation of resources and, hence, inefficient. Thus, proper co-
ordination of the transmission system is required given the monopoly characteristics 
and the technical characteristics of electricity if a system-wide network optimisation 
is to be achieved (Turvey, 1968). 
The operation and planning of the industry is made more difficult by the fact that 
electricity cannot be identified by producer. Electricity produced is pooled in a grid. 
An electricity system can be regarded as consisting of a number of nodes, all of which 
are linked to some of the others by transmission lines. Each node may contain a 
generating capacity with a load (demand) to be met. Each generating capacity 
supplies its output into the grid at a node and distribution organisations withdraw at 
some other nodes. Power flow cannot be directed along particular paths in the 
transmission system. They are allocated by nature according to the laws of physics. 
As already mentioned above, close co-ordination, particularly between generation and 
transmission, is required to prevent outages (blackouts and low voltages). This is the 
main reason why the two activities are usually integrated. Large economies of scope 
between these two activities might imply joint natural monopoly cost conditions, even 
though generation by itself does not (Kaserman and Mayo, 1991). The alternative to 
this structure is one in which there is total vertical de-integration, that is, the various 
activities are distinct form one another. 
Apart from the costs of constructing and maintaining transmission capacity, another 
element of transmission cost is power loss. In the Nigerian electricity industry, 
technical and non-technical losses throughout the 1980s was between 30 and 40 
percent of gross electricity generated (World Bank, 1993), remains one of the main 
problems ofNEPA. The level of system losses remains stubbornly high. 
From an engineering perspective, and assuming there are no structural problems with 
the electricity system, the rate of power losses is a function of net power flows along 
transmission lines.5 Since net flow is what matters for system losses, power supplies 
5 The load is the sum of the loads of the consumers served by the network plus distribution losses. 
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at some nodes in the network will reduce, rather than increase, losses. Consider a two-
node system, North-South, with power flowing North to South. Assuming that net 
supply occurring at North and net demand at South. An incremental supply at North 
will increase losses, and a concomitant reduction in losses will ensue when 
incremental supply occurs at South. Similarly, but with opposite signs, incremental 
demand affects losses. The overall efficiency of the system, therefore, requires this 
locational effect should be taken into consideration when the tariff structure is being 
designed. The implication of this is that the producers and consumers at North may 
have to face lower prices than those at South do on efficiency grounds. 
In the short run, transmission capacity may constrain power flows and, hence, the 
overall efficiency, and capacity, of the power system. Continuing with the above 
example, let us suppose that the North generator is technically more efficient than the 
South generator, despite the aforementioned losses that may arise. If the transmission 
system is limited, part of the demand emanating from the South may have to be met 
by the inefficient South generator. The degree of competition South faces IS, 
therefore, limited.6 
Distribution organisations draw electricity at different nodes at high voltage and 
"step-down" the voltage for consumption. Like transmission, distribution can be 
classified as capital intensive, with significant sunk costs and "local" monopoly. 
Electricity supply is an activity traditionally carried out by distribution organisations 
(except for large consumers who are supplied directly from the transmission network). 
Although distribution has some "local" monopoly characteristics, supply does not 
exhibit similar characteristics - distribution of electricity to a retail customer must be 
via the local network. There is no economic reason why the distribution company 
should carry out retail supply. Effective competition in retail supply is made feasible 
by sophisticated metering technology. This is a costly business for the Nigerian 
electricity industry. 
This brief explanation shows the difficulty of managing an electricity system while it 
concomitantly highlights the scope for sub-optimal performance. 
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2.2.2 Policy Questions 
In this sub-section we examine the issues that were considered that accounts for the 
emergence of the current structure of electricity industry in Nigeria. In view of the 
economic and technical characteristics of the industry, especially the need for the very 
close co-ordination between generation and transmission, the attraction towards a 
policy of vertically integrated monopoly - hierarchy rather than competitive market -
is obvious. Operational matters are left to the public utility while decisions about 
generation and transmission investment are made at the ministerial/administrative 
level. 
Although the spirit in which the integrated structure was established is laudable, the 
apparent lack of co-ordination of the respective activities of NEP A and the optimistic 
demand expectation and subsequent over-investment in generating capacities and 
neglect of supply capacities by the Ministry have all construed to undermine NEPA's 
operations. Hence, NEP A's failure to attain a modicum of effectiveness in its 
dispensation has called the issue of ownership into question. 
The structure of the Nigerian electricity industry, as it exists today, does not allow for 
competition. Further, incentives to pursue cost minimisation are blunted by the 
administrative approach to management of NEP A. If the justification for the 
integration of the electricity is taken for granted, alternatives to the present structure 
do exist. First, an alternative structure to vertically integrated monopoly is to maintain 
integration of the main generation-transmission organisation, assuming there is 
significant economies of scope, while liberalising NEP A's generating activities, if 
only partially. A form of liberalisation is to require the integrated company to seek 
competitive bids from independent generators when expanding generation capacity, 
and to allow it to build own capacity if that is lower cost than rival bids. 
A second form of liberalisation goes further by allowing independent producers 
access to distribution companies or even to customers. Hence, it combines 
6 Although the system described above is simple, with a more complex network, the essence of the 
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liberalisation of generation with some liberalisation of wholesale or retail supply, so 
as to permit third party access to the integrated firm's transmission network. Access 
terms are crucial to the effectiveness of competition. 
Finally, and most radical, is the vertical separation between generation and 
transmission. It allows horizontal break-up, as well as liberalisation, in generation, 
and is potentially the most competitive policy, though much depends on practical 
implementation. Technology, however, does not allow the total cleavage of 
transmission from generation, due to co-ordination aspect mentioned above. There are 
also pressures for vertical linkages, by contract if not by co-ownership, but these 
could undermine a policy of vertical separation. 
The central policy question revolves around whether the gain from competition in 
generation outweighs the cost of losses in co-ordination between generation and 
transmission. The short run problem is to meet the given load at standard voltage and 
frequency at minimum total cost. This reduces to minimising the sum of fuel 
purchase, fuel transport and other operating costs - capacity is taken as given and all 
other costs can be supposed to depend on capacity. 
Various competitive schemes between generators, as we see in the UK, are possible: 
contract competition, is one example. Basically, under this scheme, generators 
compete for a long-term contract to supply electricity to the grid. This offers 
generators and grid company insurance against risks. It may, however, be unwieldy 
and inefficient ex post as, over time, generators contracted might be the most 
efficient. Further, the grid operator will have to be given sufficient authority over 
generators to deal with short run contingencies if the efficacy of the dispatch system is 
to be maintained. 
At the other extreme is spot market in electricity, and price competition on a half-
hourly basis as practised in the UK since the privatisation of the electricity industry. 
Although this limits the problem of long term contractual competition mentioned 
above. The sophistry of this scheme is several years away from the practices of 
argument does not change. 
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NEP A, and for that reason, it will not be given that much attention. This is covered in 
great detail in Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996). 
2.3 Electricity Industry in Nigeria 
In this section and the subsequent ones, we consider the institutional framework of the 
electricity industry in Nigeria from an evolutionary perspective, highlighting the 
factors that have affected the organisational structure of NEP A. The impact of this on 
performance is reviewed. 
2.3.1 Institutional Framework 
The prevailing institutional framework that governs the activities ofNEPA is encoded 
in the various decrees that established the ECN and NEP A. These various decrees 
comprise the Electricity Act. As mentioned above, the demarcation of the 
responsibilities of the activities of NEP A falls into two categories: operation and 
regulation. Regulation is a catchall expression that refers to the activities of the 
Ministry of Power and Steel. In the Electricity Act, the level of authority reposed in 
the Ministry is both substantial and far-reaching. This ranges from the use of the 
management of electricity capacity, to the prescription of the condition of electricity 
supply and charges made in respect thereof, and to the design and construction of 
generation, transmission and supply capacities. 
Before the 1950s, electricity production and supply in Nigeria was the responsibility 
of a number of proliferated organisations. Despite the proliferation, the electricity 
organisations were controlled, managed and financed either directly or indirectly by 
the government. These bodies included the Public Works Department (PWD),7 
Regional Authorities and Municipal Authorities such as Lagos Municipality. 
Generally, while the operations of the PWD cut across boundaries, those of the other 
two bodies were confined to their political and administrative jurisdiction. 
7 These were affiliates of the then Ministry of Works and Transport. 
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It is obvious that the structure that prevailed in the industry has not always been 
characterised by monopoly despite the public ownership aspect. There was 
duplication of resources which amounted to waste of resources, and the failure to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope in electricity production and supply as 
there were a number of isolated, stand alone generating plants which were not fully 
integrated into the electricity system. 
Given the limited funds for investment that characterised Nigeria in the 1950s and the 
need for a concerted effort to attain optimality in electricity provision, based on 
optimistic prediction for economic activities prior to independence, a central and 
national electricity institution was proposed. Ordinance Number 15 of 1950 was 
passed through to establish the national electricity body. The ECN was established 
and the authority to develop electricity was passed to it accordingly. ECN was set up 
as a monopoly with a commercial orientation. In spite of the monopolistic 
promulgation, the ordinance provided for situations under which private electricity 
organisations could be licensed to produce electricity. 
Under this arrangement, a number of organisations were approved. These are the 
Nigerian Electricity Supply Company (NESCO), the African Timber and Plywood 
Limited, and the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. Of these 
organisations, Shell and NESCO are the only ones that generate electricity and supply 
to the National Grid today. 
Although the Ministry was expected to monitor and control the activities of the 
electricity industry, this responsibility was generally neglected. The lack of a number 
of independent producers, in my mind, is due to the above reason, the administrative 
structure set up to oversee the activities of NEP A and the plethora of policies 
formulated for NEP A. 
The advent of the Kainji hydro facility saw the establishment of another institution, 
the Niger Dam Authority in 1957. Anticipation of increased economic activity and the 
concomitant electricity requirement saw the establishment of NEPA in 1972. NEPA 
was the result of an amalgamation of ECN and NDA. It inherited the brief and 
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responsibilities of the two respective organisations. The institutional arrangement of 
NEP A was with the view to attaining adequacy in electricity supply to consumers. 
Despite this philosophy, NEPA's experience has shown that the industry is 
persistently plagued by problems of poor quality of services and general crises of one 
form or the other. Given this situation, there is a great pressure emanating from the 
consumers and the multilateral institutions such as the Wodd Bank for NEP A to be 
reformed. 
NEPA faces a lot of problems as an electricity institution. For example, the rapid 
economic and population growth of the 1970s and 1980s compounded its planning, 
operating and maintenance activities. Inadequacy of technical and managerial 
personnel further exacerbated the problem. Other problem areas, also discussed 
below, include capacity utilisation, inappropriate pricing and organisational structure 
of the industry. 
Some of the conflicting objectives of NEP A that confound reliable electricity 
provision include the following. First, the utility is required to contribute to the 
economic development of the country by meeting current and future demand for 
electricity at the lowest cost consistent with appropriate reliability and quality. 
Second, NEPA is required to cover a portion of the system's expansion from retained 
earnings to maintain high credit ratings, thus raising additional capital from both 
domestic and foreign sources at reasonable costs. Third, NEP A is expected to meet 
the government's social objectives by making electricity available to all specific 
target groups or sub-regions that may not have the economic means to cover the full 
cost of power services to them, for example, rural electricity and electricity to low 
income earners. And, fourth, NEP A is required to maintain an efficient, co-ordinated 
and economic system of electricity supply for all parts of the federation (Ayodele, 
1989). It is clear that the inconsistent objectives leave NEPA with an opaque 
institutional framework. The question that begs is what is the rationale for opting for 
such centralised system? 
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2.3.1.1 Rationale and Evolution of the Nigerian Electricity Industry 
Post World War II, the trend of electricity industries was nationalisation. The 
rationale for this was the perception that electricity was a natural monopoly. The other 
point that gave the nationalisation objective further impetus was the shortcomings in 
the market for the universal delivery of electricity. This pattern, replicated in Nigeria, 
with the formation of ECN and NEP A, fitted with the post-independence ideology of 
self-sufficiency and sovereignty to meet plans of rapid industrialisation and economic 
development. Although an integrated electricity utility was established to address 
market failures as it was perceived that the extent to which the economy would 
succeed was contingent on the performance of the energy sector. In the attempt to 
correct market failures, however, new issues and problems were created. 
Doubts about the traditional approach to the organisation of the electricity industry 
started to emerge in the 1980s as evidence accumulated against NEPA's performance, 
and further acknowledged that not all the activities involved in the electricity industry 
were characterised by natural monopoly elements. Furthermore, public ownership has 
come to be seen as a stultifying the 'tremendous vitality' of the market enterprise and 
attenuates incentives to innovate and become efficient. Basically, the case for 
government provision is no longer as convincing as it advocates argued. Empirical 
observations of some government successes, the failure of competition and regulation 
in some industries and the apparent success of central planning motivated the case for 
public involvement. In addition, a general misunderstanding of the consequences of 
the political control of firms and the disregard of innovation added to the argument for 
public intervention (Shleifer, 1998). The World Bank, using its financial and 
information hegemony, is turning the policies of developing countries towards private 
ownership following poor economic performance of the 1980s. 
The need for reform of NEP A, and the electricity industry as a whole, is now 
generally acknowledged to be unassailable. The government, rather than effecting a 
wider-reaching reform of the industry that would address operational and institutional 
issues, opted for commercialisation of NEP A's activities in 1992. In theory, 
commercialisation is defined as being comprised of policies that are aligned to market 
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forces which will enable public enterprises to generate a fair proportion of the 
financial resources from their operations, including cost of operation and an 
acceptable return on capital investment. In reality, however, commercialisation 
remains an academic issue. Government involvement remains high, leaving managers 
with little autonomy to determine NEPA's behaviour and outcome. For only what can 
be described as political expediency, the authority favoured commercialisation as a 
process of improving the performance of the electricity industry (Danju and Weiss, 
1997) without changing the objectives underpinning NEP A. 
The outcome that culminated in the promulgation of commercialisation objective 
leaves no one better off. NEPA's management, perhaps for fear of losing monopoly 
status successfully managed to convince the government that the problems of NEP A 
emanated mainly from price rigidity and lack of finance. Decree Number 104 of 1992 
was promulgated to set up the Utilities Charges Commission to "evaluate ... trends in 
tariff charged, to providing information as would enable the government to determine 
permissible increase" (Part III(a): 1992 No 104 AI223). Despite these changes, 
tangible improvement in the performance of NEP A, as perceived by customers, 
remain to be seen. 
The ensuing unreliable performance of NEP A has made the advocates of reform and 
the W orId Bank, argue that Nigerian electricity industry is unwieldy and bogged 
down by bureaucracy which militates against efficient operations. Although these are 
valid points, whether they are sufficient for ownership change is a moot point. The 
working of the organisations vis-a-vis the principal-agent relationship may be the 
bane ofNEPA's disappointing performance. 
2.3.2 Structure of Industry 
The current structure of the industry, which was established in 1992 with the 
promulgation of commercialisation objective for NEP A, is depicted below in Figure 
2.1. The structure is not dissimilar to the pre-privatisation structure of the electricity 
industry in England and Wales. 
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The central element of restructuring (pre- and post-NEPA) was the integration into a 
vertically integrated monopoly. Currently under the auspices of NEP A, there are eight 
main generating stations, eight transmission regions, and eight distributions and sales 
zones. The distribution and sales zones were to function as quasi-companies with 
authority vested in the general manager of each zone. The intention behind the 
generating and distributing entities was for them to be self-funded and self-sufficient 
so as to reduce dependence on the central administration for routine operations. The 
long run view was that these zones would be the precursor for private companies if 
privatisation was considered necessary or desirable (NEPA, 1994). The reason cited 
for the inertia differs between the government and NEP A's management. The 
government ascribed the failure to realise the proposed this decentralised structure to 
lack of funding. For the management, on the other hand, the realisation of the 
structure had not been realised due to incessant government interference. 
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Figure 2.1 NEPA's Industrial Structure 
The structure of the electricity industry as depicted in Figure 2.1 is protected from 
competition as NEPA's status as an integrated monopoly is reinforced by statute as 
the only provider of electricity in Nigeria. It cam be argued that this unwieldy 
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structure and monopoly status contributes to sub-optimal outcome of NEP A. Of the 
15.8 GWh of total electricity produced in 1995, total system losses amounted to about 
6 GWh (NEPA, 1996). 
Total nominal installed capacity in 1995 was approximately 6000 MW. The national 
grid statistics are summarised below in Table 2.1. Before the advent of hydro 
generated electricity from the Kainji power station (the first large major generating 
plant), electricity supply in Nigeria was dominated by the coal and diesel thermal 
capacities. However, the hydro system ushered in by Kainji in the early 1970's started 
ceding preponderance to the thermal facilities in the late 1970s. This was due to the 
perennial water flow problem of the River Niger at Kainji, the escalating investment 
costs of establishing hydro-plants and their long gestation lag. 
Table 2.1 National Grid Statistics, 1972-1994 
Description 1972 1980 1994 
--.... -.. ~.~---.. 
330KV Transmission Line (km) 1262 3677 5000 
132KV Transmission Line (km) 1012 3815 6000 
330KV Substations 6 14 23 
132KV Substations 14 65 91 
Installed Capacity (MW) 717 1217 5876 
Maximum Demand (MW) 407 1181 2382 
Source: NEP A, Technical Report, 1996 
The political, as opposed to economic decision process that determined the production 
and financing plans of the Nigerian electricity industry manifested itself in disparate 
performance indicators. Between 1970 and 1995, installed capacity increased by 28 
percent per annum. In 1995, the load factor, the ratio that indicates the extent to which 
capacity is used in generating electricity, was below the 1975 level, in spite of various 
policies and attempts to increase utilisation of existing capacity. This on the surface 
indicates one of the key factors of NEP A's performance. Another measure that 
captures the intensity of use is utilisation jactor, which is the ratio of maximum 
demand to installed capacity. From the latter measure of intensity of use, we can infer 
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that restricted capacity availability is what accounts for the differences in the two 
measures of intensity of use. 
On the point of capacity utilisation, Uchendu (1992) captured the poor management 
of the industry in a study. In his study of outage costs of poor electricity services in 
Nigeria, he indicated that of the 5618 MW and 5876 MW of installed nominal 
capacity in 1991 and 1992, 2690 MW and 3500 MW, respectively, were available to 
meet maximum demand of2219 MW and 2362 MW. 
Table 2.2 Total Electricity Generated, Capacity and load Factor 
Electricity Generated Installed Capacity Load Factor Utilisation Factor 
(GWh) (MW) (%) (%) 
1960 406.9 176.37 26.3 51.6 
1965 508.6 328.54 17.7 58.8 
1970 1337.1 711 21.5 31.5 
1975 2869.0 684.2 47.9 77.0 
1980 5281.1 2170.7 27.8 55.0 
1985 10138.6 3651 31.7 46.9 
1990 13045.0 5958 25.0 37.3 
1995 15870.0 5962 30.4 41.1 
Source: NEPA, Technical Report, 1996 
What this implies is that caution need to be exercised when making inferences about 
NEPA's activities from nominal and operational capacities. The low level of available 
capacities and high system losses reflect the poor operations and maintenance of 
NEPA capacity. Total system losses in 1995, as reported in NEPA's Technical 
Report, stood at 38 percent. 8 System losses are comprised of technical and non-
technical losses. Some of the latter are inevitable given the nature of electricity 
production and the characteristics of electricity. Non-technical losses, on the other 
hand, are avoidable, as it is comprised of inadequate billing, non-metered 
consumption and pilferage.9 
8 This figure is consistent with World Bank's fmding of 41 percent system losses in 1992. 
9 The acceptable level of technical losses is between 7 and 10 percent of total electricity generated 
(World Bank, 1994). 
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In spite of substantial resources put into the rehabilitation programme the 
achievement is limited. A reason for this may be ascribed to the preponderance of 
thermal facilities in NEPA's generating capacity. When this point is combined with 
deficiencies in management and operations, it results in low capacity utilisation. This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that foreign firms install the generating plants 
which increases dependency on foreign firms for spare parts and maintenance. A case 
in point is the routine and urgent maintenance of Kainji hydro station built by Area 
Brown and Bovieri (ABB), an English Power Company. On commissioning of the 
Kainji plant in 1968, the Nigerian authority signed a maintenance contract with ABB 
that is not only uncompetitive but prevents any other company from carrying out the 
maintenance. This resulted in 100 MW of the total 760 MW (installed capacity) being 
out of commission. 
A similar point was raised by the Onosode Panel set up in 1995 to investigate NEPA's 
disappointing performance. An excerpt of the report of the panel highlighting the 
above mentioned problem follows: 
"Spare parts are necessary to keep the plants runmng and outages for 
maintenance reduced. Ordering of new parts that have to be imported is a time-
consuming procedure. Most of the technology imported are sensitive to 
maintenance and easily run down by lack of maintenance. [As] neither NEP A 
nor any industry in this country manufactures a bolt as spare part for these 
machines or equipment. Every item is got from the world market at exorbitant 
prices." (NEPA, 1996) 
Apart from the delay in getting parts and supplies which stems from exceSSIve 
bureaucratic red tape (World Bank, 1983), the weaknesses of the industry is further 
exacerbated by macroeconomic, particularly, exchange rate fluctuations. This affects 
efficiency and leads to poor technical and financial management. 
The structure and operations of the electricity industry in Nigeria can shed some light 
on the performance of NEPA. For this purpose, the activities of NEPA are divided 
into three distinct time periods: 1950-1971, 1972-1985, and 1986 to present -
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performance seemingly rose and ebbed with the economic fortunes of the country. 
The first period was characterised by a state of flux in the electricity industry and it 
corresponds to the period of significant changes in the polity of Nigeria 
(independence in 1960 and the Civil War, 1967-1970). The second period is 
characterised by significant expansion of the system. This period is characterised by 
the general buoyancy associated with the oil boom of the 1970s. The third period was 
characterised by political instability and economic decline. This period saw a slow-
down of economic activity with far-reaching consequences for the electricity industry. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the industry was dominated by a proliferation of electricity 
utilities with a variety of ownership types (private, municipal and public). After the 
various utilities were nationalised and amalgamated into the ECN, the Niger Dam 
Authority was formed. The former oversaw thermal facilities and the latter hydro. 
These two were merged in 1972 to form NEP A. This structural change coincided with 
the reconstruction of the economy following the Civil War (1967-1970). The rapid 
expansion of the industry that occurred at that time was justified on what we can only 
describe as over-optimistic economic planning. See Figure 2.2 below. This optimism 
came with crude oil coming on stream, and the economic boom of the early 1970s that 
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Figure 2.2 Installed Capacity and Maximum Demand, 1972 - 1995 
the country enjoyed as an oil exporting country. The Second National Development 
Plan (1971-75) predicted an annual economic growth rate of 7 percent. This level of 
45 
economic growth was based on an efficient and well-structured electricity system, this 
made the government commit public funds to the construction of new plants. Actual 
per capita GDP grew at an annual average rate of about 9 percent, above the predicted 
rate of 7 percent, throughout the 1970s, stimulated the consumption of electricity. 
Maximum demand grew at an annual average rate of 20.67 percent during the period. 
Table 3 presents NEPA's generating capacity as of 1995. 
Table 2.3 NEP A's Generating Capacity by Type 
Plant Type Installed capacity (MW) Year installed 
Kainji Hydro 760 1968, 76, 78 
Shiroro Hydro 600 1989,90 
Jebba Hydro 578.4 1983,84 
Egbin Gas Turbine 1320 1986,87 
Sapele Steam & Gas Turbine 748 1978,81 
Afam Gas Turbine 711.2 1963-82 
Ijora (Stand-by) Steam 65 1966,78 
Delta Gas Turbine 912 1966, 75, 78, 90. 
Total 5966.6 
Source: NEPA Technical Report for 1996 - National Control Centre. 
Major additions to the system generating capacities occurred periodically between 
1975 and 1978, a further 200MW was added to Kainji which was the main generating 
station, 100MW and 120MW to the thermal stations at Afam and Delta, respectively. 
The Sapele thermal station was completed and commissioned in 1978 added an 
additional 360MW to the generating capacities. By the end of 1985, NEPA's 
generating capacity stood at 3460MW. Overall, installed capacity increased at an 
annual rate of 41.78 percent. Table 2.3 summarises NEPA's generating capacity 
The third period was characterised by economic decline following the ramifications of 
the collapse of oil prices. The profligacy of the various government policies, such as 
the expansion of capacities, rural electrification and subsidisation of factor inputs and 
outputs became apparent. Consequently, the expansion of capacity came to a grinding 
halt. Recovered revenue barely covered costs of operation, which left little funds for 
maintenance. NEPA's performance began to slide to what it has become today. Figure 
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2.3 shows how system losses have increased steadily relative to total electricity 
consumed over the period, 1972 - 1993. 
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Figure 2.3 Electricity Production, Consumption and Losses, 1972 - 1995 
These facts would suggest that internal and external factors have contributed to the 
performance of the industry. 
Problems with installation, fuel supply and maintenance constrained the full 
realisation of the system capacity. By 1992, the available capacity had been increased 
to 3015 MW (33 percent reserve margin) and peak load stood at 2260 MW. Although 
the fact remains that almost half of NEP A's 61 generating plants were out of service 
and some have been for years with the same fate befalling transmitting and 
distributing capacities. 
2.4 Performance of NEP A 
Electricity generation in Nigeria is characterised by existence of excess capacity but 
inadequate and poor supply. It has been observed that peak demand is often about 
one-third of installed capacity because of the non-availability of spare parts and poor 
maintenance service. These have invariably been responsible for unannounced load 
47 
shedding, prolonged and intermittent outages with which most consumers of 
electricity in Nigeria have had to contend with over the years. 
The unreliable electricity supply caused Nigeria to import N3.3 billion worth of 
generating sets in 1996 alone. To mitigate unreliable public provision of electricity 
services, more than 90 percent of commercial establishments rely on auto-generating 
facilities which increases total cost of industrial production by as much as 25 percent 
(World Bank, 1993; Lee and Anas, 1996). 
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Figure 2.4 NEPA's Reserve Margin and Load Factor 
Additionally, the economy has lost and continues to lose valuable foreign exchange 
due to importation of private generating sets. A survey carried out by the Business 
Concord in 1983 showed that in 1981 and 1983, NI00m and N134m, respectively, 
went towards purchase of low-frequency generators. The same pattern was observed 
in the industrial sector. In 1981 , N750m went on expenditure of generating sets and 
maintenance. Table 2.4 shows the value of the, losses NEPA incurred. 
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Table 2.4 Electricity Outage and Losses 
Year Reported Outages Total Duration of System Losses as % Value of System 
outages (hours) of generation Losses (N Million) 
1970 17.72 7.92 
1975 19.40 19.82 
1980 34.13 130.64 
1990 38.51 288.91 
1991 21948 47045.25 41.47 1972.69 
1992 23332 55277.78 41.36 2136.14 
1993* 13079 57194.74 31.21 2187.32 
*First six months of 1993 
Source: Ogunkola (1996) - Annual Report and Statement of Accountsfor Various Years. 
The 1993 W orId BankiESMAP report, based on the study of BEl and London 
Economics study recommended that no additional generation should be installed 
through the year 2000, and that existing capacities should be rehabilitated. 
Meanwhile, the industry is clamouring for more investment capital from the Federal 
government to build more power stations as a means of solving the present impasse in 
the industry. 
What is generally acknowledged is that despite the significant investment in the 
electricity industry in Nigeria, NEP A has not been able to meet the basic requirement 
of the economy. The exact cost of poor electricity services may be difficult to 
measure, they are not insignificant. World Bank (1993) estimated the annual cost to 
the Nigerian economy from poor services to be in the region of US$ 905 million in 
1992. Putting this in perspective, NEPA's annual revenue for the same year was US$ 
250 million. Thus, the overall cost for unreliable supply is more than 3 times what 
consumers are paying for electricity services. 
Lee and Anas (1996) stated that Nigeria is representative of those developing 
countries where public sector is inefficient and private provision and private provision 
of electricity compensates for public sector inefficiency. They further stated that auto-
generation, among Nigeria manufacturers, is ubiquitous even though the government 
did not encourage the use of generators in order to protect NEPA's monopoly. In a 
sample of Nigerian manufacturing firms with auto-generating capacities collected in 
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1988, they found 89 percent of the firms to under-utilise their production plants, and 
also their electricity generating capacities. This they ascribed to the recessionary 
conditions that prevailed in the country in the 1980s. 
Overall, there are chronic power shortages resulting in unannounced black outs of 
varying duration, low voltage, low frequency and high incidence of generating and 
transmitting capacity breakdowns. In the ESMAP report alluded to above, the World 
Bank identified the root causes of poor performance of the electricity industry in 
Nigeria to lack of autonomy on the part of the NEP A's management and excessive 
government control, particularly in the areas of procurement, finance, tariffs and 
personnel policies. The consequence of government involvement has been unbalanced 
investment skewed towards generation and inadequate expenditure on maintenance. 
The state of electricity supply in Nigeria is succinctly captured in the World Bank's 
Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme report (1993). As a consequence 
of the abundant energy resources in the country and NEPA's nominal capacity of just 
under 6000 MW, one would expect reliable supply of electricity. This, however, is not 
the case. The industry is hampered by distortionary and inappropriate policies. In the 
1970s and 1980s substantial investment (estimated at 1990 prices at US$ 3 billion) 
went into developing hydro, gas turbines and steam turbines which bolstered NEPA's 
nominal margin of generating capacity to 170 percent in 1990. In spite of the 
significant investment, electricity supply is characterised by poor performance and 
unreliable supply. This is exerting a high price on the economy. 
Over-investment in generating capacities based on optimistic forecasting and 
economic downturns are part of the problem. The main reasons, however, are the 
inappropriate planning and the policy regime of putting the government at the centre 
of the industry's operation. As a result of these, the bulk of the investment mentioned 
above went into the generation side of the industry to the detriment of transmission 
and distribution as bureaucrats engaged in "empire building."lo 
IO This is in line with the seminal work of Niskanen (1971) on bureaucracy. 
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The root causes of the dismal performance as listed by the World Bank directed the 
policy towards commercialisation, management contracts to increase incentives to the 
management, and tariff reviews. From the consumers' perspective, however, 
electricity provision and supply have not improved significantly. This leads one 
naturally to examine other factors that may account for the persistent level of poor 
performance in the operations ofNEPA. 
2.5 Assessment 
The 1972 restructuring of Nigerian electricity industry can be compared to the 
structure of the electricity industry in England and Wales (pre-privatisation) in terms 
of integrating the various activities involved in the production and supply of 
electricity. The economic characteristics of electricity industry created strong forces 
for vertical integration, particularly between generation and transmission. Instead of 
the co-ordinated planning required to exploit economies of scope to provide a well 
balance system, there was a preponderance of investment in generation. The 
consequence of which was to shift the balance away from hydro-electricity. 
If we consider the problem confronting NEP A from capacity constraint, it is difficult 
to understand why the government is reluctant to liberalise the industry as a way of 
attracting necessary capital and managerial skills to improve performance. 
Furthermore, such policies will neither compromise nor jeopardise the economies of 
scope argument believed to exist between generation and transmission. 
Implied thus far, major criticisms levelled against NEPA are that it has a bad track 
record of controlling capital investment cost, devotes little resources to maintenance, 
and it builds too much generating capacity while neglecting transmission and 
distribution. Thus, in terms of short run operating efficiency, NEP A's performance 
vis-a.-vis factor inputs will have to be considered. 
How can short-run operating efficiency be achieved? A major problem is that there 
are no incentives to improve short run efficiency, which makes it difficult to minimise 
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system-wide costs. Concentrated market structure In generation (and In other 
activities) is not conducive to cost minimisation. Without regulatory scrutiny, 
strategic incentives for under-declaration of available capacity to extract more 
expenditure to engage in empire building may be possible. 
The crisis in the industry that manifests itself in poor services goes back to the 
beginning of the 1970s when NEP A was established. The structure that emerged did 
not incorporate incentives to realise any efficiency in production. This was 
compounded by the macroeconomic crises of the 1980s that ushered in the 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes, hence, the rationing of public expenditure. 
The institutional and structural reforms that we would expect, given the issues and 
problems that have engulfed the industry, are still not forthcoming. 
Other factors apart from the organisation and productive efficiency affect the 
performance of NEP A. In addition to the above-mentioned deficiencies associated 
with production and delivery of electricity, there is also a pricing failure on the part of 
NEP A. The tariff structure is inappropriate and offers quantity discounts, a form of 
price discrimination. Firms that purchase less of publicly generated electricity are 
charged higher marginal prices than those that consume more publicly produced 
electricity. This tariff structure which would be efficient if public supplies were 
reliable, favours more intensive consumption by the larger users and less by the 
smaller ones. This tariff structure aggravated the poor performance of NEP A (Lee and 
Anas, 1996). 
It can be argued that such pncing policy does stimulate over-consumption of 
electricity. In 1995 for instance, 50.26 percent of the electricity sales from NEPA was 
accounted for by the domestic sector, 26.80 percent by the commercial sector and 
22.94 percent by the industrial sector. Their proportions of sales revenue were 32.33, 
33.85, and 33.82 percent, respectively. Of the total private sector revenue outstanding 
(N5869.4 7 million) in 1995, 64.19 percent was owed by the residential sector, 24.59 
percent by the commercial sector, and 11.22 percent by the industrial sector. 11 Thus, 
llThese data are complied from NEPA's Annual Report and Accounts for various years. 
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the sector that can least afford to pay for electricity has the highest consumption level. 
This can be directly accounted for by the policies of the government. 12 
As such, the continuation of the subsidisation policy (both in the factor and product 
markets) needs to be reviewed. The argument encountered in the literature is that 
(electricity) tariffs should convey the true scarcity of electricity resources to 
consumer. As this might lead to losses, Adeyeye (1991) suggested that a regular tariff 
adjustment based on an agreed formula is necessary. 
Undoubtedly, poor pricing policy aggravated poor performance. The World Bank 
argued that an increase in the level of tariff structure would reduce demand, thus 
relieving the degree of congestion on the transmission network and demand, thereby 
reducing the frequency of interruptions. In 1988 the average tariff charged by NEP A 
was 0.07 Naira per kWh which by mid-1989 was raised to 0.32 Naira per kWh and 
was reported to have been in the position to recover its full operating costs. It was 
estimated that NEP A only recovered 21.9 percent of operating cost in 1989 (World 
Bank, 1993). 
Ucendu (1996) and Anas and Lee (1996) in their respective studies investigated the 
welfare gains by analysing the impact of block tariff pricing mechanism that will 
accrue if more appropriate pricing strategy is used to alleviate the deficiencies in the 
electricity supply to the manufacturing sector. These studies corroborate the findings 
of Kilby (1969) who found that fluctuations in electricity output since 1962 led to 
losses in production, leading to idled factor inputs, damaged capital goods and 
resource misallocation to circumvent electricity shortages, thus, adversely affecting 
social welfare. 
12 One of the cornerstone policies adopted in the electricity industry after Nigeria gained her 
independence in 1960 was universal access to electricity. This was seen as a development and social 
policy objective and as such subsidisation policy, both in the factor and product markets were put in 
place. The government, for political expediency, only subsequently cited the income redistribution 
argument. 
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2.5.1 Exploration of Performance Improvement 
This section included showing the scope of optimal performance, and reference point 
of inefficiency. 
Given the current state of the industry and the general performance of NEP A in 
particular, the argument that NEPA should be privati sed commands general assent. 
Even if only because there is no good reason why public funds should continue to be 
poured into what is regarded a relatively inefficient utility (World Bank, 1994). 
Although privatisation may increase efficiency and raise revenue, the emergent 
industry structure of privatisation in a highly distorted market does not bode well. It 
may just ensure the effective transfer of a public monopoly to a private monopoly 
with a higher scope for distribution inefficiency. A second, and cogent, argument for 
reform can be attributed to poor performance. Before reform any reform is put in 
place, it is important to ascertain the sources and causes of poor performance. 
In 1992, a commission, comprised of World Bank mission, NEPA's management and 
ministers, was set up to consider the options to correct the state of NEP A affairs. The 
commission recommended commercialisation of NEP A, liberalisation of electricity 
industry, re-organisation of NEPA activities, the participation of private sector 
wholesale and retail activities, and the introduction of management contracts with 
NEPA's senior staff. Further, the commission also recommended greater 
decentralisation and the re-orientation of goals towards cost and profit objectives to 
infuse further incentives for efficient practices. In spite of all these recommendation 
and policy adoption, the practices ofNEPA are still poor. The question is what causes 
this inertia? 
Options for improving the level of efficiency and overall performance of electricity 
utilities are being considered in developing countries. Some of the issues under 
consideration include the divestiture of public ownership of electric utilities as a way 
of reducing political interference while concomitantly exposing the utilities to 
competitive pressures of the market. Another aspect that is being considered is the 
encouragement of private sector participation through build own and operate and 
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build own operate and transfer projects, BOO and BOOT, respectively.13 Here, 
independent power producers provide electricity to a central grid which are then 
transmitted and distributed by the national utilities. 
Although public ownership might provide pnma facie explanation for some 
inefficiency, the problems may go beyond ownership issues as implied by some 
empirical studies. Thus, one cannot take the effect of privatisation for granted. The 
issue might then become one of finding ways of improving performance, without 
necessarily pinning everything on the back of ownership change. For instance, the 
recent liberalisation of the telecommunication industry (facilitated by technological 
progress) has seen marked improvement in the service provided by Nigerian 
Telecommunications, NITEL. This shows that structural and institutional changes can 
affect performance. The improvement in the telecommunication industry is attributed 
to competition. 
The arguments that surround the debate of restructuring and privatisation of NEP A 
have intensified. The salient arguments in the debate include the questionable 
effectiveness and efficiency of statutory monopoly to generation and supply, and the 
severe consequence of lack of incentives. The monopoly in generation assumption has 
to be reviewed given that concentrated industry structure appears likely to be 
seriously inefficient. The high level of vertical integration leads to (potential) 
allocative inefficiency, due to scope for large mark-up on electricity tariff as a result 
of market power, and major distortions of productive efficiency. A situation further 
exacerbated by the inability to pass through cost may affect factor price ratio. 
A commensurate electricity tariff structure with escalation clauses indexed to cost of 
fuel, inflation, exchange rate and other economic factors may necessarily have to be 
approved to enable the authority to cover operational costs and execute some vital 
13 The lack of widespread use of BOO and BOOT or other similar arrangement in developing countries 
leads one to ask the question "why are they few and far between?". For now, it might suffice to 
speculate that this might be due to the absence of institutional framework for the operation of private 
utilities, and inadequate provision to safeguard their interests. If one looks at regulation of the ESls in 
developing countries, one observes that they are carried out by ministries through government fiat, 
tariffs are set by government without fully taking costs of operation into account, incentives for 
efficiency in operations and investment are also non-existent. It is not surprising that the private sector 
is circumspect about getting involved in the industry. 
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capital projects. 
It is the VIew of the W orId Bank that the government should set broad policy 
guidelines for the electricity power sector and grant the authority operational 
autonomy to function as a commercialised enterprise. As direct government 
involvement obfuscates demarcation of managerial responsibilities while usurping 
management autonomy, the restructuring of the electricity industry in Nigeria should 
incorporate two main axes: institutional reform and structural changes. At present, the 
industry is dominated by an integrated monopoly whose management have little 
incentive to pursue cost minimising behaviour or other objectives of NEPA as they 
have little motivation to do so. 
The types of institutional reform that is required to address the shortcomings of NEP A 
are nothing new. These points, outlined in the report of the Onosode Panel and the 
W orId BanklESMAP report, were summarised above. It will suffice to say that to 
successfully reform the electricity industry in Nigeria, attention has to be paid to the 
structure of the industry with respect to competition. Both neo-classical theory of the 
firm and Leibenstein's X-efficiency theory reinforce this point that inefficiency is 
expected to persist in the absence of competitive pressures. In the situation where 
there are severe distortions in the factor and product market, regulation can address 
some of the shortcomings and agency problems that plague the economic activities of 
public enterprises. 
The commercialisation of NEP A, seen as a way of re-aligning the organisation along 
market principles, is a step in the right direction but insufficient to address the lack of 
motivation in spite of management contracts. The latter alone is insufficient to 
guarantee more efficient performance as the management only has to worry about 
variable cost with the government coming up with the difference. 
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2.5.2 Financing and Tariff Constraints 
With the year of commissioning of the existing power plants ranging from 1965-1990 
it is necessary to carry out repairs and rehabilitation of generating units and phase out 
those beyond economic repairs by injection of new power plants. The World Bank 
stipulates that for effective plant maintenance at least 3% of the initial installation cost 
should be allocated yearly for maintenance. When this is applied to Egbin with 
installation cost of US$700m it shows that at least US$21m should have been spent 
on maintenance per annum over the number of years it has been in service. This has 
not been possible because of limitation of funds. 
Funding is a core problem in the development of the electricity industry in Nigeria. 
Efficient operation of a power system is capital intensive. The ability of the Authority 
to procure adequate quantities of spare parts and equipment as well as expert 
manpower services for the maintenance, overhaul and rehabilitation of the existing 
power supply system has been seriously eroded by lack of funds. The high exchange 
rate, the low revenue collected from sale of electricity as a result of inadequate tariff 
structure, escalating costs and the long delays to obtain foreign exchange for off-shore 
procurements constitute major constraints to efficient operation. For example, the cost 
of procurement of one 30MV A 132/33KV Power Transformer in January 1992 was 
about N4.5M whereas it is now about Nl2M at the official rate of exchange. This 
imposes a restriction on the number of such power transformers that could be 
procured because of financial limitations. 
The Technical Committee for Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) carried 
out a far-reaching exercise on NEPA in 1995. Adequate funding and autonomy to 
perform as a commercialised entity was identified as crucial for efficient operation of 
the NEP A power supply system. It was concluded that the Authority could barely 
meet operating expenses with the tariff structure in force and, hence, had to depend on 
Government for funding of capital projects to reinforce and modernise the power 
system. As a step forward, a Performance Agreement was signed between NEP A and 
the Federal Government on 1992 to achieve targeted levels of financial and operating 
performance. This has not shown any improvement due to the unwieldy structure of 
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the organisation. 
The financial inputs and progresslve increment In electricity rate to facilitate 
achievement of the set targets have not met expectation. However, it is important to 
note that appreciable improvement in the reliability and quality of power supply has 
been recorded. The incidence of total system collapse and major grid faults, which 
result in lengthy blackouts, still persists. 
2.6 Summary 
The electricity industry in Nigeria is characterised by excessive government control 
and involvement, inefficiencies in operation, imbalance between demand and supply, 
insufficient capital resources to expand the system required to provide reliable and 
cost effective services, and inappropriate pricing policy leading to erosion of financial 
performance. The cumulative effect of these issues and problems is to increase the 
dependence of public utilities on government for financial support through loans, 
fiscal breaks and subsidised factor inputs. 
Given the poor performance of Nigerian electricity industry, the premise of continued 
public involvement is now being called into question. The disappointing performance 
of NEP A has required ad hoc expenditure which has amounted to a drain of much 
needed scarce resources. Thus, reallocation of resources is necessary if economic 
growth is to be resumed, and the best way of achieving this is by wholesale 
restructuring of the electricity industry and NEP A. Given the constraining capacity in 
transmission and distribution in the Nigerian electricity industry, substantial 
investment is required if suppressed and potential demands are to be met. 14 
This situation is further exacerbated by economlC cnses of the 1980s and the 
subsequent stabilisation and adjustment programmes adopted with the aim of 
restoring fiscal balance, which among other things, require drastic reduction in public 
14 There is a distinction between suppressed and potential demand. Although customers are connected 
to the electricity network, their consumption is suppressed by constant interruption due to rationing and 
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investment. This begs the question of how electricity provision can be improved. The 
answer lies in the promotion of operational efficiency, better capacity utilisation 
including rehabilitation of existing capacities, and the reform of institutions and the 
structure of the industry. 
Overall, although the public provision was instituted to correct market failures, it can 
be argued that the consequences of government intervention, that is government 
failure, seem to have eclipsed the market failures that they were meant to correct. The 
position of the government with respect to this utility is to treat it as a state organ -
used for the dispensation of social and political goals. The inability to provide the 
subsidies to cover the short operational deficit and inability to secure private sector 
participation for much needed capital, have further worsened NEP A's performance. In 
short, market failures that direct government intervention initially set out to solve has 
be replaced by government. 
power cuts. Given the size of the country and the number of pe?ple with connection, there is significant 
scope for output expansion to meet both suppressed and potentIal demand. 
59 
Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to develop the concept of efficiency of the introductory chapter further, we 
review the literature on efficiency. This serves two purposes. In addition to 
illuminating the relationship between ownership types and performance, and the 
factors that determine the latter, this chapter serves to put the subsequent study of the 
Nigerian electricity industry into perspective. Consequently, the chapter is mainly in 
two main parts. A review of the theoretical aspect of efficiency vis-a-vis public 
enterprises, and other pertinent theories of firm behaviour, such as X-efficiency 
hypothesis, agency theory and property rights theory. The second part is essentially a 
review of the empirical studies pertinent to the question of performance in general, 
and the Nigerian electricity industry in particular. 
In short, this multifaceted approach is necessary given the diversity of issues involved 
in efficiency and performance of public enterprises in developing countries, and the 
paucity of empirical studies vis-a-vis electricity industries in developing countries, the 
second part of this is necessarily multifaceted. 
As implied above, the general consensus among the customers of NEP A and the 
W orId Bank is that the disappointing performance associated with electricity 
production and supply is a direct consequence of public involvement. As such, we 
consider the theoretical reasons for public involvement under the section of public 
sector enterprises and public choice. 
Consideration is gIven to the two different components of efficiency, namely 
allocative and non-allocative efficiency types. These efficiency types are considered 
within the standard neo-classical and X-efficiency framework, respectively. 
Inefficiency in both frameworks is regarded as a consequence of market failure. 
60 
The non-allocative perspective of efficiency arose out of the criticism of the 
traditional neo-classical theory of the firm for its lack of realism regarding 
assumptions on which the theory is premised. The criticisms of the neo-classical 
theory stem from the dissatisfaction with the high level of abstractedness and 
idealised variables of the model. The postulates of the neo-classical theory that were 
subjected to criticism include: firms and individuals are rational decision makers; 
economic agents are assumed to pursue maximisation objectives; perfect information; 
and, the outcome of decision process is defined in terms of inputs, outputs and prices. 
The main advocate of this perspective was Leibenstein who developed the x-
efficiency theory to take the non-allocative efficiency type into consideration. He 
argued, like some other behaviourists, that the standard neo-classical model ignored 
or treated as unnecessary non-allocative efficiency. 
Rather than consider the whole framework of standard theory of the firm and the 
various alternatives in order to illuminate the performance of the public utility in 
Nigeria, the focus will be on property rights and principal-agent theory. These 
theories remain within the neo-classical framework. 
In addition to the review of studies on the effect of ownership on efficiency, particular 
attention is paid to the empirical studies that use frontier analysis to evaluate 
performance. There are two reasons for placing emphasis on this methodology. First, 
it provides the basis of the evaluation of the performance of NEP A relative to other 
countries. Second, it captures the trend in the literature to evaluate efficiency of 
enterprises, particularly public enterprises, as the basis of organisational reform. Both 
of these reasons are central to this study. 
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3.2 Public sector enterprises and Public Choice 
3.2.1 Rationale for Public Involvement 
As NEP A is a publicly owned enterprise, it is appropriate to analyse the theoretical 
literature on public sector enterprises and public choice to understand why 
government gets involved in economic activities. Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) 
stated that it is not unusual for governments to retain the authority to intervene 
directly in the production arrangements and effect major policy changes when it is 
deemed necessary to do so. Given the precarious level of development of developing 
countries, the importance of public sector enterprises cannot be overstated. 
Public sector enterprises are generally more difficult to analyse than private firms, for 
they often have multiple objectives, answer to several different ministries, and operate 
under peculiar constraints. The issue of the existence of public sector enterprise 
concentrates on motives for public involvement and ownership. According to Bos 
(1986) the traditional motives for state ownership revolves around ideological and 
economic motives. State ownership is generally associated with the political left. 
There is a raft of ideological arguments for the existence of public sector enterprises. 
In Marxian terms, state ownership is perforce to the demise of the capitalist class 
whose economic power resides in their ability to deny others access to the means of 
production. For socialists, state ownership is seen as important in influencing or 
controlling the overall direction of the economy. And, for those that argue for 
sovereignty and self-sufficiency, public enterprises are essential for the promotion of 
self-management. 
Left wing views are not just the only ideological justification. Various nationalistic 
political creeds also emphasise the desirability of some state ownership. Economic 
reasons for state ownership revolve around allocative and productive efficiency 
arguments. For instance, the issues of natural monopoly, the need for economic 
planning, the advantages for stabilisation policy of direct industrial intervention, and 
the redistribution of income or wealth are often cited as justification for public 
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provislOn. 
On the issue of monopoly, if production and cost conditions are such that there is in , 
the long run, only room for one enterprise in an industry, public ownership is 
sometimes recommended to protect the consumer from the excesses of monopoly 
power: s If indicative planning is favoured, then planning agreements will be more 
successful with public sector enterprises than with private firms. Regarding 
distributional efficiency, the terms and conditions attached to ownership change is 
more important, while the firm's prices and wages influence income redistribution. 
The justification for the existence of public sector enterprises in developed economies 
has often revolved around the twin issue of exploitation of their monopoly power, 
natural or statutory, to raise revenue for the state and the promotion of industrial 
development. In most developing countries, capital markets are incomplete. Further, 
risk-bearing ability and/or the willingness of private sector to sufficiently deal with 
risks are usually inadequate. Hence, public sector enterprises are seen as fulfilling the 
role of galvanising domestic manufacturing activity, providing infrastructure services, 
or winning and channelling foreign economic assistance which donors would 
otherwise not wish to see enriching private owners. 16 
Leaving aside for the moment the last point about public sector enterprises in 
developing countries, the economic rationale for public sector enterprises can be 
subjected to Baumol's (1984) criticism that there is no clear ideal in the literature of 
where public sector enterprises are to be preferred to private firms. He noted that even 
if there is an additional economic argument to those outlined above, such as public 
good characteristics, public subsidy might be granted to the private firm to prevent 
under-provision. 
15 Looking at the existence of public enterprises justifications from a positive methodological 
viewpoint provides predictions of where we might expect to find them. Phillips (1987) argued that the 
case for public intervention exist when efficiency requires large-scale, highly idiosyncratic investments 
in capital with long pay-back periods, when information asymmetry exists, when residual claimants are 
ill-defined or diffuse with incongruent and conflicting objectives. In which case, market-mediated 
transactions may likely yield sub-optimal results. 
16 Although the above economic points are interesting, they do not add to a substantial reason for public 
ownership nor do they indicate where public enterprises may be found (Baumol, 1984), but may be 
better than private enterprises at protecting workers from the burden of technological change. At the 
same time it is recognised that in the search for appropriate institutional forms in a mixed economy, the 
enforcement of efficiency and the stimulation of innovation are key desirable properties. 
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If the above reasons are accepted as rationale for public prOVISIOn of economic 
activities, and we take into consideration the conflicting objectives of the various 
protagonists, inefficiency and indolence may become prevalent. Before we can 
conclude that public ownership per se further exacerbate inefficiency, we need to 
compare the outcomes of both public and private enterprises. It will suffice to say that 
a case might exist for the creation of publicly owned enterprises when the monitoring 
costs are higher for privately owned enterprises. 17 If the monitoring system is equally 
effective under both ownership types, public sector enterprises may still be preferred 
if monitoring cost is perceived to outweigh the social cost of inefficiency. 
Borcherding (1983) drew an analogy with Williamson's market versus hierarchy 
argument for the existence of firms. Creating public sector enterprises is a 
manifestation of the state deciding that hierarchy is the appropriate structure. The 
point is that there are a number of positive and normative reasons for the existence of 
public sector enterprises. 
Additionally, where markets are highly distorted, pricing policies of public sector 
enterprises provide the government with a mechanism for income distribution. Where 
public provision is chosen as the mode of production, Vogelsang (1990) pointed out 
this may be 'a means to effect a less visible income and wealth redistribution than 
could be obtained by direct transfer and more precise redistribution than by 
regulation' . 
3.2.2 Models of public sector enterprises 
The variety of models that deal with public enterprises is indicative of the plethora of 
reasons given for the existence of public sector enterprises. Indirectly, it is also 
indicative of the various approaches approach adopted to explain the behaviour of 
firms. De Alessi (1967, 1973) argued that the allocation of property rights is pivotal to 
explaining the outcome of firms. Leibenstein (1966) emphasised constraints and 
17 This is the issue addressed in Section 7.3. 
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monitoring procedure different from those facing privately owned firms. Stigler 
(1976) emphasised the separation of ownership from control as the key to 
understanding outcome. Niskanen (1971) cited public choice considerations in his 
analysis of public enterprises. 
De Alessi, invoking property rights theory, argued that the non-transferability of 
ownership attenuates incentives, and hence, performance. He assumed that the 
managers of both public and private firms derive utility from being able to control 
resources, and that this provides them with an incentive to increase their expenditure. 
As the issue of ownership of public sector enterprises is opaque, the barriers to the 
growth of managerial discretion are substantially lower than in private enterprises. 
This is likely to occur when the organisation produces non-marketable outputs or 
regarded as a public good. 
De Alessi (1969) argued that it would be possible to build models of public sector 
enterprises that emphasise the budget-increasing objective of the managers. By 
increasing the resources under their supervision qua bureaucrats, marginal product 
will increase, and, consequently, managerial remuneration. 
Lindsay (1976) questioned the premise of bureau size or budget maximising models, 
as the theories do not specify how the bureaux are expanded. 18 Government, Lindsay 
argued, only fund what it can measure, thus, budget can be expected to be increased 
when output increases are required. In his analysis, demand for budget increment 
comes through the political process with budget maximisation to explain bureaucratic 
behaviour. 
Lindsay modelled the activities of the enterprises by assuming that managers aim to 
maximise their utility, via maximising their pay, which is related to productivity. This 
in turn is defined as their contribution to social net income, that is, the difference 
between the social value of the bureau's output as defined by the political process and 
18 Budgets are typically treated as exogenous. Thus, saying that bureaucrats have a proclivity for 
bureaux, therefore, does not elucidate their behaviour as managers than does the assertion of any other 
taste. More critical is the inconsistency of imputing to management the objective of maximising their 
budgets when one of the most important functions of management seemingly is to manage resources of 
their organisations Lindsay 1976). 
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the cost of resources used. This productivity, however, must be estimated and as 
government can only measure certain aspects of the bureau's activities, managers can 
be expected to switch resources to those activities that cause a decline in the quality of 
the overall service relative to a similar privately provided good. 
The efficiency problems are caused, in part, by monitoring difficulties and the fact 
that demand is fundamentally a product of a public choice process. The level of grants 
and subventions given to public sector enterprises is consequent upon non-economic 
arguments of public provision. 
In a study of the effects of state formula grants on the operating efficiency of US 
public library services, Silkman and Young (1982) concluded that 'there is a 
significant relationship between the relative size of inter-governmental aid and 
operating efficiencies of local recipient agencies. As the non-local proportion of total 
revenues increases, so too do the observed inefficiencies of the local service 
providers' . 
The theory behind the result is that grants have both distortion and motivation effects. 
The distortion effect depends on how the intergovernmental grant is paid. For 
example, if it is to subsidise capital expenses, but not wage payments, then there is an 
incentive to adopt capital-intensive technology. This is similar to the Averch-lohnson 
(1962) effect. 
The motivation effect depends on what Silkman and Young referred to as collective 
incentive effects and fiscal illusion effects. The former arises as the proportion of 
services financed locally decreases, adversely affecting the incentive for the 
population at large to monitor government efficiency. Fiscal illusion effect arises as 
grants increase and replace local finance, local government expenditure and revenue 
patterns become more complex and less easy for scrutiny. 
As managers do not directly own rights in public enterprises, we can argue that they 
will have weak incentives to take a long-run view of its development. By the same 
token, in the absence of appropriate incentives, managers cannot increase their own 
wealth when they increase that of the firm, we might expect a significant portion of 
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their utility would be derived from non-pecuniary benefits. 19 
The above arguments relating to public sector enterprises differ over issues other than 
the explanatory power of the managerial, budget maximising assumption. As 
mentioned above, De Alessi (1973) was concerned with the demolition of the 
arguments of X-inefficiency hypothesis?O He attempted to establish that the extent to 
which X-inefficiency has any predictive content, it is already encompassed by the 
more general neo-classical theory, which yields a broader and richer set of 
implications. Silkman and Young based their argument on the various concepts 
Leibenstein used in developing the X -efficiency hypothesis. 
The variety of approaches to modelling public sector enterprises is indicative of the 
their existence in a wide range of market and non-market situations. This explains the 
markedly different pattern of behaviour and performance of public enterprises. Aside 
from the public choice and property rights literature, there is a body of work which 
sees the key to an understanding of the behaviour of public enterprises not in its 
ownership pattern nor in its explicit links to a voting process, but in the actual 
objectives of the organisation. And, more specifically in the accommodation which is 
reached between the government and the management. Rees (1984) argued that it is 
too simplistic to take the control constraints on a public enterprise as given. They are 
not simply imposed by government, but rather, are the outcomes of a process of 
discussion and negotiation. Both the profit target and capital allocation will depend on 
information supplied to government by the enterprise and, de facto, have to be agreed 
to by both sides. 
Rees's model assumes utility maXImISIng managers, whose welfare is linked 
positively to capital allocations, and hence, to the ease with which output can be 
produced, and negatively to the size of the profit target the state gives the public 
enterprise. The analysis is driven by the idea that the goal selected by the managers 
for submission to government maximises their utility, given information asymmetry 
in favour of the managers, and of the way in which the government translates the 
19 Frech (1980) noted that this outcome is not an unambiguous prediction of the property rights 
aJ'proach to the theory of public sector enterprises. 
2 We return to this X-efficiency theory in Section 3.4. 
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tendered plans into capital and profit constraints. The corollary of this is an incentive 
compatibility problem. Attempt to solve the compatibility problem explores the 
connection between the form of the appraisal process and the type of plan the 
government receives. Such an approach can provide evidence on the conditions that 
will lead the enterprise to submit optimistic or pessimistic plans. 
Levy's model (1981) similarly emphasised the importance of the objectives that 
explicitly follow behavioural precepts. He argued that because behavioural theorists 
questioned the premise of profit maximisation as an adequate specification of the goal 
of even a private organisation, and because organisational processes is emphasised, it 
is clear that the issue of goal should be pivotal to any theory of public enterprise 
behaviour. Furthermore, managers of public sector enterprises will behave differently 
from those of private firms because government intervention reduces rewards and 
raises costs to them. 
In some cases, intervention, rather than incentive schemes, may be needed to govern 
the enterprise because the amount of information on performance that an effective 
incentive scheme can require may be difficult to acquire. Intervention thus serves to 
induce greater conformity between the objectives of the managers and the 
government. But because intervention depresses managerial effort and so reduces 
effectiveness, it turns out that the optimal level of intervention will be less than the 
level needed to align the objectives of the public enterprise precisely with the utility 
function of the controller (Levy, 1987). 
A distinction can be made about the effect of different objectives. First, the theory of 
public sector enterprises, as we have described thus far, can be distinguished by the 
fact that it assumes that they are neither intended to maximise profits, nor in fact do 
they behave as profit maximisers. If this is not true then the standard theory of the 
firm is the relevant analytical model. Second, social objectives can be included in the 
framework, thereby leading to the development of a normative theory of public sector 
enterprises. Given the difficulty with information and data in developing countries, 
the analysis (developed in Chapter 7) will be based on the construction of stylised but 
realistic accounts of public sector enterprises' operation. This will lead to the 
development of a positive theory of public sector enterprises. 
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The focus in the positive tradition revolves around utility maximisation (Gravelle 
1982; Kimenyi 1985; Rees 1984a). There are variations, however, in the accounts of 
what generates managerial utility. Using an unorthodox approach, Kimenyi (1985) 
linked it to discretion over choice of employees, whether by tribe or degree of 
acquaintance; the benefit being derived both directly by the ability to exercise this 
power, and indirectly by the expectation of future political support. Ideally, this 
approach is insightful in the case of a country like Nigeria where the standard 
economic precepts21 may be insufficient to explain firm behaviour. 
Thus, from the viewpoint of formal modelling the salient characteristic of public 
sector enterprise lies less in the objective function than in the constraints. The wide 
variety of constraints that could be imposed either singly or in combination on an 
extensive range of the firms' activities can obviously generate a multitude of 
outcomes distinct from those of a profit-maximising firm. There are additional 
constraints to those of demand and technology imposed by the government, which 
might affect the outcome of the public enterprise. For instance government may 
stipulate the provision of services to certain customers at preferential rates. 
The problem with the theory of public sector enterprises as pointed out by Aharoni 
(1982) is that it does not define the firm in terms of the protagonists involved but 
merely as a layer of conflicting agents. If we regard the general population as the 
principal, then the managers of the public utility and the respective ministry with their 
overlapping vested interests, managers, employee unions and consumer groups can all 
be regarded as agents. If the ministry normally considered as the principal, is not one 
but several, and they act as agents as much as principals, then no optimal contract is 
possible because no clear objectives or trade-offs can be established. 
21 Gravelle (1982) for instance use an indirect utility function with managerial income and public 
enterprise's output prices as arguments in the utility function. 
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3.3 Modern Theories of the Firm 
3.3.1 Property Rights and Productive Efficiency 
Neo-classical economic theory is based on particular beliefs concerrung property 
rights and the ability to exchange resources. Specifically, it assumes that all resources 
are fully allocated and privately held, and that resources can be voluntarily exchanged 
with no information or transaction costs. In reality, these assumptions typically are 
rarely met. Alternative systems of property rights exist, as do positive information and 
transaction costs. 
The property rights model (Alchian, 1965) drew attention to the restrictive character 
of the neo-c1assical theory's assumptions. In particular, property rights theory argues 
that different institutional settings, such as ownership type, provide decision-makers 
with different rights to the use of economic resources, thus imposing different 
constraints upon them. These constraints will affect the costs and rewards of 
production and might systematically affect the behaviour of consumers and firms. 
Against the ambiguity of the influence of ownership on performance, property rights 
theorists argue that a change in allocation of property rights will affect incentive 
structure, and hence, performance. A re-examination of ownership structure which 
was stunted by the inconclusive empirical studies and limiting analytical techniques, 
is afforded by advances in principal-agent theory, imperfect competition and 
regulatory economics. The analysis is concerned with ownership effects on internal 
efficiency of firms and allocative efficiency. 
The thrust of modern theories of property rights is that allocation does matter because 
it determines the objective of owners and the system of monitoring managerial 
performance. In which case, the efficiency implication of change in property right, 
hence incentive structures and behaviour depends upon competition and regulation. 
Based on property rights, De Alessi's exposition IS interesting as its considers 
property rights in explaining efficiency and the fact that he argued that the issues, 
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assumptions, implications and empirical evidence raised in X-inefficiency efficiency22 
can be incorporated into the generalised neo-classical theory that he propounded in his 
1983 paper. His preference for generalised neo-classical theory stems from the fact 
that it studies individual choice made under constraints on the assumption that the 
individual is a utility maximiser. 
Primarily, De Alessi rejected X-inefficiency hypothesis based on the non-maximising 
postulate, the fact that it does not consider effect of property rights on behaviour and 
because it focuses on unobservable preference relations requiring the use of the 
concept of personality.23 Falsely, he rejects X-inefficiency hypothesis because it 
denies that maximisation ever occurs. 
U sing the concepts of property rights and transaction costs, De Alessi argued that 
general neo-classical theory better explains the central postulate of X-inefficiency 
hypothesis (with fewer assumptions). Transaction costs explain why production 
function is not well specified, why labour contracts are incomplete, why some inputs 
are not marketed, and why some individuals are rationally selective. Thus, 
transactions cost explains why firms do not operate on their expansion path. And, 
hence, X-inefficiency as a concept is premised on the comparison between actual with 
unobtainable ideal. On this last point, De Alessi and not X-inefficiency is open to this 
charge. 
The De Alessi argument is considered not least because of the direct reference to X-
inefficiency hypothesis but because it acts as the bridge between X-inefficiency 
hypothesis and modem agency theory. Modem agency problem is considered relevant 
because it provides an analytical framework for examining the various issues that can 
affect the efficiency and performance of an enterprise, and also because it offers a 
tractable way of resolving the issues that may construe against the performance of 
enterprises. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argued that the effects of competition and regulation on 
22 The X-efficiency theory is expounded in Section 3.4 below. 
23 De Alessi, by using a utility function can be accused of doing the same thing that he criticised 
Leibenstein for. 
71 
performance are more significant than that of ownership. Their model incorporates 
changes both in objectives and in the effectiveness of the system for monitoring 
managerial performance to explore the nature of the trade-off between allocative and 
internal efficiency that exists when a firm is transferred from public to private 
ownership is explored further below. It will suffice to say that in the model, it turns 
out that unit costs are lower under private ownership than public if, and only if, the 
private monitoring and incentive system is significantly better. 
Their model highlights that ownership is only one of factor that influence managerial 
incentive structures and economic performance. Others include competitive structure 
of industry and regulatory constraints. Both of which significantly impact on 
incentives and, hence, on both allocative and internal efficiency. Moreover, changes 
in anyone of the three will be contingent upon the other two. 
Let us consider the case of publicly owned firms. Public and private firms differ in 
four important ways. First, a public is created to serve the needs of society; a private 
firm is organised to maximise profits. The implication is that the two types of firms 
have different overall goals. Second, public and private firms differ in their control 
mechanisms. Public firms have an obligation to meet societal needs; private firms, on 
the other hand, are controlled or influenced by those with residual claims on the firm. 
Public firms are controlled directly by bureaux. Third, government is the residual 
claimant in public firms while shareholders claim is based on individual's stake in the 
firm. Fourth, and perhaps most important, while ownership of private firms is easily 
transferred, ownership in public firm is non-transferrable. 
These differences could have large effects upon incentives, and therefore, the 
efficiency that attends managerial effort. For example, without transferability of 
ownership, the agent cannot capture the returns to innovation and monitoring. While 
these activities have private costs to the agents, the benefits are shared collectively. 
Thus, the agents bear a bigger preponderance of the cost. The corollary of this is a 
reduction in the level of effort put into cost minimisation pursuit. 
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3.3.2 Principal-Agent Theory 
Standard economic analysis of the behaviour of firms rests on profit maximisation 
assumption. In modem private firms where ownership is separated from control, the 
realisation of the profit maximisation objective inter alia depends on the relationship 
between the principal and the agent. In the context of public firms, privatisation may 
alter the balance of residual claims such that the pursuit of profit maximisation 
becomes paramount. The changes elicited by privatisation are usually more complex 
than a straightforward shift to profit maximisation. It is useful, therefore, to consider 
some general features of the underlying principal-agent problem, with its implications 
for behaviour of firm transferred from public to private. 
The principal-agency theory24 considered here draws on Laffont and Tirole (1994). In 
this framework, privatisation is considered not just as a process for changing the 
assignment of property rights but as a process that changes the underlying principal-
agent matrix and the concomitant residual claims. 
The agency problem can be summarised as follows. An agent who is supposed to take 
decisions on behalf of the principal may act otherwise as he has objectives, which 
may conflict with that of the principal. An outcome that diverges from the optimal 
outcome is possible if there is information asymmetry in favour of the agent. 
Due to the asymmetry, the agent can be expected to exploit the information advantage 
that may adversely affect the outcome of the decision taken. The principal's problem 
is to design of a contract capable of inducing the agent to act in a manner consistent 
with the principal's objective. Or at least, the contract should be such that optimal 
outcome is elicited given the possibility that agent will optimise for himself under 
whatever contract is specified (Holmstrom, 1979). 
The precept of the principal-agent theory is that if an optimal outcome is to be 
achieved, the principal will have to give the agent an incentive that is at least equal to 
24 The assumption underlying this is that separation of ownership from control exacerbates the scope of 
X-inefficiency. 
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the agent's reservation utility?5 How well off the principal is a function of the level of 
information asymmetry. The principal can be expected to be worse off when he is 
confronted with incomplete information compared to when he has full information. 
There is yet another perspective to the principal-agent problem in public sector 
enterprises, developed by Rees (1984) and summarised below. If we examine the 
internal matrix of a public enterprise, management has a preference for higher output 
and/or revenue while the workers have a preference higher employment and wages. 
These two sets of arguments form the enterprise's utility function which can be 
expressed as u(y, W, I), where y, w, 1 denote output, wages and labour, respectively. 
The public enterprise faces the usual constraints of demand and technology. 
The production function can be expressed by f (k, I, ()), where () is a productivity 
parameter. The public enterprise also faces a control constraint, that is, the process by 
which the government tries to influence the outcome. In the case of NEP A, this is in 
the form of minimum profit objective, 1( ~ 1(* where 7t represents profit and 
maximum constraint on capacity, that is k ~ k * . 
Thus, for the gIven set ((),1(* ,k*), the decisions of the public enterprise can be 
regarded as generated by the procedure of maximising its utility subject to market, 
technology and control constraints. The solution to the above problem implies an 
indirect utility function v(k* ,1(* ,()) which expresses the public enterprise or agent's 
maximised utility as a function of the control constraints' values and the productivity 
parameter, with 
t» t» 
->0 a,* - , iJ1C* < 0, 
t» 
->0. iJ() 
The inefficiency resulting from the agency problem can now be formulated. 26 In the 
case when the principal has full information, Rees showed that the agent can be 
25 Reservation utility is also defined as individual rationality or participation constraint. This is the 
minimum offer required by the agent to induce participation. 
26 As I am not directly concerned with the optimisation problem, the marginal conditions are not 
explicitly stated here. 
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compelled to making decisions that yield first best with respect to output, price, 
capital, labour and wage rates. 
If the concern of the principal is allocative efficiency, then marginal cost pricing 
should be stipulated, with labour paid its opportunity cost, and factor inputs chosen to 
minimise costs. If the public enterprise exhibits increasing returns to scale and its on-
going concern is paramount, then non-linear pricing may be more appropriate. As the 
principal is seldom in possession of full information, the information asymmetry has 
to be taken into consideration. 
The agent is assumed to know the public enterprise's efficiency and productivity 
parameters, which is unknown to the principal, save a prior probability density 
function. This, essentially, gives rise to the adverse selection problem. To overcome 
this problem or attenuate its consequences, the principal must give the agent some 
incentive to truthfully reveal efficiency and productivity by giving the agent more 
capital and a lower profit constraint than will prevail in the first best solution. Thus, 
capital productivity and profitability are expected to be lower as a result of the 
information asymmetry. It is notable that this inefficiency is, by definition of the 
problem, minimised. That is, it is the smallest divergence from full information that is 
consistent with asymmetric information. 
From this model, what are the implications for public enterprise inefficiency? The 
inference drawn by Rees (1984) is that relative to a set of control constraints, wages 
will be higher than competitive levels. Second, employment will be higher than at 
cost minimising levels. Third, labour productivity will be lower than at cost 
minimising level. Fourth, low capacity utilisation is another form of inefficiency 
expected. The non-binding profit constraint and low returns to investment that are 
characteristic of public enterprises are inevitable consequence of information 
asymmetry. In which case, inefficiency can only be minimised and not eliminated. 
The above analysis gives only a partial insight, as it does not elucidate on the control 
process. The agency problem of incentive compatibility remains unresolved. The 
principal remains pliable to the agent and accepts false information about production 
possibilities. 
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The agency problem solution includes profit consistency. Profit consistency implies 
that given a reported 8, ceteris paribus, profit target is the amount generated by that 
level of capacity for the given 8. In other words, the public enterprise is required to 
earn the profit it says it can earn given the 8 it has reported and the capacity allocated 
(Rees, 1984b). For each 8 reported, there is corresponding pair of values of the 
constraints, (k*(O),Jr*(O))where Jr*(O) must be generated by k*(O). The reality of 
public enterprise planning and control, however, mean that the profit consistency 
principle does not exist, as public enterprises' profit constraints are usually non-
binding when the government meets the losses incurred. This is an important caveat in 
the modelling of public sector enterprises as the failure to attain optimality might be 
due to lack of stringency in the profit constraint. 
In sum, in addition to the "union" effect, and judging in terms of public interest 
criteria, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) identified four other potential sources of 
inefficiency in the control of public sector enterprises. First, we have the displacement 
of social objective by political objective. Second, preference for direct political 
intervention in managerial decisions over arms-length relationship that could restrict 
government department to the task of setting appropriate managerial incentive 
structures. Third, the high internal inefficiency associated with bureaucracy. And, 
fourth, an inefficient level of bureaucratic activity that is likely to ensue. 
The implication of these points will depend on institutional detail of differing 
frameworks of control. Generally, incentive structures for public sector enterprises 
will have more imperfections at each monitoring hierarchy. Further, the public choice 
aspect of political decisions is unlikely to provide an adequate conceptual basis for the 
analysis of behaviour in the nationalised sector of the economy. 
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3.4 Leibenstein and Non-Allocative Efficiency 
3.4.1 X-Efficiency Theory 
The similar concept to X-inefficiency in standard economIC theory is technical 
inefficiency. Leibenstein (1966) coined the term due to his belief that there is nothing 
technical about the most substantial sources of non-allocative inefficiencies in firms. 
The unusual appellation is ascribed to the fact that when Leibenstein formulated the 
X-efficiency theory in 1966, there was no appropriate concept, such as organisational 
or motivational inefficiency implied the various elements that could be involved in 
non-allocative inefficiencies. 
X -efficiency theory represents a line of reasoning based on the postulates that differs 
form standard microeconomic theory. The limitations of conventional microeconomic 
theory to sufficiently explain the economic problems faced by developing countries 
led Leibenstein (1966) to develop X-efficiency theory as a broad and general 
framework appropriate for the analysis of the problems and nature of inefficiency. 
The theory is an attempt to develop a mode of analysis wherein the conventional 
micro-economic theory assumption of maximisation are relaxed, and substituted with 
postulates under which individuals are non-maximisers when there is little pressure on 
them - increasing external pressure leads to maximising behaviour. An important 
aspect of this approach is that the behaviour of individuals is defined by conventions. 
Examining the neo-classical model, Leibenstein asserted that it is not the vector of the 
inputs per se that determines the nature and amount of output but the nature and 
amount of effort. Effort as such is not a variable in the standard neo-classical model. 
In this respect, we can say that Leibenstein developed X -efficiency theory in an 
attempt to account for the phenomena that were not well explained by the neo-
classical theory. The theory focused on effort as a major variable and he related it to 
the motivational system within forms. 
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If output and cost are not completely predetermined, then what factors affect effort 
and motivation? Leibenstein stated the importance of technology?7 A key factor in 
Leibenstein hypothesis is pressure. This is the condition whereby individuals feel 
relatively inclined to realise some potential. In X-efficiency theory, competition and 
adversity create pressure. Thus, cost is determined by pressure. This is in contrast 
with the precept of cost as a function of output. While cost is minimised in standard 
theory, X-inefficiency assumes that it is sometimes minimised but not all the time. 
A description of the concept of pressure with the X-efficiency framework is given in 
Figure 3.1 below. Leibenstein assumed that the unit cost of the firm is influenced by 
the industry's average cost. When industry cost increases, the firm's unit cost can 
increase and still remains competitive. Conversely, when the industry's cost falls, the 
firm's unit cost must fall to remain competitive. 
rm's unit cost (t) 
c2 
c3 
cl 
c4 
R2 
R3 
~----~~~-----+--------------T---Rl 
CI C3 C2 Industry Cost (t-1) 
Figure 3.1 External Pressure, Cost and X-Efficiency 
27 Rather than technology being the detenninant of effort and motivation as implied by Leibenstein, 
perhaps utilisation of technology is more important in detennining the cost. 
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Leibenstein assumed that industry's cost in the previous period (t-1) will serve to 
formulate the firm's expectation of the current period (t) industry's cost, and hence 
influence firm's unit cost in the current period. The 45 degree line is the locus for the 
points for which the industry'S unit cost in period t-1 are equal to firm's unit cost in 
period t. R1 shows the reaction curve for a cost minimising firm. 
When R1 is the prevailing reaction curve, we can expect the firm's cost not to be 
affected by pressure. R2, on the other hand, is the reaction curve for a firm that does 
react to pressure. If the firm expects industry cost to be C1, then the firm's unit cost 
will be c1. When the expectation for industry's cost is C2, the concomitant firm's unit 
cost, assuming that reaction curve R2, is c2. 
Reduction in cost by decrease in X-inefficiency and increase in knowledge are shown 
by the introduction of the third reaction curve, R3. The point a is assumed to be the 
initial point, with C2 and c2 being the industry's and firm's unit cost, respectively. A 
fall in the industry's cost would result in a movement from C2 to say C3. This will 
consequently lead to a reduction in firm's unit cost to c3 from c2. If we assume that 
X-inefficiency falls and/or knowledge increase, then the firm's new reaction curve 
will be R3 and the firm's cost will fall to C4?8 
A key assumption in the X-efficiency theory is that there is no unique connection 
between inputs purchased and output produced. The justification for this is that the 
purchase of factors of production is not in itself sufficient for production. It is the 
understanding of the actions of the people in the firm that furthers insight into 
productivity. 
The effort assumption can be described as, to some degree, a discretionary variable 
for all individuals in the firm. Thus, the theory assumes that individuals can choose 
some of their activities; the rate at which activities are carried out; and the quality of 
their effort. The nature of the choice made by each individual will depend on the 
motivational system. 
28 An important assumption is that firm's costs are not predetermined but influenced by motivation for 
cost reduction and knowledge (that is technology). 
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The methodological basis of X-efficiency theory, as already outlined above, differs 
from the neo-classical model. X -efficiency hypothesis is underpinned by four 
postulates, namely, non-maximising behaviour, inertia, incomplete contracts and 
discretion. Contrary to the rationality principle of neo-classical model, Leibenstein 
assumed that some form of decision-making, such as habits, conventions, and 
procedures are of a non-maximising nature. They are not guided strictly by 
calculation but rather by convention, partial or incomplete calculation, and complete 
calculation. The implication is that at low level of pressure, individuals will not put 
too much effort into calculating their decisions, but as pressure increases, they move 
toward complete calculation, which approximates neo-classical assumption of 
nlaximisation. 
The second postulate of inertia assumes that inert areas, within which changes in 
some independent variable involved in the decision process do not necessarily result 
in changes in the dependent variables, surround decisions and behaviour of 
individuals. 
The third postulate is related to contracts, and implies that contracts are incomplete. 
The remuneration side of contracts is usually well specified but the effort level is 
usually unspecified. 
The fourth postulate of discretion assumes that employees have effort discretion to a 
certain extent (bar shirking) and that the firm has discretion with respect to working 
conditions and some aspects of remuneration. 
The implication of these postulates is that the outcome of the firm are jointly 
controlled by both the management and the employees. Leibenstein (1983) stated the 
sub-optimal outcome as a game theory type problem given that there are conflicting 
interests between individuals in different hierarchies, and simultaneous free-rider 
effort options for peer group members. These suggest that a latent prisoner's dilemma 
problem exist. 
Employees have an incentive to move towards the minimum tolerated effort level and 
the firm has an incentive to move towards minimum tolerated working conditions -
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remuneration package. The prisoner's dilemma is, however, avoided due to the 
existence of (sub-optimal effort) convention which determine the effort level and 
solves not only the hierarchical problems but also the free riding incentive problem 
for individual members of each group.29 The distance between the convention 
equilibrium and the optimal solution represents the degree of X-inefficiency in the 
system. 
Other issues pertinent to the theory include the creation and adherence to convention 
(Leibenstein, 1983). X-inefficiency hypothesis permits a number of inferences to be 
drawn. Some of the inferences that can be drawn include, firms generally operate 
within, rather than on, their production frontiers. 3o Second, given output, costs per 
unit are generally not minimised. Third, innovations are generally not introduced 
when it is optimal to do so. Fourth, less output is not necessarily associated with more 
leisure. And, fifth, the price of the product can have an influence on the cost of 
production. 
3.4.2 Implications of X-inefficiency 
The consequence of the postulate of X -efficiency theory depends on the environment 
within which the firm operates. External environment puts pressure on management 
who transmits it further down the hierarchy. When competition prevails, the external 
pressure may be sufficiently great that the result may approximate cost minimisation. 
As markets in developing countries are highly imperfect, they provide shelter from 
competitive pressure. In such environment, the pressures to minimise cost are less 
stringent. Thus, the non-maximisation and inert area postulates imply that once 
29 Relaxing the maximisation assumption increases the acceptability and the plausibility of effort 
convention overriding the prisoner dilemma solution. As convention operates on what Leibenstein 
referred to as stimulus-response mechanism, it is easier for each individual to believe that other will 
choose the same way. 
30 This inference can be ascertained by data envelopment analysis (DEA). As a matter of fact, to further 
strengthen the argument for X-inefficiency theory, Leibenstein and Maital (1992), .using d~ta 
envelopment analysis estimated non-allocative inefficiency. DEA, a non-parametrIc techmque of 
measuring efficiency, can be incorporated into the framework of X-inefficiency. Although their usage 
of data on hockey players is not particularly insightful in terms of economics, they, nevertheless, 
showed how the technique can be used to measure and partition X-inefficiency. 
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employers choose effort-activity-quality routines that are non-optimal, they will 
continue with such routines. Hence, cost minimisation will be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
An important implication of the postulates has to do with the relation between cost 
and price. Although frequently stated that increasing factor of production increases 
output cost, Leibenstein argued that this does not necessarily follow. If cost of input 
increases at the same time, the pressure on management to be more effective 
increases, resulting in more effective effort choices, then this may engender a 
reduction of X-inefficiency, and a decrease in COSt.31 
The theory states that an understanding of productivity change requires knowledge of 
how the economic environment operates as an incentive towards more or less 
effective effort levels. Performance depends on productivity, which in turn depend on 
organisation of markets, nature of firms within markets, and how the environment 
influences incentive structures. Standard economic theory does address issues related 
to non-market production activities within the firm, the impact of the sheltered 
environment on motivation, and the significance of differential motivation. X-
inefficiency focuses on these considerations. 
Leibenstein contended that the slow down of economic growth attributable to X-
inefficiency might be greater than under-utilisation of resources. He argued that 
growth depend on innovations. Thus, sheltered environment, which might lead to high 
cost, is likely to reduce management incentives to innovate. Considerable deviation 
from maximising behaviour is expected to be inimical to innovation, and inertia must 
be overcome to introduce innovations and at certain levels of effort entropy it is likely 
to be difficult to introduce innovation effectively. 
Bureaucracy which also exists in large private firms exacerbates matters. The main 
difference between the two ownership types is that the principal-agent relationship is 
more diffuse in bureaucratic organisations. Bureaucrats are self-interested with 
different objective from principal. The careers of civil servants rarely depend on 
31 Primeaux's (1977) study of electric utilities found evidence to support the hypothesis that finns 
exposed to more pressure had lower cost per unit of output. 
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decision made due to poor accountability, rules and conventions that define the 
privileges of the civil service. Statutory monopoly provides shelter, which permits 
significant inefficiency. 
How significant is X-inefficiency to the economy as a whole?32 The tentative answer 
is that given the level of bureaucratic involvement in the provision of electricity in 
Nigeria, we would expect lack of competitive pressures, and the plethora of 
objectives, to result in some inefficiency. 
X -efficiency theory has its fair share of criticisms. There are two main lines of attack 
of Leibenstein's X-efficiency theory. The first criticises the assumptions invoked to 
develop the theory. The second argues that the concept of X-efficiency is superfluous 
as the subsequent inefficiencies can be explained within the neo-classical framework 
using concepts such as leisure, uncertainty and transaction costs. The basic argument 
is that different levels of inefficiency is consistent with utility maximisation (see 
Crain and Zardkoohi, 1980; and Schap, 1985). 
3.5 Empirical Evidence 
As shown in the above exposition, inadequate monitoring and non-profit objectives 
suggest that public sector enterprises are less likely than private firms to introduce 
cost-saving innovations, to achieve cost-minimising input combinations, to have 
lower costs or to have a wider range of products (De Alessi, 1973). If capital is 
provided at subsidised rates, then a public enterprise is likely to employ a capital-
intensive production technology, and may seem to have lower unit costs than a private 
counterpart. 
More general production subsidies, as Vogelsang (1990) pointed out, may cause rent-
seeking or X-inefficient behaviour, and have to be financed, which generates further 
32 Leibenstein (1981) estimated X-inefficiency to be of the magnitude of 20-40 percent of net national 
output. Shen (1973) suggested that X-inefficiency might even be higher in developing countries. 
Contrary to precepts of standard theory, Shen found that far from using on~y excessive labour, firms in 
developing countries use more capital than required. On the other hand, StIgler argued that X-
inefficiency is inconsequential. 
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distortions. For these reasons, it is worthwhile to search for pricing schemes that 
allow the firm to be efficient and equitable without incurring subsidies. 
With respect to the effect of competition, Boardman and Vining (1989) found 
performance to vary with different levels of competition. The literature generally 
supports the idea that market structure is important in generating efficiency 
differences. Bocherding et al. (1982) and Millward and Parker (1983) produced 
evidence to show that there is little difference between the efficiency of public and 
private monopolies, but that cost differences can be substantial when public 
monopolies are compared to competitive solutions. 
The analysis of the achievements of public sector enterprises is formalised in the 
literature on performance evaluation, which is sometimes referred to as the 
performance approach (Perelman and Pestieau, 1988) to public sector enterprises' 
behaviour. The performance approach is an evaluative appraisal of the extent to which 
public enterprises do in fact achieve the goals that are attributed to them (Tulkens, 
1986). It requires, as a starting point, a clear statement of those goals, but is often seen 
as a comprehensive technique which includes a performance evaluation system, or 
performance information system which monitors achievements, and an incentive 
system which encourages the effective achievement of goals. Jones (1991) sees 
designing an incentive system based on the performance evaluation as an alternative 
to privatisation. 
The question of what criteria to use for evaluation raises the most difficult problem in 
using this approach to control public sector enterprises. That problem arises because 
governments are often loath to specify precisely, but willing to change, implicitly, the 
objectives of the public sector enterprises. The point can be stressed that the 
application of business techniques in public sector organisation can be a political 
ritual. And while the idea, for example, of using social profitability as a criterion has 
an obvious normative appeal, the practical problem of public sector enterprises being 
answerable to several principals generally rules it out in practice (Mallon, 1981). 
In this section, I outline two sets of empirical literature pertinent to this study. The 
first is that of the Nigerian electricity industry and the second comprises studies that 
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focus on performance assessment of different aspects of electricity industries in 
general. Millward and Parker (1983) and Boardman and Vining (1994) give good 
accounts of the earlier and more recent literature on performance, respectively. 
Rather than adopt a broad perspective, we concentrate on the studies that estimate 
efficiency and productivity of electricity utilities. The common practice in the 
empirical literature is to adopt either a parametric or non-parametric technique to 
evaluate the efficiency of publicly owned electricity utilities vis-a.-vis private ones 
(Pollitt, 1995; Bagdadioglu, 1996). Also, the evaluation of the performance of 
publicly owned utilities (Golany et al. 1994; Andrikopoulos and Vlachou, 1995; 
Yunos and Hawdon, 1997). 
The choice of studies reviewed in this section is premised on two criteria. First, the 
approach adopted measures efficiency directly in terms of the production relationship 
rather than estimating a cost function. Second, they use non-parametric linear 
programming techniques rather than assuming a functional form and estimating a 
stochastic function. 
Although the studies on the Nigerian electricity industry do not directly evaluate 
performance, they are indicative of the scope of research in the field and also the 
factors that are generally perceived as impacting on the efficiency with which 
electricity is provided and supplied. Furthermore, they, directly or indirectly, address 
the issue of improving NEPA's performance. 
3.5.1 Studies on the Nigerian Electricity Industry 
There are a number of studies that investigate different aspects of the electricity 
industry in Nigeria. Ayodele (1978) for example examined the pattern of electricity 
consumption in Nigeria; Iwayemi (1978, 1981, 1983) examined investment issues in 
the electricity supply industry; Taiwo (1981) focused on cost and pricing aspects of 
electricity supply; Arimah (1993) adopted a spatial approach to explaining the pattern 
of electricity consumption in Nigeria. 
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On the organisation of the industry, Iwayemi (1995) and Lee and Anas (1989) 
discussed the relevance of contestable market structure in the Nigeria context. And on 
the issue of reforming an inefficient electricity industry, Ogunkola (1996) proposed 
two models to test the separability hypothesis of the industry along the main activities 
- generation, transmission and distribution - to see which model is consistent with 
optimisation of electricity provision. 
Ayodele (1987), using econometric techniques to estimate the demand for electricity 
in Nigeria considered the inappropriateness of block pricing for tackling the problems 
of inadequate supply of electricity. Another study that examines electricity tariffs is 
Ukpong (1976). He analysed the evolution of electricity pricing in Nigeria and 
discussed the causes, for instance, of the low rates of return on investment and the 
consequently low percentage of self-financing. He argued that the tariff structure did 
exactly what was intended of it, namely, the promotion of electricity consumption. 
Anas and Lee (1996) is a notable exception to other World Bank literature in that it 
takes a positive, as opposed, to a normative approach.33 They examine the welfare 
implications of alternative tariffs for publicly provided electricity in Nigeria and 
Indonesia. Supply reliability was found to decrease as the quantities of electricity 
purchased increased due to congestion in the transmission network. Using simulations 
they showed that increasing block tariff is optimal and produces savings in the cost of 
producing public power and in firms' operating cost. 
They argued that the response of firms that are charged higher marginal cost for 
purchasing more public power is to develop self-generation and reduce reliance on 
public power, while the smaller firms contract self-generating capacities and purchase 
more from public sector. When transmission congestion persists, cost savings are 
higher as the increasing block tariff reduces total use of public power that in tum 
improves reliability. In the case of Nigeria, they estimated the cost savings to be 4 and 
9 percent of total production cost when there is no transmission congestion and when 
33 This is an extension of Anas and Lee (1989). Essentially, it reviews the private provision of 
electricity services by manufacturing firms in Nigeria while addressing the question: to what extent can 
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it exists, respectively. 
Ogunkola (1996) in an empirical study similar to Andrikopoulos and Vlachou (1995) 
on the Greek Public Power Corporation examined the economies of scale and scope 
arguments for the integration of electricity activities of NEP A. The main finding 
corroborates Andrikopoulos and Vlachou's conclusion that economies of scale 
contribute significantly to the rate of growth in total factor productivity. The inference 
from both studies is that policies that significantly reduce the scope of operation may 
affect efficiency and productivity. 
Ogunkola estimated a production function in order to investigate the separability 
hypothesis of the Nigerian electricity industry with the demarcation along the main 
activities involved in electricity production and supply: generation, transmission and 
distribution. The main objective of Ogunkola's study was the examination of how 
best to organise NEPA's activities to attain optimal outcome. He developed two 
models, namely, separable total cost model (STCM) and direct total cost model 
(DTCM) based on the translog functional form, to examine his stated hypothesis. 
Restrictions of linear homogeneity in input prices, cost exhaustion and concavity were 
imposed to make the translog functional conform to a well-behaved production 
function. The models with the derived cost shares of factor inputs in the cost of 
production formed the basic models and were estimated jointly by the iterative Zellner 
method of estimating seemingly unrelated regression system of equations. 
With the results of the STCM and DTCM models, the acceptance or rejection of the 
models was based on the standard tests of non-linear restrictions, namely, likelihood 
ratio (LR). The STCM (on which the vertical decentralisation of electricity activities 
is based) was rejected, and the DTCM (for continued status quo) accepted when 
evaluated against the tabular chi-square at the 0.1 percent level. Ogunkola's findings 
suggested that the status quo of vertical integration of electricity activities should be 
maintained in Nigeria. 
the cost of electric power generation be reduced, and to what degree can such reduction contribute to 
overall economic efficiency? 
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The analysis is mute on horizontal de-integration. There is, however, a hint that in 
conjunction with the finding on the economies of scale of 4000GWh34 (Ogunkola, 
1992), while vertical centralisation may be viable, the horizontal decentralisation may 
be explored. He suggested that efforts at improving performance of NEP A may be 
directed at setting up two parallel integrated utilities with well-defined supply areas 
which will minimise transmission losses, promote competition and enhance 
efficiency. 
The measurement of efficiency and, hence, performance takes the analysis a step 
further. The rationale is that reducing technical and non-technical losses will improve 
the overall performance of NEP A, while the concomitant augmentation of productive 
efficiency by utilising the resources employed optimally is important in the reform of 
NEP A. The substantial efficiency gains in the Nigerian electricity industry that will 
come from the rehabilitation of and more efficient use of existing capacities can be 
directly obtained from the non-parametric linear programming approach. 
The case for efficiency analysis is further buttressed by the fact that, due a substantial 
proportion of the population remain unserved, a small increase in per capita 
consumption will initiate a significant increase in the demand for electricity. Further, 
unless there is adequate and efficient provision, the system will remain unbalanced. 
Surprisingly, in spite of the current debate about reform and private participation in 
the provision of infrastructure services in developing countries, only a few analytical 
studies exist to inform the debate on the reform of NEP A. A unique feature of the 
study lies in the fact that the it takes the analysis of electricity production a step 
further than Ogunkola (1996). It examines the efficiency and productivity of 
electricity production in Nigeria. 
The conventional wisdom and the premise of this analysis is that the policies pursued 
by the government vis-a-vis electricity production and supply are responsible for what 
now seems to be intrinsic technical inefficiency. Thus, rather than focus solely on the 
impact of ownership on the performance of electric power utilities, the orientation of 
34 which indicate that unit cost of output greater than 4000GWh under same technology would lead to 
an inefficient electricity supply 
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this analysis is towards assessing the level of productive efficiency. This should shed 
some light on the necessary reform to aid the institutional and organisational changes 
required to address the disappointing performance of NEP A. 
3.5.2 Ownership-Efficiency Studies: Performance Assessment 
The purpose of the studies reviewed here is twofold. First, to highlight the scope of 
empirical literature that exists in the field. Second, and more importantly, to indicate 
the methodological approach to estimating the performance of electricity industry. 
The approach adopted in assessing the performance of NEP A used later in the chapter 
draws from the corpus of the following empirical studies. 
Andrikopoulos and Vlachou (1995) examined the structure and productivity growth in 
the Greek Public Power Corporation (GPPC) over the period 1970 to 1989. Their 
study entailed estimating a translog cost function to investigate the implication of 
public ownership on technology and price of capital vis-a-vis economies of scale. 
Instead of demonstrating the impact of ownership, what they succeeded in showing is 
that economies of scale with respect to capacity contributes significantly to the rate of 
growth in total factor productivity. They inferred that policies that are bound to 
decrease significantly the scale of operation of the GPPC would result in reducing the 
enterprise's productivity performance. Based on their finding, they concluded that 
GPPC, although publicly owned and operated, was relatively efficient and exhibited, 
for a wide range of output, economies of scale that contributed the most to the rate of 
growth in total factor productivity. 
Bagdadioglu et al. (1996) in a study of efficiency and ownership in electricity 
distribution in Turkey used a non-parametric model to estimate technical and scale 
efficiency to establish a benchmark measure for the relative performance of the 
publicly operated organisations and their private counterparts. The primary of their 
study was to assess the impact and effect of privatisation on the reform programme of 
the Turkish electricity industry. 
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Although their results showed better technical and allocative efficiency scores for 
privately operated distribution organisations, they indicated that it did not necessarily 
imply the success of private ownership in electricity distribution. More so as they also 
observed technically and scale efficient publicly owned distribution organisations, and 
the fact that government was selective in the utilities it privatised first. 
Thus, they stressed caution In interpreting such results as a confirmation that 
privatisation results in higher efficiency measures as some public utilities were among 
the efficient subsets. They argued that it is difficult to disentangle the direction of 
causality. Examining factors and sources of inefficiency extended the scope of their 
analysis further. Market characteristics were invoked as explanatory variables. Their 
general conclusion, given sample size limitations, is that scale inefficiency 
contributed significantly to overall inefficiency. 
A study by Golany et al. (1994) applied DEA to measunng and evaluating the 
operating efficiency of electricity plants under the auspices of Israeli Electric 
Corporation (lEC). They posited that given the capital intensity of the IEC, marginal 
improvements in the performance of electricity industry may result in large monetary 
benefits in terms of investment expenditure. 
Further, the use of non-parametric approach is strengthened by the multiple nature of 
electricity industry. The analytical approach adopted was justified on the grounds that 
ex ante assumption of efficiency in production cannot be taken for granted given the 
pervasive government involvement and the heavy handed approach to regulation of 
the electricity industry given the geo-political sensitivity of Israel. 
The significance of the above study is undermined by the failure to posit theoretical 
hypotheses as the basis of the performance. The geo-political sensitivity of the 
industry might be a necessary condition for government involvement, it is neither 
sufficient to justify neither public provision nor poor performance. 
Yunos and Hawdon (1997) assessed the efficiency and productivity of the Malaysian 
Electricity Board (NEB). Their study focused on efficiency as premised on the notion 
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of economic rectitude in electricity production. In other words, how to establish an 
efficient way to operate and manage the electricity utility in Malaysia. The underlying 
argument is that the public ownership aspect of developing countries' electricity 
industry has adversely impacted on cost and effectiveness of electricity policy. This is 
the same rationale behind the World Bank's advocacy of reduction of state 
involvement and promotion of privatisation. 
Their empirical findings showed the Malaysian Electricity Board (NEB) ranked 18 
out of 27 countries with respect to technical efficiency. Using Malmquist productivity 
index, they also decomposed productivity into its respective constituents. They found 
that the productivity growth due to technological shift is not accompanied by 
catching-up effect in productivity movement. 
Yunos and Rawdon estimated that the NEB could reduce costs by over 40 percent of 
1987 prices. They showed that DEA analysis has the capacity to indicate the feasible 
benefits from continued improvement in technical efficiency of electricity production. 
A key conclusion of their study is that a change in ownership does not in itself lead to 
improvement in efficiency performance. In a similar finding to Bagdadioglu et al. 
(1996), they showed that some publicly owned firms were found to perform as well as 
privately owned firms in a sample of developing countries. 
Fare et al. (1985)35 in a study of electricity utilities in Illinois relaxed the restrictive 
assumption on the structure of production technology and developed non-parametric 
mathematical programming models capable of decomposing and evaluating the 
various components of technical efficiency. They specified one output, electricity 
generated (kWh) and three inputs, labour (average number of employees), fuel (Btu) 
and generating capacity (MW). In addition to the data on physical inputs and output, 
additional data on boiler turbine generator units, output price, first year of commercial 
operation, regulatory region and earned rate of return, were used to explain the 
pattern of calculated efficiencies. 
35 Fare et at (1990) is in the same spirit as Fare (1985) but investigated productivity growth of u.ti~ities 
in Illinois between 1975 and 1981 using Malmquist index approach. They decomposed productiVity 
growth into parts, one accounting for efficiency changes and another accounting for s.hifts in 
production frontier. They found rates of productivity growth to be stable over the penod but 
deterioration due to techno logical regression was observed between 1976 and 1977. 
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They evaluated the following efficiency measures: technical efficiency, congestion, 
scale efficiency and overall efficiency. Their results show that scale inefficiency (95.6 
percent) is more pervasive than congestion. They inferred that this was the main 
contributor to the disparity they found between overall efficiency (90.2 percent) and 
pure technical efficiency (97.7 percent). Of scale efficiency, only three plants were 
operating at optimal scale. The larger plants operated with increasing returns to scale 
while the smaller plants were in the decreasing returns to scale region of the 
production frontier. 
The study by Weyman-Jones (1991) motivated by the belief that comparative 
efficiency of the twelve-privati sed electricity distribution in England and Wales was 
crucial for the case of deregulation. He applied DEA to evaluate the comparative 
efficiency of the 12 electricity distribution companies in England and Wales. The 
measurement of potential gains is essential to proposed regulatory regime. Limited 
competition encouraged the use of efficiency measure in a price-capping (RPI -X + Y) 
incentive contract incorporating a cost component in the X-factor. Thus, the relative 
efficiency of the firms is important. 
The significance of the study by Weyman-Jones (1991) is derived from the fact that it 
highlighted the importance of technical efficiency in the restructuring of electricity 
industry. Weyman-Jones showed that 5 out of 12 distribution companies were 
efficient, with wide divergence in performance. The divergence in the efficiency 
measures implies that the scope for efficiency gains possible by increasing the scope 
for competition. 
Pollitt (1995) examined the ownership and performance hypothesis in the various 
aspects of electricity services using both parametric and non-parametric techniques on 
a cross-country sample. In conformity with the battery of evidence on ownership and 
performance debate, his results showed that there are no significant differences 
between the two distinct ownership types. 
A more important aspect of the Pollitt study is in the realisation that the two 
techniques, parametric and non-parametric techniques, for measuring efficiency yield 
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similar results. To further the efficiency evaluation, uSIng a censored regression 
approach, Tobit model, he regressed the efficiency measures against some 
explanatory variables. Load factor emerges as a major determinant of efficiency. 36 
Pollitt (1996) examined the relative efficiencies of 78 publicly and privately owned 
nuclear plants operating in 1989 drawn form an international sample. He developed 
two linear programming models, the first including all the inputs used in electricity 
generation, and the second distinguished between discretionary and non-discretionary 
inputs.37 He found evidence for improvement in labour productivity, which he 
adduced to labour shedding as part of the restructuring of the nuclear power industry. 
Using the statistical methods and censored regression model, he tested the ownership-
productive efficiency hypothesis. The null hypothesis of no difference in efficiency 
could not be rejected in the ex ante case but otherwise in the ex post case. With the 
Tobit model he examined the impact of load, size, age, ownership and technology 
factors and found load and age to be important determinants of efficiency. 
Interestingly, the dummy variable included to capture the effect ownership was found 
to be insignificant. 
There are a number of other studies that use non-parametric linear programming 
techniques to investigate the efficiency and performance aspects of privately and 
publicly owned utilities. The strength of the empirical studies outlined below, apart 
from the fact that they provide insights into the performance of various electricity 
utilities, is that they provide additional heuristics for the methodology of performance 
assessment of electricity utilities. 
Cote's (1989) study on electricity utilities in the US for instance found co-operative 
utilities to have the lowest technical inefficiency followed municipally owned and, 
lastly, privately owned utilities. He concluded that efficiency varied with size of the 
firms. 
Seitz (1971) evaluated allocative, technical and overall efficiencies of steam-electric 
36 This is not surprising given that load factor is a measure of the success of capital utilisation. 
37 Pollitt called this ex ante and ex post, respectively. 
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generating plants in the US electricity industry estimated the industry's production 
function. Seitz, like Cote, found scale efficiency to be an important determinant of 
overall efficiency. The technique enabled the identification of excess factor use. 
Zeitsch and Lawrence (1996) evaluated the reform program of Australia's public 
infrastructure. They found that government intervention adversely affected 
performance of the public utilities. 
The inferences we can draw from the above studies reviewed are multifarious. First, 
there are key input and output variables that must be included in efficiency and 
performance analysis. Second, although non-parametric linear programming 
technique in itself sheds light on performance, it becomes much more cogent when 
combined with some economic hypotheses. Third, the empirical evidence shows that 
there is no a priori case for the superiority of private ownership over public 
ownership or vice versa. What these add to is that a case by case approach has to be 
taken to performance assessment, not just in terms of pertinent hypotheses but 
methodology as well. 
There are two main shortcomings in the literature, mentioned briefly in the last 
section that motivates this study. First, although the literature abounds with theoretical 
and empirical studies of efficiency and ownership, the number of studies that actually 
combine the two analytical aspects are few. Worse still, there is a serious dearth of 
studies that combine the two such that the empirical analysis tests the precept of the 
various theories. And even less, when it comes to studies that examine performance in 
the Nigerian electricity industry. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter we have reviewed a number of theories that focus on efficiency in 
production. The inference that can be drawn form the literature when we investigate 
efficiency in developing countries especially when public ownership dominates is that 
the profit objective of standard economic theory is not appropriate and has to be 
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supplemented by other factors. We focused on Leibenstein's X-inefficiency 
hypothesis and principal-agent theory as the appropriate framework to shed light on 
the performance of NEP A and how it can be improved. The rationale behind this is 
that productive efficiency cannot be taken as given. From this premise, the next thing 
is to examine the motivational aspects, hence, the principal-agent relationship. 
The other main issue examined was the economics of public sector enterprises. We 
concentrated on the motives for and implications of public ownership. Also, the 
differences between private and public ownership vis-a-vis the impact of privatisation 
is also examined. The issue regarding privatisation revolves around the review of the 
ideological and economic motives for public sector enterprises given their 
disappointing performance. 
The justification for the multifarious approach was ascribed to the fact that they 
emphasised different aspects of the behaviour of firms in their models. For example, 
property-rights theorists stress the crucial importance of ownership patterns in 
explaining the public's lack of incentive to monitor performance. Those models 
derive from the literature on the managerial theory of the firm emphasise the 
importance of exploring the genesis of government restrictions on managerial 
autonomy. 
Public choice theorists concentrate on the process which generates demand, and on its 
manipulation by management, in the face of efficiency monitoring difficulties or even 
disinterest on the part of the members of the polity. Behavioural theorists devote 
especial effort to exploring the process of goal formation. Goals are generally 
multiple, and in confused command systems may even be indeterminate, or have ill-
defined trade-offs. 
If the argument that the public ownership does adversely affect NEP A's performance 
is accepted as the modus operandi, then we can examine how changes in the 
institutional and organisational structure (due of the changes they bring to bear on the 
allocation of property rights, and hence motivation) will affect performance. The 
superiority of private ownership, as indicated in the empirical survey, does not enjoy 
universal assent. Indeed Vickers and Yarrow (1988) showed that under certain 
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circumstances public ownership could actually provide superior outcome compared to 
private ownership. The public ownership argument cannot be jettisoned at will 
because the arguments that gave rise to public involvement in economic activities in 
the first place are still very much in existence. 
Public enterprises' inefficiency, especially in developing countries, has led some to 
argue that privatisation may provide a more efficient alternative. As privatisation in 
some cases entails changing public to private monopoly, there is a need to address the 
issues of whether political goals are likely to be achieved at a cost in terms of 
economic efficiency. Privatisation may change the enterprise utility function, but not 
the market nor technological constraints. In a regulated environment, the principal 
becomes the regulator. As this analysis focuses on efficiency, the principal's objective 
function, that is, maximisation of social welfare will not change. The initial impact of 
ownership change comes from control constraint, which reflects changes in the 
underlying processes of planning, monitoring and control. 
The motives for privatisation may be many and various, from a desire to improve 
technical efficiency to an intention to exclude political opponents from a future source 
of patronage. The interest in the process in the last decade in the advanced economies 
such as the UK is both ideological and economic. In developing countries, the range 
of motives for the existence of public sector enterprises is extensive, and included 
their use as a substitute for the lack of entrepreneurial activity, to provide linkages for 
economic growth and as a counterweight to foreign ownership (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
1988). What this chapter has shown are the various issues that are involved in 
explaining the behaviour and performance of firms. In the following chapter, we 
outline the methods of measuring efficiency in production. 
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Chapter 4 Frontier Production Functions and Technical 
Efficiency Measurement: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Central to the evaluation of firm performance is the concept of economic efficiency. 
Efficiency is generally taken to consist of two components - technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency is defined as the capacity and willingness 
of an economic unit to produce the maximum possible output from a given bundle of 
inputs and a technology. Allocative efficiency is defined as the ability and willingness 
of an economic unit to equate its marginal product value with its marginal cost. 
A number of reasons exist for evaluating efficiency. First, it facilitates the direct 
comparison of firms, that is, it is indicative of relative efficiency. Second, the 
disparity in relative efficiency of firms acts as precursor to further analyse 
inefficiency, that is, the identification of the factors that influence performance. Third, 
performance analyses have policy implications for the improvement of efficiencies. 
Although the concept of efficiency in economic theory is not new, its measurement, 
on the other hand, is. The reason behind this can only be attributed to the fact that 
standard economic theory assumes full technical efficiency. There are reasons why 
this presumption may be considered flawed. First, there is the probability that the 
feasible maximum output might not be achieved in reality. This discrepancy is the 
basis of the concept of X-inefficiency developed by Leibenstein's (1960). Second, 
where technical inefficiency exists, it may exert an influence on allocative efficiency 
and that there will be a cumulative negative effect on economic efficiency (Bauer, 
1990; Kalirajan and Shand, 1992). The attainment of technical efficiency is central to 
the achievement of economic performance, and thus the importance of its 
measurement is underlined. 
The measurement of technical efficiency, compared to allocative efficiency, is more 
controversial. A number of methodologies are suggested in the literature. Kalirajan 
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and Shand (1999) reVIew the vanous methodologies for measunng technical 
efficiency and offer a comparison between established methods of measurement. 
4.2 Definition of Technical Efficiency 
The measurement of technical efficiency is premised on a description of production 
technology. The latter can be represented using isoquants, production functions, profit 
functions, or cost functions. Although the premises of these different approaches 
differ, the methodologies are fundamentally similar, and as such, their results are 
expected to converge. 
The discrepancy between feasible and observed efficiency, and the explanation of the 
efficiency measurement is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Output 
P' 
F 
P'--::;:::::;~ 
P 
A 
Input 
Figure 4.1 Technical Efficiency, Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency 
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In standard economic theory, all firms are assumed to operate at their potential 
technical efficiency along the frontier FF and inefficiency is attributed to allocative 
inefficiency. According to the precept of standard economic theory, economic 
efficiency will, thus, occur at point B, the point of tangency between factor price ratio, 
P'P', and the production frontier, FF. At this point, factor inputs II are used to 
produce output QI, and maximum profit, 7t}, is obtained, as there is neither technical 
nor allocative inefficiency. If, on the other hand, the firm is operating at point A, and 
it uses input level h to produce Q2, and the profit level, 7t2, may be obtained. Hence, 
the firms allocative inefficiency, or economic inefficiency/8 can be represented by 
( 7t2/7t1). 
In reality, however, we find that firms rarely operate on the feasible production 
frontier. Some of the reasons that preclude firms from operating on their technically 
feasible frontier can be ascribed to incomplete knowledge of best practice and/or 
inappropriate organisational behaviour. Thus, the operation of such a firm will occur 
on a sub-optimal frontier, such as AA (depicted in Figure 4.1). If, for instance, the 
reason for sub-optimal performance is due to lack of knowledge of best practice, the 
firm may be operating at point C, using h to produce Q3, and earning profit 7t3. Point 
C, as defined in the diagram, is allocatively inefficient. When the SUb-optimal 
production frontier is applicable, the firm's profit will be maximised when operation 
occurs at point D, where input level 13 is used to produce output level Q4. Although 
the firm attains allocative efficiency at point D, economic efficiency eludes it since, 
by definition, it requires the attainment of (maximal) technical efficiency. 
As described above, economic efficiency is comprised of two components, allocative 
and technical efficiency. Although implicit in the exposition thus far, the effect of 
inefficiency can be looked at from both profit and output perspectives. In terms of 
profit, the overall loss in economic inefficiency in operating at point C is (7t1 - 7t3). 
This loss can be decomposed into technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency 
constituents, which can be expressed as (7t3 - 7t2) and (7t1 - 7t2), respectively. In terms 
of output, the losses can be expressed as (Q2 - Q3) and (QI - Q2), respectively. 
38 Since all firms are assumed to operate under perfect technical efficiency. 
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This exposition provides the basic model for performance assessment. It forms the 
conceptual framework on which this efficiency analysis is based. Before expounding 
the analytical framework used in this thesis, an account of the various models for 
measurement of efficiency used in the literature is given in the following section.39 
4.3 Analytical Framework 
As described in the above section, the premise on which efficiency analysis is based is 
the frontier production function. The latter describes the maximum feasible output of 
a firm for different input mix given production technology. As such, the production 
frontier of the ith firm producing a single output with multiple inputs following the 
best practice techniques can be defined as, 
4.1 
where .0. and x/ s are the frontier output and inputs, respectively, of the ith firm, and T 
is the given technology. For this exposition, we assume that the ith firm is producing 
less than the feasible amount due to some organisational factors. The production 
function can then be written in a modified neo-classical framework as follows: 
4.2 
where Ui represents the combined effects of various non-pnce and organisational 
factors that constrain the firm obtaining it's maximum possible output .0* . The term, 
exp(ui), is therefore, firm-specific, and it reflects the ith firm's ability to produce at its 
present level. This level represents the firm's technical efficiency. 
The parameter, u, depends on the various constraints that face the firm. When there 
are no constraints, U assumes a value of zero, or a value of less than zero when there 
39 For a detailed account of the various approaches to measuring efficiency, see Fried et al. (1993) and 
Kalirajan and Shand (1999). 
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are constraints. A measure of the technical efficiency of the ith firm can subsequently 
be expressed as: 
y 
exp(u;) = i. 
I 
4.3 
Expression (4.3) represents the ratio of the actual output to maximum feasible output, 
and is the basic model used in the measurement of technical efficiency. As defined, 
the actual output is observable whilst the feasible output is not. Accordingly, a 
number of methods, premised on different assumptions, have been suggested to 
estimate the unobserved output, and hence, the component exp(ui). 
The two methods commonly used in the literature are the programmIng or 
deterministic methods (based on the pioneering work of Farell (1957)) and the 
statistical or stochastic methods (developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) 
and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), independently). A third approach also 
exist, this is, the Bayesian methods. A summary of this method is given below.4o 
4.4 Measurement Techniques of Technical Efficiency 
4.4.1 The Deterministic Frontier Production Function 
Given that maximum feasible output is defined by the best practice techniques used 
by a given group of firms, the focus, therefore, is to ascertain the maximal output 
level that can be obtained using the best practice technique at the firm level. The 
production function, known as the firm-specific frontier production function, may be 
estimated using a number of methods. 
Take the simple case of one-input one-output as an example. By invoking the 
assumption of constant returns to scale assumption, the output-input ratio may be 
calculated for a number of firms and the most efficient firms, those considered as best 
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practice, will compnse the efficiency frontier. When varyIng returns to scale 
assumption is imposed, the specification of a functional form for the relationship 
between input and output is required to define a frontier through the observations. The 
efficiency frontier is analogously defined by the most efficient firms. 
F or an exposition of the above concept, consider a firm that uses two inputs to 
produce one output, 
4.4 
As defined, the frontier can be estimated in terms of an isoquant. Assuming constant 
returns to scale, the ratio of each input to output, (X1/Y, X 2 /Y), can be plotted in a 
scatter diagram. Each observation in the scatter diagram represents a combination of 
the inputs Xl and X2 used to produce a unit of output, Y. A piecewise facet joining the 
lowest points would be the frontier production function. A similar smooth curve may 
be drawn when varying returns to scale assumption is invoked. Farrell (1957) used the 
former method to measure technical inefficiency, while Aigner and Chu (1968) fitted 
a smooth curve to show the frontier production function. 
By specifying a functional form, Aigner and Chu extended the above model to the 
general case of one output and m-inputs.41 They represented the production 
relationship as, 
v - A+XP1 x P xPm 1 i - iI' 12 , ..• , im i=1,2, ... ,n. 4.5 
Using double logarithmic the above non-linear expression can be transformed into a 
linear one, such as, 
Y· = a + "'/3 x .. , ~ j lj i=1,2, ... ,n. 
40 Detailed exposition of this method, along with the other two methods, is given in Kalirajan and 
Shand (1999). 
4.6 
41 Aigner and Chu (1968) showed that without specifying any probability distribution function for u, a 
frontier production function can be estimated by linear or quadratic programming techniques. 
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Assuming that the frontier production function is determined by the second 
expression on the right hand side, we can assert that each firm's output is bounded by 
a deterministic quantity for each combination of inputs, which can be expressed as, 
Y < a + "p.x ... I ~ } y 4.7 
In which case, the observed output of the ith firm can be expressed as, 
4.8 
where Ui is the difference between actual and maximum feasible output, and estimated 
by fitting the function a + L pjxij to represent the frontier production function on the 
assumption that Ui can be either negative or zero. The best practice firms will obtain 
maximum feasible output, and have a Ui value of zero. And for the less efficient firms, 
Ui will be negative - the value of which will depend on the degree of relative 
inefficiency. Programming techniques minimise the sum of absolute differences or the 
sum of squared differences respectively, under the constraints that all differences must 
be either negative or zero. 
The above-described technique has two primary advantages. First, it is easy to apply 
where the underlying function is linearly homogenous. Second, and more importantly, 
due to the structure of functional forms, its imposition on data set is often criticised as 
too restrictive. The restrictive assumption of constant returns to scale is a problem. 
Seitz (1970) attempted to relax the constant returns to scale assumption but the 
method was rather cumbersome and intractable. Second, regarding the definition of 
the efficiency frontier, not all the observations are taken into consideration. This 
makes technical efficiency scores susceptible to extreme observations and 
measurement errors. 
Chames et al. (1978) developed another programmIng technique for measunng 
technical efficiency. Their model is premised on a constant returns to scale 
technology. Banker et al. (1984) modified the model to incorporate varying returns to 
scale technology. These models are generally known as data envelopment analysis 
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(DEA). The production efficiency of a firm is measured in terms of the amount by 
which output can be increased to increase efficiency, given the level of inputs used by 
the firm in question. The premise of the measurement of production efficiency is the 
ratio of optimal output to input or optimal input to output depending on whether 
output or input specification model is adopted. A description of the DEA model and 
some of its extension to is given. 
4.4.1.1 Basic Data Envelopment Analysis 
To describe the DEA approach, we consider an enterprise that uses input vector x to 
produce output vector y. The objective of the DEA method is to measure the 
efficiency with which enterprises transform input vectors into output vectors relative 
to the best practice in a given sample. In other words, the goal is to determine how 
efficient vis-a.-vis production each enterprise is, using the conceptual approach 
suggested by Farrell (1957) which generalises the concept of Pareto efficiency to a 
context of multiple outputs and inputs. 
The DEA model developed by Charnes et al (1978), based on Farrell (1957) uses 
linear programming to formulate the efficiency problem, by attaching weights to each 
enterprise's inputs and outputs to solve the following problem 
V.x· O • dt. I I 
mIn '1'0 
U,v UrYrO 
4.9 
subject to 
where Y denotes outputs, x inputs; Yrj represents the rth output of enterprise j, xi} the 
ith input of enterprise j; U and v denote weights of outputs and inputs, 42 respectively, 
U
r 
is the coefficient of rth output that minimises ¢la, Vi the coefficient of ith input that 
42 An alternative interpretation of the weights is shadow prices. 
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minimises rPo; j = 1, ... , n represents the index of enterprises, i = 1, ... , m, the index of 
inputs, and r = 1, ... , s the index of outputs. 
The basic objective of this model is to derive a set of non-negative weights, which 
when applied to each enterprise's inputs and outputs, minimises the weighted input-
output ratio for the enterprise being evaluated, subject to the constraint that no firm in 
the sample has a ratio less than unity (which is optimal efficiency). 
The above ratio characterisation can be converted to a linear form by normalising the 
objective function with respect to the denominator. This conversion enables the 
problem to be stated as a linear programming problem. This form is generally referred 
to as the linear programming multiplier problem, and can be stated as follow,43 
mIn ViXiO 4.10 
u,v 
subject to 
For computational convenience, the dual of the above problem is solved to obtain the 
weights. The dual problem is referred to as the envelope problem and it is expressed 
as follows: 
maxB 
B,A. 
subject to 
(}YrO ~ AY 
A~O 
4.11 
43 For a detailed exposition of the various characterisation of the DEA method, see Chames et al. 
e 1994). 
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where X is an (m x n) input matrix with column Xi; Y is an (s x n) output matrix with 
columns Yn and A is an (n x 1) intensity vector. Expression (4.11) is solved 
iteratively to generate n optimal values of (B, A). The DEA model as represented by 
Expression (4.11) is the output-oriented permutation. An input-oriented model can be 
analogously defined by replacing the maximisation problem with a minimisation 
problem. 
In the output-oriented DEA model, an enterprise's performance is evaluated in terms 
of its ability to expand the output vector subject to the constraints imposed by best 
practice. Thus, the condition B:2: 1 will be strictly greater than one if expansion of 
output is feasible without changing the level of input, and equal to one if technically 
efficient. As e is a radial measure of technical efficiency, the efficiency condition of B 
being equal to unity is insufficient for technical efficiency as (~rO'xiO) may contain 
slacks. This distinction comes from the fact that there is some divergence between the 
Koopman's efficiency definition and Farrell's efficiency definition with the former 
being more stringent (Fried et al. 1993). At optimum, the following expression 
{B = 1,AX = xiO,Yrj = AY} characterises technical efficiency. 
4.4.1.2 Extensions of Data Envelopment Analysis 
Various attempts have been made to extend and develop further the basic DEA model 
described in the foregoing section - see Byrnes et al. (1984), Fare et al. (1985), 
Banker and Maindiratta (1988) and Sengupta (1989). A fundamental concern of some 
of the aforementioned work relates to the measured efficiency as it confounds the true 
efficiency with noise because the former is calculated relative to the deterministic 
frontier. Varian (1985) incorporated stochastic characteristics into the model to 
introduce two-sided deviations to include random noise and to calculate the efficiency 
measure free of such random noise. 
Land et al. (1989) developed a model known as the chance-constrained efficiency 
analysis as an alternative to the Varian's extension of DEA model mentioned above. 
The model by Land et al. (1989) allowed a deterministic frontier to capture the effects 
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of random noise without introducing stochastic characteristics. The effect of this is the 
introduction of further restrictive assumptions. In addition to the input and output data 
requirement of basic DEA model, the chance-constrained efficiency analysis requires 
data for the verification of the accuracy of the data and the risk profiles of firms being 
evaluated. The fact that standard errors are not directly provided by DEA method 
makes it difficult to ascertain the result as far as inferences and hypotheses testing are 
concerned. 
Charnes et al (1997) remarked on the fact that the usefulness of DEA in estimating 
and partitioning (X-)inefficiency rests on the variety of forms it can take. For 
instance, the inclusion of non-discretionary and categorical variables, the 
incorporation of judgement or ancillary managerial information, and the investigation 
of change over multiple time periods. The use of such variables might permit the 
partitioning of inefficiency among its proximate causes, including those related to the 
performance of the management. 
Banker and Morney (1986) provide the basis of the non-discretionary DEA model 
outlined below. The quintessence of the non-discretionary model is premised on the 
rationale that not all the variables involved in the production process are directly 
under the discretion of the management. The appeal of such a model is obvious when 
analysing the Nigerian electricity industry as the management of the public utility is 
burdened with social objectives alongside economic ones. It can be used to exclude 
variables beyond the control of the managers from the objective function of the DEA 
model while keeping them within the analytical framework as part of the constraint. 
This is particularly useful for taking the impact of usurpation of managerial autonomy 
by government on electricity production into consideration, as it is inconceivable that 
this will not affect the technical efficiency. The implication of a failure to separate 
variables into discretionary and non-discretionary variables may over-qualify the 
inability of the management to attain technical efficiency. 
The Banker et al. (1984) DEA model, an extension of the Chames et al. (1978) DEA 
model44 outlined in the previous section assumes that all the variables used in 
44 A convexity constraint of LA= 1 is introduced. This effectively converts the technology from constant 
returns to scale to varying returns to scale. 
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production are discretionary. The consequent failure to produce the maximal output 
results in decrease in efficiency score. In reality, however, inputs and outputs may be 
exogenously fixed, which may be beyond the control of management. For example, 
the lack of influence management has over the level of manpower employed due to 
government's use of public enterprises to meet employment policies. The rationale for 
non-discretionary variable lies in the observation that information about the extent to 
which non-discretionary input variable may be reduced is not meaningful for the 
management of the organisation. 
To develop the non-discretionary model, suppose that input and output variables may 
be partitioned into subsets of discretionary CD) and non-discretionary (N) variables. 
Thus, 
correspond to the set of input and output, respectively. The non-discretionary model 
based on the Bee model can be represented as follows, 
4.12 
subject to 
n 
LYrjAj - s; = YrO r = 1, ... , S 
j=l 
n 
(}x·o - " x.·A. - s-:- = 0 i E ID I L...IjJ I 
j=l 
n 
- L xijAj - s; = - xiO i ~ 1 D 
j=l 
where the index set r E 0D and i E 1 D are confined to discretionary outputs and 
inputs. Note that () to be minimised appears only in the constraint for which i E I D 
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whereas the constraint for which i f1. I D operates only indirectly (as they should) 
because the output levels XiO are not subject to managerial control. 
4.4.2 Stochastic Approaches 
Timmer (1971) pointed out a way by which the latent statistical deficiency of the 
DEA model can be circumvented. He introduced the concept of probabilistic approach 
to the deterministic frontier used by Aigner and Chu (1968). It entailed the deletion of 
three percent of the observation based on the rationale that they were affected by 
statistical errors. He applied linear programming technique to the remaining 
observation to estimate the frontier production function. 
Afriat (1972) proposed a specification that explicitly stated the distribution for output 
observations from the frontier values. The model can be represented as, 
Y = !(Xj ; b) exp(-uJ 4.13 
where the random variable exp(ui) is defined to have a flexible distribution, such as, 
beta or gamma distribution. The range of the random variable is between zero and 
one. This ensures that no observation lies below the frontier. With the Cobb-Douglas 
functional form, E[exp(ui)] can be considered to be a natural measure of the mean 
technical efficiency of the firms, as suggested by Timmer (1971). 
The above expression (4.13) can be transformed, linearly, into 
Y· = P+ "p.x .. -u· I ~ J Ij I 4.14 
where Xi is the vector of the logarithms of inputs and f3.J are a vector of unknown 
parameters. The parameters can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure. 
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Richmond (1974) suggested the corrected ordinary least squares method. Imposing 
Cobb-Douglas production type, he introduced an error term with zero expectation, 
namely, ej = n - uj where n = E(u;). Thus, the Expression (4.14) can thus be re-written 
as, 
4.15 
Essentially, the new error term satisfies all the standard OLS assumptions except the 
normality and r = fJo - n. The OLS estimators can be expected to be unbiased except 
the constant term. Richmond (1974) suggested using the moment of error distribution 
as a way of adjusting the intercept term.45 The main problem with this method is that 
the correction may not always yield non-negative error values for all the residuals 
(u; - e;) thus failing to satisfy the frontier hypothesis of efficiency. Greene's (1980) 
suggestion is that the intercept term should be corrected by shifting it up until no 
residual is positive and one is zero. An alternative technique is the stochastic frontier 
approach. This is discussed below. 
Schmidt (1976) invoked specific distribution assumptions for the error term U; and 
applied maximum likelihood to estimate the unknown parameters. He noted that if the 
disturbance term had an exponential distribution, then the maximum likelihood 
estimators of the unknown parameters are obtained by the use of the linear 
programming method. Conversely, assuming that the disturbance term has a half-
normal distribution, obtained by a truncation at zero of a normal distribution with zero 
mean and finite variance, the maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters can be 
obtained using quadratic programming methods.46 The asymptotic properties of these 
maximum-likelihood estimators are unknown as the restrictions given by 
y ~ I(X;, fJ) depend upon the parameters to be estimated (Schmidt, 1976). This, 
however, violates a condition for the variance of the maximum-likelihood estimators 
to be obtained using standard methods (see Theil, 1971). 
45 Richmond (1974) noted some shortcomings with this method. First, the residuals may follow a beta 
distribution, thus, there is no a priori justification for the gamma distribution. Second, he questioned the 
reliability of the empirical results that are obtained from a skewed distribution as they are affected by 
the size of the parameter, n. 
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Given assumptions analogous to the standard regreSSIOn In which the errors are 
identically and independently distributed with J..l and the variance if, and x's are 
uncorrelated, Schmidt (1976) observed that ordinary least squares (OLS) methods 
yield unbiased and consistent estimators of all parameters except for the intercept 
term.47 There is another method that takes account of statistical errors explicitly in the 
estimation of the frontier function as follows: 
til 
Yi = Po + L pjxij + Vi + Ui 
)=1 4.16 
where U is the difference between the individual firm's practice and the best practice 
technique. The disturbance term, u, can be zero or negative. The term, V, is the 
statistical error and other random factors, and it can be positive, negative or zero. 
Thus, the above equation means that a firm's frontier function can be defined by 
4.17 
provided it uses the best practice technique (u = 0) and there are no statistical errors, 
and the influence of external factors like impact of government employment policy on 
production is negligible (v = 0). If a firm uses the best practice technique, but there are 
either statistical errors, such as measurement errors or influence of external factors, 
then the firm's frontier function can be calculated as 
4.18 
where v indicates that the frontier is stochastic with random disturbance v. The 
implication is that the frontier function may vary randomly across firms or over time 
for the same firm. If there are no statistical errors and no influence of external factors 
on production, the firm's actual output will be equal to or less than the potential 
46 Schmidt pointed out that the Aigner and Chu (1968) estimates can be viewed as maximum-likelihood 
estimates under particular error specifications. 
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frontier output depending on whether the firm uses best practice. In other words, 
whether u is zero or negative respectively. 
The frontier function may be estimated by maXimum likelihood techniques. An 
advantage of specifying the density functions for u and v is that it is possible to 
identify whether the deviation from potential output can be attributed to not using best 
practice technique or to some other external random factors. It is, therefore, possible 
to infer about the cause of the anomaly between the potential and observed output. 
Assuming that u is non-positive, a number of density functions can be specified.48 
Technical efficiency for cross-sectional data can then be estimated as the ratio of 
actual output to the potential frontier output. 
The stochastic frontier approach described above, however, only provides average 
technical efficiency measures for the sample observations. Observation-specific 
technical efficiency measures are more useful from a policy viewpoint. Estimation of 
the stochastic frontier production function for a single cross-section of firms requires 
the explicit specification of distribution of statistical noise and inefficiency variable 
terms. Common distributions in the literature are the positive half-normal and the 
exponential. 
Criticisms levelled against the estimates of the production frontier focus on the 
assumption of the error distribution and the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
distributional specifications, particularly with regard to the measurement of technical 
efficiency. These problems can be circumvented with the use of panel data. Schmidt 
and Sickles (1984) highlighted three principal benefits accruing to the panel data in 
the context of production frontiers. First, no specific distributional specification is 
necessary for the efficiency disturbance for consistent estimation of the parameters. 
With panel data, the assumption of independence between inefficiency and factor 
inputs can be relaxed. An advantage of estimates based on panels over those based on 
single-cross-secti ons. 
47 OLS is considered inappropriate in the analysis of production frontier since it is an averaging 
technique. 
48 Aigner et al. used assumed a truncated normal (half normal) distribution for u, along with a normal 
distribution for v. Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), assumed an exponential distribution for u. 
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Panel models can identify the disturbance component which is technical inefficiency, 
separately from that which is statistical noise at the level of individual unit. The 
preponderance of the distributional assumption cannot be overlooked in the single 
cross-section equation in identifying the expected values of inefficiency term given 
the composed error. This makes the estimation of individual technical inefficiency 
difficult (Jondrow et al. 1982). Panel data circumvents this deficiency because the 
noise is averaged in the overall residual as the inefficiency term is observed over a 
number of periods. 
In a panel data framework, we can represent the stochastic frontier model involving n 
firms observed over T period as 
Yil = /30 + x;/ /3 + Vii - uil 
i = 1,2, ... ,n 
t = 1,2, ... ,T 
4.19 
As defined, Uu can be decreasing, remain constant or increasing, which means that 
technical efficiency may be improving, remain constant or deteriorating over time 
respectively. 
Thus, the model can be written as follows, 
where /30i = /30 - ui • 4.20 
Stochastic frontier can be estimated by either of two methods. First, the estimation of 
the parameters of the production frontier is done conditionally on fixed values of the 
U;, which leads to the 'fixed effects' model, and the 'within' estimator of the frontier 
coefficients. Second, the estimation is carried out marginally on the firm-specific 
While Greene (1980) considered the maximum-likelihood estimation of a stochastic frontier with 
gamma-distributed errors. 
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effect Uit, which leads to the 'random effects' model and either the generalised least 
squares (GLS), or the maximum likelihood (maximum likelihood) estimation of the 
parameters. The 'within' estimator of f3 is obtained by the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method as follows: 
4.21 
Thus, measures of technical efficiency can be expressed as TE = exp(ui ). 
In spite of the obvious advantage of the 'fixed effects' models in allowing correlation 
between the inefficiency term and the independent variables, and the fact that it does 
not require the imposition of a distribution form on the error term, caution need to be 
exercised when interpreting the results. This is because there is the possibility that the 
firm-specific effects would include the influence of variables that vary across firms 
but may be invariant over time. According to Simar (1992), the 'fixed effects' model 
provides a poor estimation of the intercepts and of the slope coefficients of frontier 
production functions. The consequence, therefore, is unreliable measures of technical 
efficiency. 
In the 'random effects' model, the stochastic nature of the efficiency effects is 
explicitly taken into account in the estimation process. The GLS estimation provides 
consistent and unbiased estimates of the parameters if the regressors, Xi!, are not 
correlated with the technical efficiency effects Ui!. If correlation does exist, then 
another estimation procedure proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) can be used. 
First, a test of the 'within' and GLS estimator, tantamount to the case in which all or 
none of the regressors are correlated with individual efficiency effects, is carried out. 
Then, an instrumental variable (IV) method is used to obtain unbiased and efficient 
estimators under the assumption that all or some of the variables are correlated with 
observation-specific individual efficiency effects. 49 
49 GLS technique estimates better than the 'within' technique due to its flexibility in including ti~e­
invariant regressors. The latter drops out in the fixed mode~ during n:ansfonn~tion. T~ereby makmg 
efficiency comparisons difficult as it compounds firm speCIfic technIcal efficIency WIth factors that 
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A number of models, defined in terms of the assumptions made regarding the firm-
specific technical efficiency effects, Uit, were considered by Pitt and Lee (1981). The 
first model assumes that the Uit are time-invariant, that is Uit = Ui. The second model 
assumes that the Uit are uncorrelated, that is cov(uit ' uit') = 0 for all i, t::j:. t ' and i:t= j . 
The third model assumes that the Uit for some observation are correlated over time , 
Assuming a truncated normal distribution, the maXImum likelihood estimation 
procedure, is suitable for estimating the first two models. Zellner's (1962) seemingly 
unrelated regression can be used to estimate the third model. This method, however, is 
not straightforward as it is premised on the assumption that the slopes are equal across 
time periods due to the intractability of the likelihood function when multivariate-
truncated normal distribution is specified. Invoking the assumption that the time-
invariant non-negative firm-specific Uit are truncated with distribution N(u, if), 
Battese and Coelli (1988) used maximum-likelihood as the method of estimation. 
The strong assumption of time-invariant firm-specific technical efficiency renders the 
analysis inapplicable, particularly for observations that extend over a large sample 
period. Sickles et al. (1986) attempt at relaxing the assumption led to a highly 
parameterised model which required maximum likelihood estimation on a highly non-
linear model. 50, 51 
Battese and Coelli (1992) considered the following model of time-varying firm-
specific effects for unbalanced panel data: 
4.22 
and 
influence time-invariant variables. The IV technique in tum has advantage over GLS technique in that 
there is scope for firm-specific effects to be correlated wit~ the ~xog.enous variables. . 
50 The high pararneterisation resulted from the fact that theIr estImatIOn was ~f a syste~ of equ~tIOns 
involving profit, output supply and input demand equations to measure technIcal and tIme varymg 
allocative efficiencies. 
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t E ¢(i); i=1,2, ... , n 
where the Ui are assumed to be independently and identically distributed non-negative 
truncations of N(f..l, a;) N; 1] is an unknown parameter, and ¢i represents the set of Ti 
time periods among the T periods involved for which observations for the ith firm are 
available. The model can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. A major 
limitation of this approach pertains to the parameterisation of firm-specific effects, Un, 
in that it is rigid. That is, technical efficiency must either increase or decrease at a 
decreasing rate (1] > 0), decrease at an increasing rate (1] < 0), or remain constant (1] = 
0). 
The underlying assumption in the above models is that the frontier production 
function is a neutral shift from the realised production function. This implies that the 
production response coefficients of the conventional function and the frontier 
production function remain constant with the exception of the intercept term. 
Khalirajan and Shand (1999) questioned this logic given that the discerning aspect of 
the frontier production function model compared to the conventional production 
function lies in the inclusion of observation specific production behaviour, along with 
factor inputs. Thus, the assumption that the observation specific production behaviour 
would result in the same factor input response coefficients that would then shift the 
frontier function neutrally from the realised production function is inconsistent. 
A non-neutral shift of the frontier from the realised production function is much more 
plausible, and perfect efficiency is attained when firm adopts best practice 
technology. The inference that can be drawn from this is that technical efficiency is 
primarily affected by the method of application of inputs, rather than by inputs per se, 
that is, scale of operation. Various non-price and organisational factors determine the 
method of application. Different methods of application will affect output 
considerably. The implication is that the slope coefficients will vary from firm to 
firm. Thus, using the same factor inputs, firms that use best practice technology will 
exhibit higher input-output response. 
51 Kumbhakar (1990) examined the model in which the firm-specific effects, Uih were the product of an 
exponential function of time involving two parameters and a time-invariant, non-negative random 
variable. 
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To consider the limitation of conventional constant slope approach, Khalirajan and 
Obwona (1994) proposed a model capable of distinguishing the efficient firms from 
the inefficient firms as an alternative approach to modelling observation-specific 
characteristics and estimating efficiency. Thus, the above discussed conventional 
constant-slope approach of measuring technical efficiency is not quite directly useful. 
This warrants an alternative approach of modelling observation-specific 
characteristics and estimating technical efficiency, distinguishing the best firms from 
the non-best firms, which is discussed below. 
4.4.3 The Stochastic Varying Coefficients Frontier Approach 
Khalirajan and Obwona (1994) developed the SVFA model as an alternative approach 
of modelling firm-specific production behaviour and of measuring firm-specific 
technical efficiency. This approach provides a different perspective in the 
methodology of efficiency measurement. As we would expect, different levels of 
outputs are obtained with same factor inputs when different methods of application of 
the same technology are used. The implication is that diversity of firm behaviour 
leads to variations in the production response coefficients, which include not only the 
intercept but also slope coefficients. 
A general formulation of the varying coefficients stochastic production frontier in 
terms of panel data can be expressed as, 
Yit = I fJijtxijt + Sit 
j 
i = 1,2, ... , n 
t = 1,2, ... , T 
4.23 
As defined Yit is the logarithm of output of the ith firm in the tth period; xijt is the 
logarithm of the }th input used by the ith firm in the tth period when} *- 1;52 Pi I t is the 
intercept of the ith firm in the tth period; and, Pijt, when j*-1, is the slope coefficient 
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concerning the jth input used by the ith firm in the tth period, and 8 is the disturbance 
term. 
The expression (4.23) implies that production response coefficients are specific to 
each individual decision making unit and to each time period for the same decision 
making unit. As expressed, (4.23) cannot be estimated as the number of parameters to 
be estimated exceeds the number of observations. Imposing certain restrictions on the 
structure of (4.23), using for instance, analysis of variance approach circumvents this 
problem, 
fl ··, = [J. + u .. + V .. ,· lj } lj lj j=l ,2, .. . ,m 4.24 
and 
where uij and Vjt respectively denote cross-sectional and temporal variation of the 
production coefficients [Jijt. 
Drawing on Kalirajan and Obwona (1994), the assumptions underlying the model 
represented by (4.23) can be used as the basis of estimating the individual response 
coefficient. Hence, technical efficiency is attained when best practice technique that 
involves the efficient use of inputs is adopted. Thus defined, technical efficiency 
stems from two sources. First, the efficient use of each input which contributes 
individually to technical efficiency and can be measured by the magnitudes of the 
varying slope coefficient [Jijt. Second, any other firm-specific intrinsic characteristics, 
which are not explicitly included, may produce a combined contribution over and 
above the individual contributions. This 'lump sum' contribution, if any, can be 
measured by the varying intercept term. 
Alternatively, the SIze of each response coefficient and the intercept, form the 
production coefficients of the stochastic frontier production function. Let [J* be the 
estimates of the coefficients of the frontier production function, that is, 
52 An intercept is included in this model by consideringj= 1. 
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i = 1,2, ... , n; 
j = 1,2, .. ,m; 
t = 1,2, ... ,T 
4.25 
where fl;, is the frontier coefficient of the jth input in the tth period, and flijt is the 
coefficient of the jth input of the ith firm in the tth period. The maximum possible 
frontier output for individual firms can be calculated as 
Yi: = I fl;,xij, + 8 il 
j 
i = 1,2, ... ,n 
t = 1,2, ... ,T 
The measure of technical efficiency of the ith firm can be expressed as, 
(TE)il = exp(Yil) / exp(y~) 
4.26 
4.27 
where Yit is the logarithm of the observed output of the ith firm in the tth time period 
and Yi: is the logarithm of the estimated frontier output of the ith firm in the tth time. 
An advantage of the above methodology is that the analysis can also be carried out 
with cross-sectional data. 
4.4.4 Bayesian approach (BA) 
Another recent method proposed that is different from the above sampling theory 
paradigms to measuring technical efficiency, is the Bayesian approach. It addresses 
the uncertainty issue concerning the sampling model to use by mixing a number of 
competing inefficiency distributions proposed in the literature with posterior model 
probabilities as weights. The choice of a particular distribution for the inefficiency 
term most favoured by the data can be made using Bayes factors as a criterion for 
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model selection. 53 As an example, consider the Bayesian approach of estimating the 
parameters of the above stochastic frontier model. Here, 
denote the vector of parameters to be estimated. Following van den Broeck et al. 
(1994), the Bayesian inference may be carried out by formulating a prior probability 
density function f( B) and combining this prior with the likelihood function f (yle) 
using Bayes' theorem to form a posterior probability distribution function, f(yle). As 
the dimension of 0 can be expected to be large and the algebraic form of f( B) 
complicated, van den Broeck et al. suggested the estimation of the marginal posterior 
probability distribution function, such as f(yiO) , so that the posterior expectations of 
any functions of the parameters can be estimated using the 'importance sampling'. 
One way of looking at the Bayesian approach is as an attempt to circumscribe the 
criticism levelled against stochastic frontier approach regarding the imposition of a 
priori sampling distributions on the efficiency-related random variable, u. 
Additionally, the Bayesian approach illuminates the difference between the random 
versus fixed effects issue particularly when panel data sets are used. 
There are a couple of drawbacks with the Bayesian approach. First, there is the issue 
of the specification of sampling distributions and the definition of prior procedure vis-
a-vis the computation of posterior moments and marginal densities. Second, Koop 
(1994) pointed the computational difficulty with Bayesian approach as evidenced in 
the empirical study of van den Broeck et al. (1994). The empirical analyses depend on 
Monte Carlo integration with 'importance sampling' for all parameters and the 
inefficiency terms. 
The verification of whether the Bayesian approach is suitable should include 
prediction and diagnostic testing of the assumptions. Though some of the verifications 
53 Koop, et at. (1994) have used 'Gibbs sampling' for Bayesian estimation of both the ~cated normal 
and gamma distributions. On the other hand, van den Broeck et al. (1994) have u~ed the Importance 
sampling' for the Bayesian estimation of the truncated normal model for the effiCIency term. 
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can be done uSIng recently developed statistical computational methods, some 
applications still require the development of additional computational methods. These 
above issues make application of the Bayesian methods computationally difficult, 
which accounts for the paucity of empirical analyses using this approach. 
4.5 Comparison of DE A, SFA, SVFA and Bayesian Approach 
The four approaches use the concept of a frontier to define individual firm-specific 
technical efficiency for a group of firms using the same technology and the level of 
technical efficiency of a firm is determined in relation to its own potential. In DEA 
and SVFA, however, the potential is calculated by allowing technical efficiency to 
vary over inputs. The firm that follows best practice techniques in its input usage can 
readily be identified in the sample. Thus, comparisons in firm performance are made 
in relation to actual observations in the sample. In SF A and BA, on the other hand, the 
potential is calculated by allowing technical efficiency to vary over all inputs taken 
together, therefore, the frontier parameter estimates cannot be identified with firms 
following the best practice techniques of applying inputs in the sample. 
While DEA and SVF A can facilitate identification of a benchmark of best practices in 
a given sample of observations, the SF A and BA can only provide a signal to indicate 
whether a firm's overall performance is adequate in terms of realising its own 
potential. 
When compared to the other approaches, DEA has two obvious advantages. First, it 
does not place any restriction on the functional form of the production relationships 
between inputs and outputs. Second, it does not require imposition of any 
distributional assumption on the firm-specific effect, Ui. Further, DEA can 
accommodate multiple inputs and multiple outputs simultaneously. 
The maIn disadvantages of the technique are that it can be sensitive to variable 
selection and data errors. Another limitation mentioned in the literature, is that DEA 
efficiency measures in small samples are sensitive to the difference between the 
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number of firms and the sum of inputs and outputs (Seiford, 1990; Weyman-Jones, 
1991). Due to this limitation, many firms may be seen to be efficient, even though 
they are not. 
An advantage of SF A is that vanous hypotheses concernIng modelling the 
technology, and characteristics of firm-specific efficiency measures can be 
statistically tested. Modelling production functions following SF A is in conformity 
with production theory. SF A offers flexibility in modelling various endogenous and 
exogenous aspects of production. Further, it facilitates decomposition of economic 
efficiency into technical and allocative efficiencies. A major criticism against SF A is 
that it requires the imposition of a specific distributional assumption on firm-specific 
technical efficiency, Ui. Although statistical testing procedures are available, they are 
all based on nested hypotheses testing. 
SVF A may be considered to possess some of the advantages of using both DEA and 
SF A, as it may be viewed as a stochastic counterpart of DEA. SVF A does not require 
the imposition of any special distributional assumption on firm-specific effects. The 
modelling of production technology following SVF A is in conformity with production 
theory. SVF A facilitates calculation of overall technical efficiency as in SF A, and also 
provides measures of input-specific efficiencies without involving any significant 
additional calculations. It also allows decomposition of economic efficiency into 
technical and allocative efficiencies (Kalirajan and Obwona, 1994). 
A major criticism which may be levelled against SVF A is that under special cases of 
the production process in which constant returns to scale are imposed on the 
individual response coefficients Pj' the estimation of frontier coefficients pj would 
be complicated and intractable. Even when the condition of constant returns to scale is 
imposed on the mean response coefficients Pj' then due to the relationship that fl*j = 
max. {fl.i + vii} the possibility that L fl; > 1 cannot be ruled out. In either case, the 
problem remains that the frontier may not be feasible if constant returns to scale were 
invoked in all the production processes. 
An advantage of the Bayesian approach to estimating potential output and measuring 
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technical efficiency is that the measures have the advantage of recognising parameter 
uncertainty by obtaining parameter-free marginal predictive probability distribution 
function. The specification of a prior distribution that reflects the beliefs about the 
parameters, plays a crucial role in the Bayesian estimation. There are two methods: 
one is 'non-informative' prior when there is no a priori information about the 
parameters of the model, and the other is 'informative' prior when there is a priori 
information about the parameters. The latter case is more complicated than the former 
in indicating how is the prior formulated. Also, the computation of the posterior 
results is not easy in many empirical applications. 
Stevenson (1980) noted that the various assumptions pertaining to the firm-specific 
inefficiency components make comparisons of empirical analyses incommensurate. 
Notwithstanding, attempts have been made to compare different estimation methods 
on the same data sets. Gong and Sickles (1992) used their Monte Carlo results to 
indicate that the relative performance of SF A vis-a-vis DEA is dependent by the 
choice of the functional forms. They found that when the specified functional form is 
a true or close representation of the underlying production technology, SFA 
outperforms DEA. With large scope for the mis-specification of the underlying 
functional form, and as the degree of correlatedness of inefficiency with regressors 
increases, DEA is more attractive than SF A. 
Kalaitzandonakes et al. (1992), in their study found that the technical efficiency of 
each individual observation in the sample varied widely when DEA and SF A were 
used as estimation procedures. Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) surveyed a selection 
of efficiency studies using DEA and SF A. They found that the degree of measured 
efficiency was very sensitive to the assumptions about the appropriate method of 
analysis. They noted that not only did SF A and DEA yield different estimates of 
technical efficiencies, but also provided different distributions of efficiencies among 
observations for the same data set. 
From the aforementioned studies that compare DEA and SF A, two salient points 
stand out. First, the efficiency measurement is determined by the choice of functional 
forms considered to represent the production technology. Second, DEA appears to be 
more appropriate when knowledge about underlying technologies is weak. On the 
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other hand, information about scale and substitution possibilities is best handled with 
SF A, BA or SVF A depending on what type of distributional assumptions for the error 
terms are considered. But, the Bayesian estimation based on 'non-informative' 
specification of a prior distribution, computational difficulty notwithstanding, would 
yield the same results as the SF A. 
4.6 Research Methodology 
Considering factors that influence performance such as competition, regulation and 
ownership type, there is the possibility that measured inefficiency is a reflection of an 
inability to completely measure quantity and quality of all relevant variables and to 
model objectives and constraints correctly. 54 More specifically, variation in technical 
efficiency can be attributed to variation in factors under the control of the producers, 
although the search for these factors rarely proceeds far beyond the allegation of 
variation in the (usually unmeasured) managerial input. In contrast, however, 
variation in allocative efficiency, in the literature has been attributed to numerous 
sources, including a divergence between expected and actual prices, a persistent 
under-valuation or over-valuation of prices, discrimination or nepotism (Kimeniyi, 
1985; Boehm and Hofler, 1987), and satisficing behaviour. 
There are, however, some deficiencies with the general methodology used in the 
literature. For instance, there is little attempt to integrate the literature on the theory of 
production under uncertainty (about technology or prices) into the efficiency 
measurement literature. The argument is that if producers are faced with some 
uncertainty about productivity and prices, then the scope for inefficiency becomes 
real. Second, little effort has been directed towards making use of the literature on the 
internal organisation of the firm in developing hypotheses on efficiency variation. 
Williamson (1975, 1985), Leibenstein (1976, 1987), Aoki (1984), and others have 
been developing models of intra-firm organisation, hierarchy, and performance. 
Furthermore, a huge literature on principals and agents and incentives has developed 
54 This is essentially the crux of Stigler (1972) argument against non-allocative type definition of 
inefficiency. 
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and we attempt to integrate these developments into the methodology used for 
assessing performance in this study. 
The ability to quantify efficiency and productivity provides the principal with a 
control mechanism with which to monitor the performance of production units under 
its control. The literature contains numerous examples of the use of 
efficiency/productivity measurement for this purpose. What we propose is to use in 
this study is a multi-dimensional approach to performance assessment. Thus, rather 
than solely assessing performance by evaluating productive efficiency, the breadth of 
the analysis is increased by also investigating total factor productivity and capacity 
utilisation in the Nigerian electricity industry. 
The empirical models used are explained in the relevant chapters along with an 
account of the respective models for measuring performance. Using different 
techniques outlined above to assess performance permits a deepening of the analysis 
while consistency in the empirical results will bolster the confidence in them when 
drawing inferences and policy implications. 
The thrust of this study is informed by two different, but not wholly unrelated 
hypotheses (see Chapter 3). The first is X-inefficiency hypothesis (Leibenstein, 1966) 
that the lack of 'pressures,' both internal and external, will lead to non-allocative, 
which in the parlance of the literature on performance assessment, is productive 
inefficiency. Following the reasoning of this hypothesis, therefore, we would expect 
the level of productive inefficiency to be higher in markets where competition is 
precluded. 
The second hypothesis is derived from the public choice and property rights literature. 
Basically, a change of ownership is said to influence the allocation of property rights 
and, hence, internal efficiency. The empirical analysis of this thesis, comprised of 
Chapters 5 and 6, is concerned, primarily, with identifying changes in productive 
efficiency to see if there is a case to be made for the reforming of the electricity 
industry in Nigeria. The second part of the analysis, Chapters 7, is of a normative 
perspective, considers the impact of ownership on performance, and examines how 
improvement in efficiency in production can be achieved. Structural limitations, in 
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particular, and the domination of the electricity industry in Nigeria by NEPA, 
preclude the analysis from addressing the public-private ownership hypothesis. 
As economic theory suggests, we would expect both ownership and competition to 
affect efficiency. Competition leads to greater allocative efficiency, since prices are 
related more closely to marginal costs, and provides incentives for management to 
minimise waste and maximise productive efficiency. Under monopolistic conditions, 
in contrast, the cost can be passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices. In the 
Nigerian electricity industry where there is no competition, and government sets the 
tariff persistently below cost of production, distortions can be expected to exacerbate 
inefficiency. Strictly speaking, although the impact of competition on economic 
efficiency is independent of ownership, it should also be recognised that where you 
have public ownership, governments usually restrict competition and introduce 
subsidies to protect their industries for a multitude of social and political reasons. 
Yarrow (1986) asserted that in choosing between product market competition and 
ownership, 'competition and regulatory policies are more important determinants of 
economic performance per se'. Kay and Thompson (1986) expressed a similar view 
but highlighted the difficulty of separating the effects of ownership from that of 
competition. Ideally, a thorough analysis of the performance of enterprises would 
require substantial data on market structures and their impact on organisational 
behaviour, which in the case of Nigeria just does not exist. 
There are studies that directly consider the performance of public and private 
ownership against an industrial organisation backdrop. Although the effect of 
competition on performance cannot be separated from ownership, this possibility 
must be borne in mind when interpreting the results from the performance assessment. 
Also, it is noteworthy that regulation can also be expected to affect performance. The 
consequences of regulation are even more difficult to evaluate, not to mention the 
difficulty associated with its modelling. The objective of the regulatory body is to 
ensure the universal access to electricity and the efficient operation of NEP A. This 
dual objective may entail a trade-off due to the impact on incentives on the outcome. 
We would expect this to affect the performance of electricity provision. 
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There is the danger that the effects of other exogenous factors can be erroneously 
summed with ownership in the reform debate. For instance, the performance of public 
enterprises in a mixed economy might be taken prima facie as supporting the case for 
or against government intervention. For example, superior performance of private 
firms may be due to innovation or the rigours of the capital markets. To overcome the 
effect of such exogenous factors on performance, it is necessary to assess the 
performance changes found for each of the organisations against broader structural 
and institutional factors affecting the electricity industry. To this end, the explanatory 
variables capable of discerning different influences of managerial autonomy and 
structure of the industry are included in the regression in investigating determinants of 
performance. It is recognised that the adjustments may not capture all exogenous 
effects, which by their nature may be multitudinous. The adjustments are best 
interpreted as an attempt to capture the general approach to provision of goods and 
services in Nigeria. 
To identify as precisely as possible the effect of government involvement, a 
longitudinal study of NEPA's production activities is undertaken. Inter-temporal 
analysis of productivity is also attempted to capture the changes in performance 
attributable to changes in different policies. This approach enables us to isolate more 
clearly the effect of changing the objective ofNEPA to commercialisation in 1992. 
Three models are used to assess the performance of the Nigerian electricity industry. 
As mentioned above, these are the DEA model, Malmquist productivity index 
approach and the stochastic frontier method. The justification for using these 
techniques is that apart from shedding light on efficiency and productivity, they 
enable direct inference and policy implications to be drawn - a central theme of this 
inquiry. For instance DEA, in addition to evaluating technical efficiency, indicates 
slacks and targets, and peer group, which are useful information if the activities of the 
firms under observation are to be projected onto the efficiency frontier. Malmquist 
index approach evaluates productivity growth and its concomitant sources. The 
stochastic frontier method enables the analysis of production structure and the testing 
of various hypotheses. 
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Further, to the best of my knowledge, there is virtually no study that specifically 
assesses the technical efficiency of NEP A. Thus, the approach adopted is one that 
examines the various hypotheses of public choice, X-inefficiency and principal-agent 
relationship. We use DEA to estimate the technical efficiency, and then explore the 
causes of inefficiency by examining the impact of some explanatory variables on 
efficiency measures. McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) and Pollitt (1995) used this 
approach albeit on schools in the US and electricity industry of developed countries, 
respectively. 
The methodological justification for the use of DEA may be questioned in the case of 
an electricity industry that is solely publicly owned and vertically integrated given the 
fact that the efficiency measurement techniques are comparative in nature. This pitfall 
is avoided by examining the efficiency of NEP A against a number of other electricity 
industries. Further justification for the use of the technique is provided by the fact that 
we are concerned primarily with productive as opposed to allocative efficiency. 
4.7 Data 
4.7.1 Definition of Variables and Sources 
F or the purpose of estimating technical efficiency as a way of assessIng the 
performance of NEP A, three data sets were constructed. First, two sets of cross-
sectional data covering the years 1987 and 1995 are used. The sets are comprised of 
industry level data on the electricity sectors of 29 developing countries. The selection 
of the 29 developing countries was based primarily on the availability of data, 
similarity in their economic development using electricity consumption per capita, 
and the composition of their electricity industry. The second set of data is a time 
series data on a set of key variables for the Nigerian electricity industry covering the 
period 1970 to 1995. The third and final data set is panel data comprised of the 
variables of the current eight electricity stations that generate electricity under the 
auspices ofNEPA. This data set covers the period 1990 to 1995. 
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The cross-section data that corresponds to the first data set mentioned above is 
constructed from a World Bank publication: 1987 and 1988 Data on the Power 
Sectors of 100 Developing Countries (compiled by Escay, 1988 and 1989, 
respectively). The information from this source is aggregated at the industry level 
making it appropriate for our inter-country comparison in determining the relative 
performance ofNEPA vis-a-vis other electricity industries. 
Unfortunately, the data series were discontinued by the World Bank depriving us of 
information for the subsequent years. Attempts were, however, made to construct a 
more up to date data set. The construction of such a data set for all the subsequent 
years was a particularly difficult task. The main constraint was the lack of resources 
to compile the necessary information from the same sources as obtained by the World 
Bank in the data series mentioned above. Nevertheless, a complete set for 1995 was 
constructed. 
The cross-section data used in the analysis is comprised of information on a sample of 
29 electricity industries in developing countries for 1987 and 1995. This data set 
improves upon Yunos and Hawdon (1997) in which their data set is comprised of 
1987 data only. A number of issues were considered in building the data set. The first 
was the concern of sample size and composition. To make sure that countries included 
in the data set are comparable to each other, GDP per capita was introduced as a 
criterion, and countries with similar GDP per capita level in 1970 were taken into 
consideration. 
The year 1970 was chosen because at that time, most developing countries had 
embarked on their path of economic development. The choice was generally between 
either laissez faire or government control. This impacted not only on the 
organisational structure of various industries but also the performance of the 
industries as the two approaches embody different incentive systems. The choice of 
direct government involvement, which appeared as an innocuous choice at the end of 
the 1960s later turned out to be a key determinant of performance and economic 
development. 
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Attempts to construct a data set for performance comparison between two distinct 
period drew on materials from the United Nations, London Economics, a firm that 
consults for the World Bank, and direct contact of some of the electricity utilities in 
the sample. London Economics graciously allowed me access to their rich corpus of 
information on the electricity industries of a number of developing countries. The 
information obtained from this source, in conjunction with those form the United 
Nations Energy Statistical Y earbook (various years) and the various reports from 
individual utilities, were used to construct a cross-section data for 1995. The 
definition of the variables and how the data were manipulated to conform to those in 
the World Bank (1990) are described below. 
F or the assessment of NEP A's performance, two data sets were constructed. The first 
is comprised of a time series data on the key variables for the electricity industry in 
Nigeria covering the period 1970 to 1995. The second set is comprised of panel data 
of the eight electricity-generating stations that are currently in service. The periodicity 
of the data and the fact that the data is disaggregated compensates for the paucity of 
years. 
The purpose for which this data set is employed is to examine the impact of the 
changes that were instituted towards the end of the 1980s directly contributed to the 
disappointing performance ofNEPA. This data set is used in the productivity analysis, 
which forms the subject of Chapter 6. It is hoped that these two data sets will be 
robust enough to enable us to investigate and test the various hypotheses posited 
about the relationship between ownership and performance. 
NEP A is virtually the only source of statistical information on electricity supply and 
demand in Nigeria. Although electricity purchased by NEP A from private enterprises 
such as Nigeria Electric Supply Company, Shell Company, and African Timber and 
Plywood Company were reported, they were aggregated under the category of 
"purchases" which effectively denied us the ability to juxtapose privately and publicly 
generated electricity. Some other government agencies, for instance, the Federal 
Office of Statistics (FOS) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), publish statistical 
information on electricity supply and consumption, the source of the primary data is 
the same. 
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There were two main criteria used for the selection of the countries in the sample. The 
first is premised on level of development and per capita production and consumption 
of electricity and the second on the organisational and institutional structure of the 
electricity industries. The former entailed selection on the level of electricity 
production per capita in 1970. 
The purpose of this was to see whether there is any discernible pattern in the 
organisational and institutional structure and the growth of the electricity industries in 
these countries. The second criterion was based on the World Bank distinction 
between countries that have reformed their electricity industries and those that are 
reforming compared to non-reformers. The sample was found to be representative of 
the spectrum of developing countries. 
The rationale for this selection procedure is to see whether there is a discernible 
pattern in the groupings of electricity industries into efficient and inefficient subsets 
along the above mentioned axes. A performance comparison is made over two time 
periods to see how different reform programmes have impacted on efficiency and 
productivity growth. The subject of this analysis is on the least developed countries, 
and the aim is to see whether the common issues and problems that affect the 
performance of these countries as enunciated by the World Bank (1993) are 
corroborated by empirical findings. 
The second set of criteria pertains to the variables used in efficiency measurement. 
Weyman-Jones (1993) mentioned that there is an inverse relationship between the 
number of variables included in a DEA model and the effectiveness of the DEA 
model to estimate relative efficiencies. He indicated the expediency of keeping the 
number of input and output small relative to the number of firms. 55 This is because as 
the ratio (Y+X)/N increases, the ability that any given firm will find some set of output 
and input weights which will make it appear efficient. Thus, parsimony is the key to 
the variable selection - to avoid mis-specification of model. Because the focus of this 
55 A similar point was made by Boussofiane et al. (1991). The larger the number of inputs and outputs, 
for a given number of decision making units, the less discriminatory the DEA model becomes. 
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analysis is efficacy with which inputs are successfully converted to outputs, we 
include only the key variables in our analysis. These variables are (i) gross electricity 
generated; (ii) level of manpower; (iii) generating capacity; and, (iv) fuel input used to 
generate electricity. Definitions of the various variables are given below. 
With respect to input and output specification, we adopt methods similar to those in 
other empirical studies of electricity generation (Fare et aI, 1994; Golany et al. 1994; 
Pollitt, 1995). Output is defined as total electricity generated in kWh. Inputs are 
labour, capital and fuel. Labour is taken as the average number of employees. Primary 
energy used in electricity generation is converted to a common unit of measurement, 
namely, tonnes of oil equivalent, to avoid the problems with different fuel 
measurement units. Capital is defined as installed capacity and measured in MW. 
In addition to the above inputs, Yunos and Hawdon (1997) included system losses in 
their set of input variables. They argued that the level of system losses is indicative of 
effectiveness of maintenance and operation of the electricity system. 56 While the 
methodological rationale behind the inclusion of such a variable is unambiguous, the 
practical dimension is more difficult because losses are an inevitable part of electricity 
generation and supply due to the nature of electricity transmission. The closer we 
move towards low voltage supply, the higher the level of losses. Data on electric 
power losses, however, is aggregated and to avoid the problem of double-counting, 
we leave it out and concentrate on efficiency in electricity production rather than 
efficiency in provision or overall efficiency. 
When we consider the 1987 data set, for the two sets of countries, as present in Table 
4.1, we observe that there is only a slight disparity in the variables. For instance, the 
average electricity generated by the reformers in 1987 was 10717 G Wh compared to 
10793.22 GWh for the non-refromers countries. A marked contrast is observed 
between the two groups in 1995. The statistics were 17981.62 MW and 53946.13 MW 
for reforming and non-reforming countries, respectively. This disparity and general 
Satisfactory discrimination is obtained if the number of units present in the assessment set is three 
times the number of inputs multiplied by the number of outputs. 
56 8agdadioglu et al. (1996) included losses as input since it reflects the quality of the system in terms 
of how much electricity is lost in the transmission and distribution processes. Further, it also captures 
much electricity is unaccounted for other reason, such as illegal usage. 
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pattern is observed for all the other variables in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Efficiency Measurement 
Reformers Non-Reformers 
Year Mean Standard Mean Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
Outputs 
Total Electricity 1987 10717.08 11859.22 10793.22 10983.46 
Generated (GWh) 1995 17681.62 22546.37 53946.13 74135.77 
Inputs 
Labour 1987 24527.92 35703.92 25272.95 33180.58 
1995 16244.54 15802.90 30703.50 44711.83 
Capacity (MW) 1987 3367.31 3603.29 3383.04 3336.56 
1995 4942.08 5772.04 11673.88 14898.05 
Fuel (Btu) 1987 2412.09 2988.36 2450.51 2770.68 
1995 3598.22 5059.46 9352.19 11547.00 
The third set of criteria applied is referred to as auxiliary or qualitative variables. The 
inclusion of this set of variables is to facilitate explanation of the technical efficiency 
measures. The proxy variables that were considered included the following 
categories: (i) public/private ownership57; (ii) reformers/non-reformers; (iii) 
government interference/ autonomy; (iv) social/economic objective precedence; (v) 
proxy for maintenance (losses); and, (vi) revenue and expenditure. For the variables, a 
number of criteria in the same vein as Golany et al. (1994) were used. The three main 
criteria used in variable selection are site-specific factors, operation-specific factors 
(generating plant composition) and managerial factors (organisational structure, level 
of autonomy of utility management). 
Of the above variables that were considered, two of the categorisation was used. The 
first, percentage of public provision is indicative of the extent to which the private 
sector is involved in the provision of electricity supply. The justification for this is 
that we can expect this categorisation to have both institutional (ownership structure) 
and organisation (hierarchy or market) impact on the structure of the electricity 
57 This categorisation is also used to capture market structure. 
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industry, and hence, on performance. The second variable is a dummy variable for 
reform with 1 indicating reform and 0 otherwise. The categorisation is particularly 
relevant to the section in which we consider the factors that affect performance. 
Generally speaking, the impact of reform emanates from the rationalisation of the 
various activities based on their technical and economic characteristics. For instance, 
reformed industries have moved away from the original position that generation is a 
national monopoly by allowing direct or indirect competition 
Further investigative exerCises into the determinants of technical efficiency and 
performance of NEP A are attempted. The approach used entailed regressing the 
efficiency measures derived by DEA against a set of explanatory variables. The 
general form can be specified as follows. Technical efficiency measure can be 
described asf(Y, X, Z, losses), where Z is comprised of variables such as ownership, 
reform and percentage of thermal capacity. And with the estimates of this regression, 
we can further investigate the various hypotheses on performance and ownership 
outlined above and in Chapter 3. 
In sum, to perform an analysis of efficiency in production on the activities of a key 
industry like the electricity industry, robust information is required if policy 
implications are to be drawn. An international comparison provides a benchmark as a 
tool for productivity enhancement by promoting indirect or yardstick competition 
especially as monopoly elements weaken incentives for good performance making 
actual performance deviate from optimal outcomes. The methodology adopted in this 
study draws from Pollitt's (1995) assessment of the effect of ownership on 
performance of electric power utilities in developed countries. The method 
implemented for the data analysis is based on Fare et al. (1994). Linear programming 
technique is used to calculate the various components of efficiency. 58 The technique 
envelops all the observation to construct a non-parametric piece-wise frontier over the 
data. The efficiency of each observation is then calculated relative to the best practice 
frontier. 
58 Hawdon and McQueen (1996) and Coelli (1996) illustrate how the linear programming problem is 
formulated to calculate efficiency. Further, how the application of weights calculated projects the firm 
under observation towards the derived best practice production frontier. 
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The data set have been constructed in such a way that enables us to measure the level 
of efficiency using DEA. The advantage of this non-parametric approach is that its 
data requirement is relatively straightforward. Second, in addition to the relative 
efficiency measure that can be derived from this approach, it is also has the ability to 
indicate type (source) of inefficiency. In the same vein as the methodology used by 
Pollitt (1996), the efficiency measures derived from the DEA models can be regressed 
against a number of variables that may affect the performance of electricity 
generation. It is for this purpose that the third data set described above was 
constructed. 
4.7.2 Data Limitation 
Part of the initial plan for this study involved the collection of physical and cost data 
on output and inputs for all the generating stations over the period 1970 to 1995. This 
data was to be used to estimate a variety of non-parametric, stochastic frontier 
production and cost functions, in order to investigate the structure of the technology 
and to estimate technical, allocative and overall economic efficiencies for all the 
plants. The collection of the data, however, proved a difficult endeavour. On one 
hand, the change from a proliferated industry to a monopoly reduced the number of 
comparable electricity utilities. 
Further change occurred with the shift towards larger plants to exploit economies of 
scale. This effectively reduced the number of generating stations to eight plants. 
Another limitation to collection of robust data set is attributed to the poor record 
keeping practices of NEP A. Thus, after abortive effort of attempting to collect a 
comprehensive data set, the industry level study is restricted to an analysis of physical 
data only while both physical (and cost) data were compiled at the generating station 
level for the period covering 1990 and 1996. 
The data limitation encountered explains the multiple approach of this analysis. Thus, 
the present analysis involves the estimation of non-parametric and stochastic frontier 
production functions and the prediction of technical efficiency form these estimated 
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functions. The lack of cost data (at the industry level) precludes the estimation of cost 
functions and the prediction of allocative or overall economic efficiencies. 
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Chapter 5 Technical Efficiency and Productivity of 
Electricity Generation in Nigeria: Application of DE A and 
Malmquist Indices 
5.1 Introduction 
Prior to the establishment of NEP A in the early 1970s, the Nigerian electricity 
industry could reasonably meet the electricity needs of the country. Electricity outage 
was low, and by the mid-1970s the level of electricity production was high enough for 
export to the neighbouring countries of Chad and Niger Republic. By the late 1980s, 
however, what remained of the "golden age" was the relic of inter-country grid that 
NEP A once exported electricity to neighbouring countries. At present, electricity 
outage is of daily occurrence. Generally speaking, the deterioration of electricity 
provision became widespread with the macroeconomic decline of the mid-1980s. 
Although there is no doubt that additional capacity is required to meet electricity 
demand, just as much as the alignment ofNEPA's objective purely along economic 
lines is necessary for effective provision of electricity, an assessment of NEP A's 
performance is necessary. In addition to ascertaining the level of technical 
inefficiency and how it can be improved, measurement of efficiency forms an integral 
part of the reform process that is urgently required in the Nigerian electricity industry. 
There are a number of studies that examine the Nigerian electricity industry (as 
outlined in the literature review of Chapter 4). It is surprising that given the 
disappointing performance of NEP A and the imminent reform, there is no analysis of 
production and/or relative efficiency in the Nigerian electricity industry. It is the gap 
in the empirical literature that we intend to fill with the analysis of electricity 
generating performance. 
In this chapter, we investigate the technical efficiency of the Nigerian electricity 
industry. Firstly, we compare the industry to those of other developing countries. The 
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purpose of this is twofold: to see whether the Nigerian electricity industry is indeed 
one of the worst electricity industries in the world in terms of performance (World 
Bank, 1994); and, to see what we can infer about efficiency in production from a 
comparative analysis. Secondly, a longitudinal study of the Nigeria electricity 
industry is conducted over the period sample 1970 to 1996. The purpose of this is to 
investigate the pattern of efficiency of electricity production. 
In a similar manner to Yunos and Rawdon (1997) and Meibodi (1998), data was 
collected on the electricity industry of 29 countries for 3 operational years, 1987, 
1988 and 1995. Two different approaches of efficiency measurement were adopted: 
non-parametric and parametric. In this chapter, DEA and Malmquist productivity 
index are used to evaluate technical efficiency and productivity of the electricity 
industry in Nigeria. Data on the generating plants under the aegis of NEP A are used 
both in the longitudinal analysis of this chapter and the stochastic frontier analysis of 
the following chapter. 
To determine the factors that influence efficiency of electricity production, the 
estimated technical efficiency measures derived from DEA are regressed against some 
explanatory variables. This method is better known in the literature as the two-step 
procedure of estimating efficiency (Grosskopf, 1986). It contrasts with the single step 
of the stochastic frontier analysis. A comparison of the two approaches is made in 
Chapter 6. 
5.2 Theoretical Issues 
F or completeness, a summary of the diverse theoretical strands pertinent to the 
ownership-efficiency debate given in Chapter 3 is reiterated in this section. The main 
theoretical perspectives cited in the literature are property rights, public choice, X-
inefficiency and regulated monopolies (Byrnes et al., 1986; Pollitt, 1995). The 
dominant models of explaining the performance of ownership and performance, 
however, are public choice and property rights. We are of the conviction that although 
both theoretical strands yield insightful results, the scope of an analytical framework, 
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particularly when it comes to analysing developing countries, may necessarily have to 
be expanded to include Leibenstein's X-inefficiency hypothesis to explain the 
perfonnance of a public enterprise like NEP A. This view is premised on the 
perception that X-inefficiency, property rights and public choice theory are not 
competing theories. Further, although electric utility is owned and controlled by the 
government in Nigeria, this analysis is based on a more subtle distinction: the 
tendency of electric utilities in developing countries towards public or private 
ownership and the concomitant impact on institutional and organisational structures 
rather than ownership per se. 
The central thesis of the property rights literature (Alchian, Demsetz, and De Alessi) 
is that public ownership attenuates allocation of property rights in such a way that it 
creates monitoring problems and adverse behavioural incentives, which may, 
effectively, reduce incentives to minimise costs. Public enterprises can survive for 
long periods, and their managers prosper in the presence of persistent deficits and 
grossly inefficient management. For any given level of output, publicly owned finns 
are expected to have higher total costs than their private counterparts, and may be 
expected to use more inputs (De Alessi, 1974). This is in addition to De Alessi's 
(1969) argument that we can expect to find publicly owned enterprises not to be scale 
efficient compared to their privately owned counterparts because of myopic 
behaviour. 
The justification given for the creation of statutory monopolies when it comes to 
public provision of infrastructure services is that they can be expected to charge lower 
prices and produce higher output than similarly situated privately owned finns (Bos 
and Peters, 1988). This view is consistent with that of earlier economists as a 
justification for state provision of some goods and services (see Schleifer, 1998). 
Although low prices meet other objectives, such as social or political, it can be argued 
that low price objective in practice imply less incentives towards productive 
efficiency than profit maximisation as government invariably provide production 
subsidy to the public enterprises. 
The spin put on by public choice literature, particularly the theory of bureaucracy 
associated with Niskanen (1971, 1975), is that public finns will perfonn less 
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efficiently than their private counterparts. The rationale behind Niskanen's argument 
is that, in terms of scale efficiency, it can be expected that publicly owned enterprises 
will not be scale efficient and would be expanded beyond the optimal level. 59 
Leibenstein (1966) hypothesised that as a consequence of X-inefficiency, monopolies 
are likely to be less efficient, irrespective of ownership. The reason being that 
management is lacking in motivation due to lack of internal and external pressures. 
Specifically on technical efficiency, Leibenstein argued that utility with or granted 
monopoly status, will exhibit significant deviations from technical efficiency. 
An investigation of regulation indicates how the relationship between ownership and 
efficiency is complicated further. Modem theories of regulation suggest that the 
existence of imperfect information can reduce efficiency. And since private utilities 
are subject to regulation, the case for relatively higher efficiency levels in privately 
owned enterprises is no longer clear cut. Crain and Zardkoohi (1980) maintain that 
privately owned firms will still have lower costs, and hence higher technical 
efficiency, since they have more incentives to protect rent. 
Biases in input proportions due to regulatory effects will not necessarily be reflected 
in terms of technical efficiency, but rather in terms of allocative efficiency which is 
generally more difficult to test directly. The empirical study by Hausman and Neufeld 
(1991) examined the effect of ownership and efficiency question without the 
obfuscation of the analysis by regulation by using data on the US electricity industry 
prior to the rate ofretum regulatory regime at the tum of the century. 
5.3 Sample and Data Selection 
To perform an analysis of efficiency in production on the activities of a key industry 
like the electricity industry, robust information is required if policy implications are to 
be drawn. A cross-country comparison provides a benchmark as a tool for 
productivity improvement by promoting indirect or yardstick competition especially 
59 See Chapter 3 for detailed exposition of this argument. 
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as monopoly characteristics weaken incentives for optimal social outcome making 
actual performance deviate from optimal outcomes. 
The methodology adopted in this study draws from Pollitt's (1995) assessment of the 
effect of ownership on performance of electric power utilities in developed countries. 
The method implemented for the data analysis is based on Fare et al (1994), which are 
then transformed into linear programming models in order to calculate components of 
efficiency. The technique envelops all the observation to construct a non-parametric 
piecewise frontier over the data. The efficiency of each observation is then calculated 
relative to the best practice frontier. 
Two main criteria used for the selection of the countries in the sample. The first is 
premised on level of development and per capita production and consumption of 
electricity and the second on the organisational and institutional structure of the 
electricity industries. The former entailed country selection on the level of electricity 
production per capita in the 1970s. The purpose of this was to see whether there was 
any discernible pattern in the organisational and institutional structure and the growth 
of the electricity industries in these countries. The second criterion was based on the 
World Bank distinction between countries that have reformed and those that are 
reforming compared to non-reformers. The sample was found to be representative of 
the spectrum of developing countries. The rationale behind this selection procedure 
was to see whether we can discernible a pattern in the groupings of electricity 
industries into efficient and inefficient subsets along the above mentioned axes. 
With respect to input and output specification, we adopt methods similar to those in 
other empirical studies of electricity generation (Fare et ai, 1994; Golany et ai, 1994; 
Pollitt, 1995). Output is defined as total electricity generated in kWh. Inputs are 
labour, capital and fuel. Labour is taken as the average number of employees. Primary 
energy used in electricity generation is converted to a common unit of measurement, 
namely, tonnes of oil equivalent, to avoid the problems with different fuel 
measurement units. Capital is defined as installed capacity and measured in MW. 60 
60 The data set used for this analysis are reported in Appendix F. 
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5.4 Empirical Model 
5.4.1 Data Envelopment Analysis Model 
In this section, the DEA model developed by Banker et al. (1984) is used to evaluate 
NEPA's relative scale and productive efficiency measures is introduced.61 The basic 
DEA model, briefly described in Chapter 4 has two orientations, input and output 
oriented model. According to Chames et al (1997), the main difference between the 
two orientations can be attributed to the way each model projects the inefficient firms 
onto the efficient production frontier. For instance, in the input-oriented Banker et al 
(BCC) model (1984), the focus is on the maximal movement toward the frontier 
through proportional reduction of inputs, whereas the output-oriented model focuses 
on maximal movement via proportional augmentation of outputs. 
Secondly, the problem that is being investigated also predetermines the choice of 
DEA model. As the problem of NEP A is generally perceived to be an inability to 
meet the electricity demand of its consumers, and taking the stated objective of 
maximum electricity production, the output orientation BCC model is the more 
appropriate for this analysis. 
A further reason for choosing the BCC model is the obvious difference in scale of 
operations between the small plants and the larger plants. The BCC model offers a 
distinction between scale and technical efficiency and, thus, can differentiate between 
various sources of inefficiencies. An important criterion for choosing BCC model as 
opposed to CCR model can be attributed to our interest in scale efficiency. Scale 
efficiency can be used to determine how close a firm under observation is to the most 
productive scale size (Forsund and Hjalmarsson, 1979; Banker, 1984; Banker and 
Thrall, 1992). 
61 The second type of basic DEA model is that by Chames et al (1978). This model's main attribute is 
that the underlying production technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. The 
difference between Charnes et al model and that by Banker et al (1984) model outlined above is the 
absence of the convexity constraint, LA = 1. The significance of this constraint is that when it is 
dropped, it enlarges the feasible region from a convex to a conical hull. 
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It may be calculated as the ratio of the measure of technical efficiency calculated 
under the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) to the measure of technical 
efficiency calculated under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) (Banker, 
Chames, and Cooper, 1984; Fare, Grosskopf, and Lovell, 1985). The BCC model 
gives a measure of technical efficiency under VRS orientation. An input measure of 
technical efficiency under CRS is given by the solution to the input-oriented CCR 
primal model (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978), which is the BCC model less the 
convexity constraint. The difference between the BCC and CCR models is that the 
latter does not include the convexity constraints. The effect of the constraints is to 
enlarge the feasible region for the solution, and characterises the data as satisfying 
constant returns to scale. Scale efficiency (SE) for each enterprise is given by SE = 
9*CCR 19*BCC, where the numerator is the solution to the CCR model, and the 
denominator the solution of the BCC model. 
A enterprise may be scale inefficient if it exceeds the most productive scale size, thus 
exhibiting decreasing returns to scale. If the enterprise is smaller than the most 
productive scale size it will exhibit increasing returns to scale. In both cases, it fails to 
take full advantage of increasing returns to scale. Fare et al. (1985) showed that the 
source of scale inefficiency may be found for each firm by invoking different 
assumptions regarding returns to scale and then comparing the measures of technical 
efficiency found under assumptions of constant returns to scale, varying returns to 
scale, and non-increasing returns to scale. This is achieved by replacing the strict 
inequality on the convexity constraint with a weak inequality. As a result of this 
comparison, returns to scale can be characterised as being increasing, constant, or 
decreasing. 
The linear programming characterisation outlined below for this exposition is derived 
from the fractional programming problem (Charnes et al. 1997). The ratio form of the 
DEA model has a more intuitive appeal since it extends the single-input, single output 
approach for performance assessment to multiple-input, multiple-output situation. 
The "virtual" input or "virtual" output aspect of the technique provides a measure of 
efficiency that is a function of the multipliers where the ratio to be maximised or 
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minimised forms the objective function for the firm under observation. The linear 
programming characterisation is the form used in evaluating performance because of 
its computational ease. The linear programming formulation, outlined below, shows 
how the model maximises ~ to achieve proportional output augmentation. The 
normalising constraint for the multiplier form in the dual problem involves f..1 Y 0, and 
vXo appears in the objective function. 
In the following exposition, we assume that there are n numbers of firms to be 
evaluated. Each firm consumes different amounts of m different inputs to produce s 
different outputs. Specifically, firm} consumes Ai = {xij} of inputs (i = 1, ... , m) and 
produces Jj = {Yrj} of outputs (r = 1, ... , s). For these constants which generally form 
the observations, it is generally assumed that xij and Yrj are greater than zero. This 
assumption, however, can be relaxed. 
Output Oriented Bee (Primal) 
max Zo = ¢ + eeLs; + Lsi) 
"t, 1 + -
'f',.IL,S ,s 
subject to 
"'Y - y.-1, + s~ = 0 
'Y 0 1 
1 + - > 0 
A, S i ,s k -
Output-Oriented Bee (Dual)62 
. TX 
mIn qo = V 0 + Vo 
f.J,v,vo 
subject to 
flTyo = 1 
T > coT V _v 
Vo unconstrained 
5.1 
where superscript T stands for transpose, s + and s- refer to output and input slacks, 
respectively; ¢ is the scalar variable; E is a non-Archimedian constant;63 fl is a (s xl) 
vector of output weights; v is a (m x 1) of input weights; and, .-1, is a (n x 1) vector of 
constants. The standard practice, due to computational convenience, is to solve the 
primal formulation (the envelopment form) because it contains fewer constraints than 
the dual form (the multiplier form). The linear programming must be solved n times, 
62 The primal and dual representations of the DEA models are also referred to as the envelopment and 
the multiplier form, respectively, in the literature. 
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once for each firm. A value of ¢ is then obtained for each firm. 
Hence, the duality of the linear programming can be used to guarantee that z; = q~j!, 
where the subscript (*) denotes an optimal value. Either problem may be solved using 
standard linear programming algorithms. The objective function in the output 
orientation is to maximise output production without exceeding given inputs. In this 
particular model, expanding production of Yo via ¢* attains maximum output by as 
much as the constraints will permit. 
The objective of the model is to find supporting efficiency frontier (hyperplane) that 
lies on or above all the observations such that the vertical distance from the frontier to 
the observation being analysed is minimised. Projection onto the frontier by itself is 
insufficient to guarantee efficiency, additional movement via positive input and/or 
slack variables may be necessary. Efficiency is attained when the observation assumes 
the optimal objective value of one with all slacks identically zero. Finally, an 
observation is only characterised as efficient with an output orientation if, and only if, 
it contemporaneously attains optimal efficiency with the input-orientation permutation 
as well. 
5.4.2 Malmq uist Prod uctivity Index Method 
By comparing annual changes in the productivity of individual generating stations 
under the aegis of NEP A, it is possible both to identify general trends in the 
productivity of the generating plants and the electricity industry as a whole. Further, it 
is possible to identify individual generating stations exhibiting patterns of change in 
productivity that differ from the rest of the industry. A careful analysis of the results 
of this exercise should add to our knowledge about the factors determining the pattern 
of electricity productivity in Nigeria. 
63 The purpose of the non-Archi~ed,ian ,con.stant i~ the primal objective function is to allow the 
maximisation to pre-empt the optImIsatIOn mvolvmg slacks. 
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Although electricity can generally be regarded as homogenous, there are technical 
differences at different nodes that change the cost structure of electricity production 
and supply. Further, the exact nature of the production technology is rather complex 
given the different technologies used, and security of supply argument. Furthermore, 
NEP A does not operate in a competitive market environment. Due to subsidisation 
policy and centralised administration of the activities of NEP A, input prices are 
generally unavailable and product prices are distorted. Thus, it cannot be taken for 
granted that NEP A pursues cost minimisation. These facts are reflected in the choice 
of the analytical approach. 
In spite of the above shortcomings, an analytical framework developed by Tatje and 
Lovell (1997)64 which calculates productivity indices under general conditions is used 
to assess NEP A's performance over time. In addition to calculating productivity 
indices, they further decomposed technical efficiency change index into magnitude 
and bias indices. In the following empirical analysis, the decomposition into technical 
change, which is equivalent to a shift in production frontier, and technical change 
index, are investigated. The latter index is further decomposed into scale and pure 
technical efficiency index. This decomposition enables us to ascertain the sources of 
productivity changes. 
The above decomposition can facilitate the design of appropriate policy aimed at 
addressing the deterioration of productivity growth. Ameliorative policies required for 
ascertaining whether the deterioration of productivity growth is due to technological 
deficiencies or X-inefficiency can be designed appropriately. The latter comes with 
the efficacy with which the management of an enterprise conducts the operations and 
activities ofNEPA. 
The productivity calculations exploit the fact that the output distance functions used to 
construct Malmquist indices are reciprocal to Farrell's (1957) output-oriented 
64 This paper is an extension of Malmquist (1953). Further decomposition of the Malmquist index is 
developed by Fare et at (1997). Essentiall~, the~ further decompo~e t~e technical c~ange i~de~ of 
Malmquist productivity index into a magmtude mdex, an output bIas mdex, and an mput bIas mdex. 
The motivation for this decomposition came from what Fare et at. (1997) referred to as the presence of 
non-neutral technical change. A similar decomposition is outlined in the following section and it is 
undertaken in this empirical study using a linear programming model developed by Coelli (1996). 
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technical-efficiency measures.65 They, therefore, bear a close relationship to the CCR 
output-oriented DEA model. This direct link to efficiency allows us to decompose 
productivity changes into changes in efficiency and change in the best-practice 
frontier (technical change) - an idea used by Nishimizu and Page (1982) in a 
parametric context. A detailed exposition of Malmquist and distance function is given 
in the Appendix. 
The Malmquist index has some features that readily contribute to the analysis of 
electricity production in Nigeria. It can accommodate input and output observation 
'" without requiring prices on inputs and outputs. This is a useful attribute especially in 
the case of developing countries where prices are either highly distorted or are just not 
available. Another salient feature of this technique is that it does not require the overt 
specification of a behavioural objective such as profit maximisation or cost 
minimisation. This again, is a useful feature when we consider that NEP A has a 
plethora of, and often conflicting, objectives.66 
In the following section, we show how the Malmquist productivity index and its 
constituent indices are calculated using linear programming. 
5.4.2.2 The Empirical Malmquist Model 
To calculate the various distance functions required for the Malmquist indices, the 
technology that will serve as constraints to the linear programming problem is 
specified. Suppose that k = 1, ... , K observations of n = 1, ... , N inputs x~,t in each 
time period t = 1, ... , T, which are employed to produce k = 1, ... , K observations of 
m = 1, ... , M outputs denoted by y:,t in each time period t = 1, ... , T. Invoking the 
assumption that the number of observations do not change over time, that is, K! = K, 
for an observation k't, we calculate 
65 The method can be traced to Farrell (1957) with subsequent development by Farrell and Fieldhouse 
(1962), Seitz (1970) and Afriat (1972). The method has been app!ied quite extensively (Fare et ai. 
1982' Banker et al.. 1984; Fare et ai. 1985; Forsund, 1994) showmg how the Farrell concept of 
effici~ncy can be further decomposed. This decomposition allows the ~xtr~ction of ad~itional . 
information on whether changes in performance of fInns are due to shifts m best practice frontler or 
improvement in the efficiency component. 
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[D~(Xk,,1 ,yk',1 )jl = max¢ 5.2 
subject to 
m=I, ... ,M 
I;},I X!,I < X!'I n=I, ... ,N 
k=l 
K 
LAk,1 ~ 1; Ak,1 ~ 0 k = 1, .. . ,K 
k=l 
where Ak,1 is an intensity variable. This above problem measures the output-based 
Farrell technical efficiency of observation k't, relative to the reference technology of 
the same period, period t. The second component in the Malmquist productivity 
index, D~+l (Xt+l ,yt+l), measures the Farrell technical efficiency of an observation at 
t+ 1 relative to the technology of the same period. The computation of this component 
is similar in structure to that of (5.2) with the exception that t+ 1 is substituted for t. 
The third component of M~+l(XI+l ,yt+l ,Xl ,yl) considers observation k't+l relative 
to the technology at period 1. This component is computed as 
subject to 
I .lLk,1 X!,I S X!'t+l n = 1, ... , N 
k=l 
K 
L A k ,I ~ 1; A k,1 ~ 0 k = 1, ... , K 
k=l 
5.3 
In Expression 5.3, note that the input and output constraints have the two periods t 
and t+ 1 on opposite sides of the inequalities. This indicates that the observation, 
k't + 1, is compared to the reference technology of a different period, t. The fourth 
66 These objectives set for NEPA are discussed in chapter 2. 
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component, D6+1 (Xl, yt), which compares k't to the reference technology of period 
t+ 1, is similar to the third component and can be computed by interchanging t and t+ 1 
in (5.3). 
In the linear programming problems, varying returns to scale assumption on the 
technology has been invoked. Relaxing the assumption of varying returns to scale, 
however, yields efficiency scores relative to other scale assumptions such as constant 
returns to scale or non-increasing returns to scale. The comparison of these scores 
decomposes the change in efficiency into changes in scale efficiency and pure 
efficiency. Because the frontier constructed with the constant returns to scale 
assumption on technology envelops the data more loosely than the frontiers under 
alternative scale assumptions, the resultant efficiency scores (¢) will be lower than 
those computed with respect to other frontiers. 
The degree of scale efficiency, which is the output loss from deviating from the 
constant returns to scale technology, can be computed by dividing the efficiency 
scores obtained from constant returns to scale technology by the efficiency scores 
obtained from variable returns to scale technology. That is, scale efficiency at time tis 
IJ.T' = ¢~RS / ¢~RS. Once the scale efficiency for each time period is obtained the 
change in scale efficiency between t and t+ 1 can be computed as IJ.Tt / IJ.Tt+ 1 . The 
second component of efficiency change, the change in pure efficiency between t and 
t+ 1, is calculated by dividing the change in efficiency by the change in scale 
efficiency. 
5.5 Results and Discussion 
5.5.1 DEA: Relative Efficiency Measures 
With this empirical assessment, we infer about organisational structure and ownership 
from the performance of electricity industry. The technical and scale efficiencies were 
calculated for the electricity industries of 29 developing countries in 1987 and 1995. 
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The first stage of this efficiency assessment consisted of identifying all the inputs and 
outputs pertaining to the function of the organisations being assessed. All the data 
should be in physical terms, so as not to stray into the area of measuring allocative 
efficiency when measuring technical efficiency. The inputs represent the key inputs 
used and the outputs should include all the products and services produced or 
delivered by the organisation. 
Thus, in similar tradition to the empirical literature, one output, gross electricity 
generated, and three inputs, labour, fuel and generating capacity, were used in the 
calculations (Pollitt, 1995). The electricity utilities of the 29 countries that comprised 
our sample vary extensively in their characteristics with respect to the level of 
managerial autonomy, level of reform, participation of private sector to size of 
system. These distinctions enabled us to examine the case for a decentralised and 
privately owned system and centralised, publicly owned system. 
The efficiency scores, as reported in Table 5.3, are calculated for each electricity 
utility relative to the utilities in the sample. The efficiency measures are calculated 
using the DEA models described above. The CRS model is the main model for this 
analysis while the VRS model is used to take the different sizes into consideration. 
The discretionary model can be used as a sensitivity analysis to capture different 
aspects of efficiency particularly when the government stipulates other objectives, for 
instance, using public sector enterprises to meet the employment goals. 
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the efficiency scores for the full sample as 
well as separately for two groups demarcated along (World Bank) reform - non-
reform axis.67 The individual efficiency scores and the returns to scale measures are 
given in Table 5.3. When we consider all the countries in our sample, referring to 
Table 5.l, we observe that the average scale efficiency is 96 percent in 1987 and 94.6 
percent in 1995. This would suggest that the scale inefficiency is unlikely to be the 
main source of overall inefficiency. 
67 See Table 5.1 for this classification. Further details of the results obtained from the DEA models 
using DEAP program are given in Appendix F. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Efficiency Scores for the ESls 
1987 1995 
CRS VRS Scale CRS VRS Scale 
All countries Sample Mean 0.732 0.763 0.96 0.764 0.801 0.946 
Standard Dev 0.220138 0.226374 0.059215 0.196701 0.174566 0.11103 
Max. Value 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Min. Value 0.243 0.254 0.754 0.208 0.482 0.431 
Reform Sample Mean 0.753895 0.780105 0.968263 0.815421 0.850211 0.958421 
Standard Dev 0.202109 0.20752 0.057394 0.159562 0.153386 0.058475 
Max. Value 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Min. Value 0.419 0.444 0.754 0.551 0.585 0.782 
Non-Reform Sample Mean 0.6895 0.7307 0.9452 0.6655 0.7063 0.9233 
Standard Dev 0.257005 0.267438 0.062716 0.230414 0.180762 0.174975 
Max. Value 
Min. Value 
1 
0.243 
1 
0.254 
1 
0.819 
1 
0.208 
1 
0.482 0.431 
The mean efficiency scores of the countries that have reformed or reforming their 
electric industries are higher than to the sample mean, while the mean efficiency 
scores of the countries that have failed to reform was lower than the sample mean 
over the period. 
The statistical Mann-Whitney test was conducted to ascertain the significance of the 
efficiency findings of the two sub-samples. The null hypothesis was stated to imply 
that there is no significant difference in the relative efficiency measures between the 
two sub-samples. And the alternative hypothesis against which the null was tested is 
that the countries that have reformed their electricity industries have higher efficiency 
score than the non-reformed electricity industry. The significance of the z-values 
generated test was determined by comparison to critical z-values. The observed z-
values and their probabilities (p-values) are reported in Table 5.2. The p-values 
indicate how credible the null hypothesis. 
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Table 5.2 The Mann-Whitney Test 
Efficiency Score (1995) CRSTE 
z-value 1.4486 
p-value (0.073719) 
VRSTE 
1.79383 
(0.003642) 
SCALE 
-1.41655 
(0.0783) 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no significant difference in the relative 
efficiency of the two subsets in favour of the alternative hypothesis given that the p_ 
values are, largely, above the 5 percent significance level, except in the case of the 
varying returns to scale efficiency measures. What this implies is that the reformed 
utilities cannot be said to have higher productive efficiency.68 
Given the surpnsing result of no discernible significant difference between the 
reformers and non-reformers, a further analysis, on a country basis, was conducted to 
examine whether or not there is discernible pattern in the technical efficiencies of the 
electricity industries in the sample. 
Interpreting the individual efficiency scores, an enterprise is technically efficient if, 
and only if, the solution to the expression of the envelopment form of the output-
oriented BCC model is ¢* = 1 and s-* = s+* = O. From Table 5.3, we observe that in 
1987 and 1995, six of the 29 electricity industries were found to be technically 
efficient when constant returns to scale assumption was invoked compared to ten 
when the varying returns to scale assumption was used. As described in Chapter 4, the 
efficiency frontier of the constant returns to scale is based on a conical hull when 
compared to the convex hull of varying returns to scale. The implication of this is that 
four electricity industries are measured as inefficient because of scale inefficiency. 
Table 5.3 also indicates the sources of inefficiency. Scale inefficiency of 10 utilities is 
attributed to the fact that they operated in area of increasing returns to scale in 1995; 
another 13 utilities classified as scale inefficient for exhibiting decreasing returns to 
scale. 
68 The inference made is qualified due to the paucity of our sample size. 
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Table 5.3 Summary of Cross-Country Efficiency Measures 
1987 1995 
CRSTE VRSTE SCALE RTS CRSTE VRSTE SCALE RTS 
Reformers 
Congo 0.754 1.000 0.754 IRS 0.910 1.000 0.910 IRS 
Ghana 0.986 1.000 0.986 IRS 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Ivory Coast 0.617 0.628 0.984 IRS 0.542 0.545 0.995 IRS 
South Africa 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Zambia 0.441 0.444 0.994 IRS 0.755 0.757 0.998 DRS 
Cameroon 0.931 1.000 0.931 IRS 0.984 0.992 0.992 IRS 
Chile 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Colombia 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 0.833 0.868 0.960 IRS 
Ecuador 0.741 0.748 0.991 IRS 0.755 0.758 0.995 DRS 
Guatemala 0.419 0.445 0.939 IRS 0.850 0.876 0.971 IRS 
Indonesia 0.484 0.485 0.998 DRS 0.711 0.730 0.975 DRS 
Egypt 0.586 0.614 0.955 DRS 0.656 0.682 0.963 DRS 
Tunisia 0.606 0.633 0.956 IRS 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Argentina 0.662 0.711 0.931 DRS 0.680 0.738 0.922 DRS 
Malaysia 0.787 0.793 0.993 IRS 0.847 0.848 0.998 DRS 
Pakistan 0.936 0.941 0.994 IRS 0.833 0.925 0.901 DRS 
Philippines 0.641 0.646 0.993 IRS 0.719 0.720 0.998 IRS 
Thailand 0.733 0.734 0.998 IRS 0.999 1.000 0.999 DRS 
Venezuela 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 0.782 1.000 0.782 DRS 
Sample Mean 0.754 0.780 0.968 0.835 0.865 0.966 
Standard Dev 0.202 0.208 0.057 0.140 0.142 0.055 
Max. Value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Min. Value 0.419 0.444 0.754 0.542 0.545 0.782 
Non-reformers 
Ethiopia 0.702 0.857 0.819 IRS 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Kenya 0.883 1.000 0.883 IRS 0.888 0.907 0.980 IRS 
Mozambique 0.243 0.254 0.957 IRS 0.205 0.208 0.985 IRS 
Nigeria 0.530 0.534 0.992 IRS 0.558 0.584 0.955 DRS 
Tanzania 0.455 0.518 0.879 IRS 0.742 0.748 0.992 IRS 
Zaire 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Zimbabwe 0.930 0.970 0.959 IRS 0.782 0.785 0.997 IRS 
Algeria 0.594 0.602 0.987 IRS 0.668 0.669 1.000 CRS 
Bangladesh 0.558 0.572 0.976 IRS 0.702 0.702 1.000 CRS 
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Brazil 
Sample Mean 
Standard Dev 
Max. Value 
Min. Value 
All Countries 
Sample Mean 
Standard Dev 
Max. Value 
Min. Value 
1.000 
0.690 
0.257 
1.000 
0.243 
0.732 
0.220 
1.000 
0.243 
1.000 1.000 CRS 
0.731 0.945 
0.267 0.063 
1.000 1.000 
0.254 0.819 
0.763 0.960 
0.226 0.059 
1.000 1.000 
0.254 0.754 
Note: CRSTE, constant returns to scale technical efficiency 
VRSTE, variable returns to scale technical efficiency 
Scale, scale efficiency = CRSTENRSTE 
RTS, returns to scale 
0.974 
0.752 
0.245 
1.000 
0.205 
0.806 
0.183 
1.000 
0.205 
1.000 0.974 DRS 
0.760 0.988 
0.246 0.015 
1.000 1.000 
0.208 0.955 
0.829 0.974 
0.187 0.046 
1.000 1.000 
0.208 0.782 
Projection of the electricity industries classed as technically inefficient onto the 
efficiency frontier should make their operations (more) efficient. This can be achieved 
by adjusting their operations according to those of the electricity industries that 
comprise their reference or peer group. The usefulness of reference group information 
is illustrated using Table 5.4. The linear programming technique used to calculate the 
DEA models provide information about the sources of inefficiency for each industry 
evaluated (see Appendix F). Basically, the model projects inefficient industries onto 
the frontier in two movements. The first is via radial movement (depending on the 
orientation adopted for the analysis) and the second is via slack movement. The latter 
conforms to the Koopman's strict definition of efficiency. 
The efficient output and input target can be represented by Y;o = tPoY ro + s: , where r = 
1, ... , s, and x: = xio - s; , where i = 1, ... , m. As stated in the output based DEA 
model, the assumption is that all the efficiency improvements are achieved by 
producing maximal amount of outputs from the current level of inputs or less. The 
input slacks indicate the need and scope for further reductions in corresponding 
inputs. On the other hand, output slacks indicate additional outputs that can be 
produced by the efficient level of inputs. The difference between the target and 
observed values of outputs (Y;o - Yro) represents the amount of outputs to be 
increased, while the difference between the observed value and the target value of 
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inputs (xio - x;o) represents the quantity of inputs to be reduced, to project the 
inefficient observation onto the efficiency frontier. 
To illustrate this point, the efficiency score shows that Nigeria's electricity industry 
had a relative efficiency score of 56.9 percent efficient in 1995 compared to the other 
countries in the sample, when constant returns to scale assumption was invoked on the 
technology of electricity production. What this implies is that Nigeria can increase its 
output level by at least a factor of the reciprocal of the efficiency score with the given 
input level or less depending on the slack values. The lambda values correspond to the 
relative importance of each industry in the reference (peer) group in determining the 
target values. 
Table 5.4 Detailed Results for the Nigerian Electricity Industry3 
Technical Efficiency: 0.558 
Facet (and Lambda) 
Output 
Electricity Generated 
Inputs: 
Capacity 
Fuel Input 
Labour 
Brazil 
(0.065) 
Observed Value 
14483 
5841 
2330 
32000 
Zaire 
(0.935) 
Target Value 
24798 
5695.86 
2300 
15999 
(y* - Y) 
10315 
(x* -X) 
145.14 
o 
16001 
a The efficiency calculations are based on the varying returns to scale technology. Constant returns to scale 
technology can be analogously prepared. 
Of the enterprises that comprise Nigerian's reference set, Zaire has the higher lambda 
value, so its share is relatively more important than that of Brazil. Thus, for the 
Nigerian electricity industry to be as efficient as the industries in its reference set, it 
must produce the target values of outputs using the target level of inputs. Thus. NEP A 
should reduce its employees and generating capacity by 50 percent and 2.5 percent, 
respectively. Notwithstanding these reductions, the implication of the efficiency 
measure is that NEP A can increase its electricity supply by 71.2 percent. 
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Thus, from the set of DEA results, we can infer that the efficiency measures of the 
electricity industries in the sample show a wide diversity. The significance of these 
results, however, requires some clarification. As we expected the electricity industries 
that have been reformed to have higher efficiency since they incorporate some 
elements of competition. Due to the fact that they would be expected to be less 
encumbered with non-economic objectives and policies than their unreformed 
counterparts. The significance of the results obtained above between the reformed and 
non-reformed electricity industries is further examined. The factors that affect 
performance are investigated by regressing the efficiency measures obtained from the 
DEA models against a number of explanatory variables. 
To summanse thus far, the main findings of our efficiency analysis as far as 
improving the efficiency of the Nigerian electricity industry includes the identification 
of efficient peer electricity industries that Nigeria will have to emulate to achieve 
optimal efficiency, and the input and output targets required for efficiency projection. 
Focusing on Nigeria, the number of employees was found to be excessive. Output 
shortfall was found to be main contributor to inefficiency in the Nigerian electricity 
industry vis-a.-vis other electricity industries. This finding supports the World Bank 
(1983; 1993) claim that NEPA is over-staffed.69 
The next exercise is to use a long time series to evaluate NEP A's performance over 
the period 1970 to 1995. The purpose of this is to try and provide more information 
about NEP A's performance, especially if appropriate reform is to be instituted. This 
analysis has focused on physical measures, measuring the technical efficiency with 
which inputs are transformed into outputs. It makes no reference to whether inputs are 
used in least cost combinations, given their relative prices, nor indeed whether these 
input prices themselves reflect appropriate resource costs in the wider community. 
These aspects are clearly crucial in formulating optimal electricity policies. 
69 Lack of data, however, prevented further disaggregation of the electricity industry in Nigeria into its 
various activities to identify where the problem is most acute. These findings may, therefore, be used to 
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5.5.2 Efficiency Evaluation: Censored Regression Model 
The issues of what and when to reform are examined in this section. To address the 
first of the two questions raised, the determinants of efficiency are investigated. In 
order to formulate appropriate electricity policy, there is the need to establish which 
factors influence efficiency. The justification for the use of Tobit model is that not all 
the explanatory variables with respect to performance are observed. Secondly, the 
choice of this model is premised on the fact that the dependent variable is observed 
only within a limited range. 
It will suffice to say that the approach adopted here is in the same spirit as Pollitt 
(1995, 1996) in which he employed DEA model and Tobit regression model to 
evaluate and explain efficiency, respectively. The efficiency results obtained by DEA 
are regressed against some explanatory variables to ascertain which factors affect 
performance of electricity utilities. An attempt is made to examine the combined 
effect of state involvement, size and technology on the performance of the electricity 
industry in developing countries. The explanatory variables are percentage of public 
generation, system size, managerial autonomy capacity utilisation or load factor or 
available capacity, and technology. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the technical efficiency score associated with 
maximal electricity generated is denoted as TE*, and is taken as to be regressand in 
our model. This is expressed below: 
if TE'k > 1 5.4 
where xk is a (1 xL) vector of explanatory variables and ek is identically and normally 
distributed error term (which represents technical efficiency) with zero mean and 
constant variance. Thus, for any firm, the level of TE actually estimated is 
{
TE* 
TE = 0 ifTE* ~ 1; otherwise TE* > 1. 
support the intuition that the government ought to eliminate social and other non-economic objectives 
from the goals set for NEPA. 
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The censored regression model can then be expressed as 
detailed exposition of Tobit models see Amemiya (1984). 
Table 5.5 Regression Estimates 
Coefficient Marginal Value 
Constant 0.5467 0.5283 
(3.835) 
Auton 0.l357 0.l312 
(2.099) 
Sysfac 0.88E-02 0.85E-02 
(3.822) 
Cap 0.44E-05 0.42E-05 
(1.149) 
Pubgen -0.22E-02 -0.21E-02 
(-1.633) 
Sigma 0.1351 
(Tobit parameter) (6.678) 
R2 0LS 0.5861 
Where n = 58 
The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics of the estimated coefficients. The 
dependent variable is the technical efficiency scores from the DEA models. Auton is a 
dummy variable to indicate management autonomy in the electricity utilities. It 
assumes a value of one when there is autonomy, that is, there is no government 
involvement or interference with the core operation of electricity production, and zero 
otherwise. Sysfac represents system factor which is a ratio indicating the extent to 
which installed capacity is used in generating electricity.7o It represents the maximum 
output of electricity that a plant could produce if it were operated continually at 
maximum capacity. Cap is the capacity size measured in MW. Pubgen indicates the 
share of production of public utilities in total electricity produced. 
Direct interpretations of the estimated coefficients are not straightforward in the Tobit 
model due to the estimation procedure. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer the 
70 System factor is also referred to as load factor in the literature. 
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marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. 71 The 
magnitude and the signs of the explanatory variables were as expected. The 
coefficient for capacity is, however, statistically insignificant. 
The inference that can be drawn from this result has policy implications. The marginal 
values of the coefficients indicate the impact of the variables on efficiency. The 
autonomy dummy variable shows the strong impact of managerial autonomy. This is 
in conformity with the precepts of the public choice and property rights theories, the 
electricity industries of the African countries with less autonomy and direct 
government provision of electricity services seem to perform much worse than those 
with more autonomy and restructured industry. The coefficient for system size shows 
that increasing capacity size is not necessarily an appropriate way of increasing 
productive efficiency. 
Finally, we can infer from the results that the percentage of public provision in total 
production is inversely related to efficiency. Unlike ordinary regression model, the 
estimated coefficients obtained in a regression model ought to be interpreted with 
caution. Due to the characteristics of the Tobit model, a direct interpretation of the 
marginal effects of the estimated coefficients can be misleading. They are, however, 
indicative of the impact of the coefficients. The R-squared value from the 
(unreported) OLS results indicate that the explanatory variables explain 58.6 percent 
of the variations in the efficiency. 
5.5.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Productivity 
To investigate the relative productivity differences between the electricity industries 
of the selected countries, we use DEAP, a linear programming software developed by 
Coelli (1996a) to calculate the Malmquist productivity indices constructed from 
distance functions as described above. 
71 LIMDEP, which is used to estimate the unknown parameters in the Tobit regression model also, 
gives an estimation of the marginal values. 
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~;:~;8i~;:;;/~:ctiVity Growth of Electricity Industry of Selected Developing Countries, 
COUNTRY EFFCH TECHCH CHPEFF CHSEFF Reformers MALM 
Congo 1.267 0.874 1.000 1.267 1.107 Ghana 1.089 1.039 1.000 1.089 1.132 Ivory Coast 0.862 0.860 0.938 0.919 0.742 South Africa 1.000 1.288 1.000 1.000 1.288 Zambia l.131 0.810 l.127 1.004 0.917 Cameroon 1.088 0.991 l.000 1.088 1.078 Chile 1.000 1.318 1.000 1.000 1.318 Colombia 0.962 1.072 0.994 0.968 1.031 
Ecuador 1.059 1.017 1.020 1.038 1.078 
Guatemala 1.373 1.108 1.225 1.121 1.521 
Indonesia 1.000 1.114 1.040 0.962 1.114 
Egypt 0.723 1.138 0.743 0.972 0.823 
Tunisia 1.613 1.519 1.503 1.073 2.44972 
Argentina 0.917 1.174 0.941 0.975 1.077 
Malaysia 1.277 1.119 1.270 1.006 1.429 
Pakistan 0.923 1.256 1.064 0.867 1.159 
Philippines 0.896 1.123 0.898 0.998 1.006 
Thailand 1.115 1.117 1.143 0.976 1.245 
Venezuela 1.016 1.180 1.000 1.016 1.198 
Non-Reformers 
Ethiopia 0.908 0.990 0.820 1.107 0.899 
Kenya 0.838 1.118 0.789 1.062 0.936 
Mozambique 0.740 0.810 0.831 0.890 0.600 
Nigeria 1.183 1.049 1.179 1.003 1.241 
Tanzania 1.515 0.956 1.241 1.221 1.448 
Zaire 1.000 0.855 1.000 1.000 0.855 
Zimbabwe 0.968 1.139 0.883 1.096 1.102 
Algeria 0.894 1.120 0.893 1.002 1.002 
Bangladesh 1.082 1.116 1.036 1.044 1.207 
Brazil 0.973 1.039 1.000 0.973 1.011 
Mean 
Sample 1.049 1.080 1.020 1.025 1.138 
Reformers 1.069 1.111 1.048 1.018 1.195 
Non-Reformers 1.010 1.019 0.967 1.040 1.030 
Note: MALM, Malmquist index; TECHCH, technological change index; EFFCH, 
efficiency change index; CHPEFF, pure efficiency change index; CHSEFF, scale 
change index. 
Assessment of productivity growth addresses another aspect of performance 
assessment, namely the improvement or deterioration of technical efficiency and 
technological progress over time. In addition to providing more information on 
different components of efficiency, it allows a direct economic interpretation useful 
for economic policies (Bhattacharyya et al. 1997). Following the exposition of the 
productivity growth index approach in Appendix B, the Malmquist index is applied to 
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the data set of the electricity industry of the sample of developing countries for 1987 
and 1995. 
The linear programming models outlined in Section 5.4 were applied to the data to 
construct a best practice frontier for the developing countries between 1987 and 1995 
using data on electricity generated and three inputs: labour, capital and energy inputs. 
The data are compiled from World Bank and United Nations data sources. The data 
are presented in the appendix. 
Table 5.6 reports the summary results of the productivity analysis. The index, based 
on the geometric mean of two output-based Malmquist total factor productivity, uses 
period t and t+ 1 technology. In interpreting the values in Table 5.6, it is noteworthy 
that best practice is a common electricity generation frontier defined over the 
generating stations in the industry. 
With respect to the average productivity growth of the 29 developing countries that 
comprise our sample, we observe a Malmquist index of 1.138 over the sample period, 
1987 - 1995. This is an indication of improvement in productivity if 13.8 percent.73 
The constituents of the Malmquist index are 1.049 and 1.080, which are the efficiency 
change index (EFFCH) and technological change index (TECHCH), respectively. The 
interpretation is that over the sample period, the improvement in productivity can be 
attributed to efficiency improvement, that is movement towards the frontier, was 4.9 
percent, and 8.0 percent technological improvement, equivalent to a shift in the 
frontier. 
The efficiency change index, EFFCH, can be further decomposed into pure technical 
efficiency (CHPEFF) and scale efficiency (CHSEFF) indices.74 Following on from 
the above discussion, the corresponding indices are 1.020 and 1.025, respectively. 
These indices can be interpreted as a 2 percent improvement in CHPEFF, which 
72 The high Malmquist index exhibited by the Tunisian electricity industry is due to the reform of the 
industry that was completed 1993 (World Bank, 1994) 
73 In interpreting Malmquist index and its various components, a value of greater than one indicates an 
improvement in productivity, and less than one indicates deterioration in productivity relative to the 
best practice. ..,
74 Scale change index captures the movement towards optImal scale over tIme, and changes In pure 
efficiency index can be interpreted as the measure of development in managerial efficiency. 
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indicates an improvement in technical efficiency of 2 percent over the period, and a 
2.5 percent improvement in scale efficiency, CHSEFF. 
The results in Table 5.6 are more revealing when we distinguish between the utilities 
that have undergone sector reform and those that have not. We observe that, in 
general, the indices of the reformed utilities outweigh those of the non-reformed 
except for the scale efficiency index over the same sample period. First of all, the 
average productivity index for the reformed utilities of 1.195 and 1.030 for the non-
reformed utilities indicate improvements of 19.5 and 3 percent, respectively. 
The EFFCH indices of 1.069 and 1.010 for the reformed and non-reformed, 
respectively, indicate improvement in overall efficiency change of 6.9 and 1.0 
percent. TECHCH, which with EFFCH comprise the Malmquist index, indicate 
improvement of 11.1 and 1.9 percent for the reformed and non-reformed respectively. 
Am examination of the constituents of the overall efficiency change index, namely 
pure efficiency and scale efficiency changes indices reveals that the improvement in 
EFFCH of 6.9 percent for the reformed utilities can be decomposed into 4.8 percent 
pure technical change and 1.8 percent scale efficiency change. The indices for the 
non-reformed utilities can also be analogously interpreted. Not only do these results 
indicate better productivity performance of the reformed utilities over the sample 
period, but also the constituents of the productivity indices. 
To highlight the significance and usefulness of Malmquist productivity vis-a.-vis 
policy implication, we compare the electricity utilities of Nigeria with that of Ghana-
this selection conforms to the World Bank's definition of reformed and unreformed 
utilities. Coinciding with the above criterion that demarcates the sample along the line 
of reform, Ghana's electricity industry is defined by the World Bank (1994) as a 
"reformer" and Nigeria as a "non-reformer." 
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Figure 5.5 Productivity Indices of Electricity Industries in Ghana and Nigeria between 
1987 and 1995 
Over the sample period, the Nigerian electricity industry exhibited higher 
performance compared to the Ghanaian electricity industry with respect to 
productivity growth. The Malmquist index for Ghana is 1.132, which is equivalent to 
an improvement of 13.2 percent in overall productivity. Nigeria, on the other hand, 
achieved an index of 1.241, which is equivalent to productivity improvement of 24.1 
percent (see Table 5.6). This result, at first glance, is contrary to expectation. A closer 
inspection of the performance statistics of the two electricity industries/s however, 
indicated that the Nigerian electricity industry started with a lower capacity utilisation 
and lower technical efficiency (see Table 5.3), and hence, a much wider scope within 
which performance can be improved. 
Further examination of the constituent indices, TECHCH and EFFCH, of Malmquist 
index further bore this out. Nigeria attained an efficiency change index (EFFCH) of 
1.183, which is equivalent to 18.3 percent improvement - a movement towards the 
frontier - compared to an EFFCH index of 1.089 (8.9 percent) for Ghana. Similarly, 
Nigeria attained a technological change index (TECHCH) of 1.049 (4.9 percent 
improvement), which measures shift in the frontier, compared to an index of 1.039 
(3.9 percent) for Ghana. Ghana exhibited higher scale efficiency index (CHSEFF) 
75 Various Annual Reports and Accounts, Volta River Authority (Ghana) and NEPA. 
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than Nigeria - 1.089 (8.9 percent) and 1.003 (0.3 percent), respectively. In the case of 
Nigeria, most of the improvement in efficiency change can be attributed to pure 
efficiency change (CHPEFF) index of l.179 (17.9 percent). The latter is equivalent to 
a movement of 2.55 percent per annum, a figure that is comparable to the 2.8 percent 
improvement in CRSTE DEA measure (see Table 5.3). 
The inference we can draw from these results is that most of the improvement in the 
electricity industry of the two countries came from efficiency improvement rather 
than substantial addition to capacity - given the constraint of investment capital. 
Thus, in summary, we observed that Nigeria obtained higher productivity as a result 
of higher operational efficiency and capital accumulation (increasing available 
capacity rather than new capacity) compared to Ghana. This was possible because 
Nigeria started from a lower performance base. The Malmquist productivity index, in 
addition to showing the level of productivity growth, can be decomposed into its 
constituents, which can be further decomposed to indicate the sources of productivity 
growth. This naturally lends itself to policy analysis and prescription as the indices 
can be used in simulation exercises. 
5.5.4 Efficiency and Productivity of Electricity Generation in Nigeria 
Given the relative inefficiency of the Nigerian electricity industry, further 
investigation into the level of efficiency and its causes is undertaken. With the result 
from the previous section, the question is no longer a question of whether or not or 
what to reform but the form and sequence of reform. For the purpose of assessing the 
performance of NEP A, so far we have examined efficiency and productivity from a 
cross-country perspective, in this section, the performance analysis of NEP A is based 
on a longitudinal data set, 1970 to 1995 inclusive. The appeal if this approach lies in 
the fact that we can assess various policies regarding the electricity industry. Further, 
with simulation exercises we can infer which policies are likely to impact 
significantly on the performance ofNEPA. 
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The performance assessment of the electricity industry in Nigeria is in two parts. The 
first part assesses the general trend of efficiency in the industry, and the second part 
examines, in detail, efficiency and productivity of the generating plants under the 
auspices of NEP A. The unique set of data on the operations and activities of NEP A 
over the period 1970 to 1995, and of the electricity generating stations over the 
period, 1990 to 1995, in particular, enabled the study of efficiency and productivity in 
electricity provision of one ofNEPA. 
5.5.4.1 DEA Efficiency Score of the Nigerian Electricity Industry 
In this section, we discuss the results obtained USIng DEA, the non-parametric 
approach to performance measurement. These results are reported in Table 5.7 and 
depicted in Figure 5.2, and with additional information on the operations of NEPA, 
analysis of the various policies governing the activities of NEPA. For instance, we 
can examine the impact of a centrally-controlled, vertical integrated public utility on 
electricity production. This, essentially, was the structure that was put in place after 
NEPA was established in the early 1970s. Secondly, an examination of the effect of 
large-scale plants on electricity production is also undertaken. The shift in the 
structure of the electricity industry in the mid-1970s to mid-1980s from a proliferated 
to a highly concentrated industry was based on economies of scale argument. The 
third aspect examined is whether there is any discernible pattern between the 
economic downturn that ensued after the mid-1980s and the general performance of 
the electricity industry. 
The validity of these analyses is based on the conventional wisdom enunciated in 
Chapter 2. Figure 5.2 below depicts the trends of the efficiency measures obtained 
from the DEA model. With supplementary information on the operation of NEP A, 
inferences about the efficiency and productivity of electricity production in Nigeria 
are drawn since the creation ofNEPA. 
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Table 5.7 Efficiency Summary Nigeria Electricity Industry: 1970 - 1995 
FIRM CRSTE VRSTE SCALE RTS 
1970 0.560 1.000 0.560 IRS 
1971 0.651 1.000 0.651 IRS 
1972 0.721 1.000 0.721 IRS 
1973 0.904 0.991 0.912 IRS 
1974 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
1975 0.990 1.000 0.990 IRS 
1976 0.994 1.000 0.994 IRS 
1977 0.967 0.970 0.997 IRS 
1978 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
1979 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
1980 0.750 0.79 0.948 IRS 
1981 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
1982 0.950 1.000 0.950 DRS 
1983 0.931 0.990 0.940 DRS 
1984 0.881 0.935 0.942 DRS 
1985 0.864 0.955 0.905 DRS 
1986 0.827 0.834 0.992 IRS 
1987 0.813 0.864 0.940 DRS 
1988 0.792 0.845 0.937 DRS 
1989 0.860 0.905 0.950 DRS 
1990 0.821 0.842 0.975 IRS 
1991 0.886 0.89 0.996 IRS 
1992 0.941 0.948 0.993 IRS 
1993 0.915 0.931 0.983 DRS 
1994 0.918 0.923 0.994 DRS 
1995 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Mean 0.882 0.947 0.934 
The first conventional wisdom examined is the integration of the activities involved in 
the electricity industry. From the figure depicted below, it is observed that in the early 
1970s to the mid-1970s, technical efficiency and scale efficiency increased 
significantly. When non-constant returns to scale technology was assumed, however, 
the efficiency scores were found to be higher. The discussion in this section is 
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essentially restricted to constant returns to scale. This assumption is in line with the 
integration argument, the purpose of which was to move the industry towards optimal 
capacity by exploiting economies of scale. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, 
technical efficiency was relatively high and stable. At first sight, the integration of the 
various activities under the aegis ofNEPA impacted positively on performance. 
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Figure 5.2 Efficiency Measures of Electricity Production in Nigeria, 1970 - 1995 
The significant drop in technical efficiency - from unit efficiency to 0.75 efficiency 
score - that occurred in 1980 can be ascribed to high system losses (see Table 2.4) 
and operational disequilibrium that manifested itself in the divergence between 
reserve margin and load factor (see Figure 2.4). Although system losses remained 
stubbornly high, the subsequent improvement in 1981 was due to the introduction of 
additional generating capacity.76 
The advantage conferred by integration and the general high efficiency scores 
achieved throughout the 1970s was, however, reversed from 1982 onwards when 
technical efficiency began to decline. Two factors account for this pattern. The 
76 Afam and SapeJe CCGT generating plants were commissioned in the 980/81 operating year. 
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investment in the electricity industry was skewed in favour of electricity production 
(to the detriment of supply). The structural imbalance subsequently caused bottleneck 
in the system, which manifested itself in interruptions in supply, which further 
undermined electricity provision. 
The economic downturn experienced in the country in the mid-1980s was mirrored in 
the electricity industry. The shortage of capital meant the imbalance could not be 
addressed, which further constricted the bottleneck. In spite of the economic 
downturn, electricity consumption did not abate due to inappropriate (factor and 
product) subsidisation policy. The effect of this was that revenue dwindled as the 
amount of illegal consumption increased along with payment default (World Bank, 
1993). Further, with the macroeconomic disequilibrium that ensued in the mid-1980s, 
requisition of spare parts became a cumbersome process that meant expenditure had 
to get ministerial approval. The result of this was a reduction in the level of available 
capacity. The rationalisation of public expenditure/7 included in the structural 
adjustment programmes of the late 1980s meant that investment in research and 
development and training were abandoned. 
Although the downward trend of technical efficiency was reversed in the late 1980s 
and increased towards the end of the observation period, a caveat is necessary to 
explain this. The source of efficiency improvement can be adduced to the on-stream 
and operation of the Egbin CCGT station. The argument advanced for this change was 
the exploitation of scale and scope economies. Although this might appear to be a 
plausible justification in a robust system, the stability of the system might become 
risky when one plant accounts for around 30 percent of electricity generated - in 
1995, Egbin station generated 4.563 TWh of the total 15.780 TWh. 
Similar results to Table 5.7 are observed when the technical efficiency of the 
generating stations are examined. The results reported in Table 5.8 show wide 
variations between the efficiency measures of the various plants - with Ijora 
generating station exhibited the lowest efficiency measures compared to the Shiroro 
and Egbin, which had the highest relative efficiency scores. This is in keeping with 
77 This was a component of the stabilisation programme as advised by the IMF in 1986. 
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the vintage and type of the generating technologies. Ijora, a coal-fired thermal station, 
was constructed in the 1960s, Egbin, a CCGT -based station with higher intrinsic 
thermal efficiency capability, was constructed at the end ofthe1980s. 
Table 5.8 Summary Results of Productive Efficiency of Generating Stations in Nigeria, 
1990 - 1996 
Station 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Mean 
Jebba 0.594 0.843 0.609 0.509 0.789 0.926 0.606 0.697 
Shiroro 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Kainji 0.348 0.550 0.523 0.444 0.670 0.761 0.530 0.547 
Ijora 0.050 0.011 0.004 0.024 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.014 
Afam 0.425 0.529 0.377 0.504 0.330 0.256 0.251 0.382 
Delta 0.286 0.154 0.488 0.719 0.627 0.566 0.590 0.490 
Sapele 0.242 0.198 0.223 0.132 0.271 0.334 0.334 0.248 
Egbin 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 0.493 0.536 0.528 0.541 0.587 0.606 0.539 0.547 
5.5.4.2 Productivity Indices of the Nigerian Electricity Industry 
U sing a data set of the electricity generating plants in Nigeria over the period 1990 
and 1996 (see Appendix E2), the pattern of the efficiency and productivity in 
electricity production is examined next, to see what insights can be gained from 
productivity analysis. Further insight into the performance of electricity generating 
stations is gained by assessing productivity growth over a period of time. As 
described in Section 5.5.3, Malmquist productivity indices can be decomposed into its 
respective components, technological change and efficiency change. The latter can be 
further decomposed into its constituents of pure and scale efficiency indices. In 
addition to these indices indicating the sources of productivity changes, they can be 
used in simulation exercise for policy prescription. 
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Table 5.9 Cumulative Growth Between 1990 and 1996 
STATION EFFCH TECHCH CHPEFF CHSEFF MALM 
Jebba 1.003 1.035 0.978 1.026 1.038 
Shiroro 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Kainji 1.072 1.042 1.004 1.068 1.118 
Ijora 0.550 0.993 1.000 0.550 0.546 
Afam 0.916 1.058 0.958 0.956 0.969 
Delta 1.128 1.050 1.065 1.060 1.185 
Sapele 1.055 1.047 1.022 1.032 1.105 
Egbin 1.000 1.079 1.000 1.000 1.079 
MEAN 0.947 1.038 1.003 0.944 0.982 
Over the sample period, total factor productivity (MALM) and efficiency change 
(EFFCH) deteriorated by 1.8 and 5.3 percent, respectively. These results are reported 
in Table 5.9. Technological change (TECHCH), on the other hand, improved by 3.8 
percent. An inspection of the components of the efficiency change index reveal that 
pure technical efficiency (CHPEFF) - equivalent to managerial efficiency (Tatje and 
Lovell, 1997) - exhibited a marginal improvement (0.3 percent) over the period, and 
scale efficiency (CHSEFF) deteriorated by 5.6 percent over the same period. Of the 
components of efficiency change index, we observe that scale inefficiency is the main 
cause of the deterioration in efficiency change (see Table 5.9). 
From the above results, we can infer that the rehabilitation policy pursued from the 
late 1980s onward succeeded in increasing technological change index - this index 
measures the shift in the productivity frontier. This result is in line with expectation as 
the emphasis was on increasing capacity utilisation, which is tantamount to increasing 
generating capacity. The observed deterioration in efficiency change index (5.3 
percent), the other component of Malmquist indices, however, undermined 
productivity growth. The Malmquist indices and its various components for the main 
electricity generating stations under the aegis ofNEPA are reported in Tables 5.10-
5.12. 
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Table 5.10 Malmquist index (Annual Changes) 
Station 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 
Jebba 1.362 0.848 0.82 1.48 1.218 0.735 
Shiroro 0.928 l.153 0.93 0.975 0.965 1.065 
Kainji 1.531 l.119 0.840 l.431 l.195 0.792 
Ijora 0.206 0.446 5.038 0.260 0.764 0.287 
Afam l.228 0.845 1.357 0.609 0.842 l.147 
Delta 0.521 3.732 l.474 0.816 0.977 l.212 
Sapele 0.788 1.329 0.590 l.938 1.317 l.154 
Egbin 1.023 1.233 l.051 0.925 l.095 l.174 
Mean 0.821 l.123 l.189 0.912 1.031 0.872 
An examination of the individual generating stations revealed large variations 
between the Malmquist indices and their various components. For instance, over the 
operating year 1992/3, Ijora exhibited a Malmquist index of 5.038 which, by any 
standard, is a very high productivity growth. This can be attributed to the increase in 
available capacity and the subsequent increase in electricity generated. Ijora has a 
nameplate capacity of 65 MW (see Table 2.3) with available capacity for generation 
ranging between 4 and 10 MW. In the year 1992/3 available capacity increased to 
around 20 percent of nameplate capacity. See Appendix E2. 
Table 5.11 reports the technological change indices. Over the period, there was a shift 
in the frontier starting with deterioration in 1990/91 of 3.4 percent and an increment 
of 13 percent in 1995/96 - this further corroborates the improvement of TECHCH in 
Table 5.9. The indices, when viewed from the perspective of each generating station, 
display consistency in technological growth. This indicates that although additional 
capacity undoubtedly impacts on performance, the impact of efficiency change is 
higher as evidenced by the significant increase in the 1992/93 efficiency change index 
for Ijora in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.11 Technological Change Index (Annual Changes) 
Station 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 
Jebba 0.960 1.175 0.980 0.955 1.037 1.122 
Shiroro 0.928 1.153 0.930 0.975 0.965 1.065 
Kainji 0.968 1.178 0.989 0.948 1.053 1.138 
Ijora 0.929 1.146 0.926 0.967 0.947 1.061 
Afam 0.987 1.184 1.015 0.931 1.087 1.167 
Delta 0.968 1.179 1.001 0.935 1.081 1.163 
Sapele 0.967 1.179 0.997 0.941 1.069 1.154 
Egbin 1.023 1.233 1.051 0.925 1.095 1.174 
Mean 0.966 1.178 0.985 0.947 1.041 1.130 
These finding are consistent with the precepts of the various theories on public 
provision and bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971; Williamson 1984) in that those in charge 
of public organisations will favour expansion of factor inputs over cost-minimising 
decisions. Evidence shows that more stands to be gained by equally putting emphasis 
on pure technical efficiency78 as much as technological improvement. 
Table 5.12 Efficiency Change Index (Annual Changes) 
Station 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 
.. --..... ---.... ----.... -------.. --.. ---.~---.... -----..... -..... ---~ ... -~--.-------.. ~---~---.----~------.~ 
Jebba 1.419 0.722 0.837 1.549 1.174 0.655 
Shiroro 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Kainji 1.581 0.95 0.849 1.510 1.135 0.696 
Ijora 0.222 0.389 5.441 0.269 0.807 0.271 
Afam 1.245 0.713 1.337 0.655 0.775 0.982 
Delta 0.538 3.166 1.473 0.872 0.903 1.042 
Sapele 0.814 1.127 0.592 2.059 1.231 1.000 
Egbin 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 0.850 0.953 1.207 0.963 0.990 0.772 
78 A measure of moving toward the optimal scale size over time, and measure of development in 
managerial efficiency, respectively. 
172 
These results and their interpretation have policy implications. First, they facilitate the 
analysis of various policies pursued and simulation of the various productivity 
indices. As discussed above, policy of capacity rehabilitation needs to be supported by 
improvement in operational efficiency. How these various indices interact is 
examined by a simulation exercise in which a 5 percent increase in TECHCH, 
CHPEFF and CHSEFF are assumed. The results are reported in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13 Simulation of TECHCH, CHPEFF and CHSEFF 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1997/98 
1998/1999 
1999/2000 
EFFCH 
1.183 
1.343 
1.480 
1.632 
1.799 
TECHCH 
1.049 
1.102 
1.157 
1.214 
1.275 
CHPEFF 
1.179 
1.238 
1.300 
1.365 
1.433 
CHSEFF 
l.003 
1.085 
l.139 
1.196 
1.256 
MALM 
1.241 
1.479 
l.712 
l.982 
2.294 
Using the indices of 1995/96 as the base scenario, we observe that with a realistic 5 
percent increment in the indices that comprise Malmquist productivity indices, overall 
productivity growth doubles in five years. This exercise is merely indicative of the 
potentials and policy implications of the productivity indices. Based on this stylised 
exercise, one can conclude that the sort of institutional structure that will reinforce 
both technological and efficiency improvement would necessarily have to be an 
integral part of the reform programme necessary for the electricity industry in Nigeria. 
In other words, institutional structure that will aid the realisation of technical 
efficiency and productivity growth should be the objective of reform rather than 
reform for the sake of reform per se. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter we have investigated the efficiency and productivity of the electricity 
industry in Nigeria vis-a-vis a selected sample of developing countries and also the 
electricity generating activities of the stations under the aegis of NEP A using time 
series data. Efficiency analysis was conducted using DEA models while productivity 
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growth was evaluated using Malmquist productivity index. The analysis showed that 
over the period the efficiency of the Nigerian electricity industry is relatively low 
compared to the sample of developing countries, while productivity analysis indicated 
the scope for performance improvement. Inefficiency in the Nigerian electricity 
industry was found to emanate from managerial inefficiency, shortfall in output, and 
indirectly from excessive use of labour. 
Investigation into the sources of productivity growth indicated that scale inefficiency 
is a problem in the Nigerian electricity industry. Further, the rehabilitation programme 
pursued by NEP A in the late 1980s was found to place attention on technological 
improvement (by increasing generating capacity) while neglecting the impact and 
importance of operational efficiency. The evidence by decomposing efficiency change 
index showed that scale efficiency index, which measures the optimal scale of 
electricity production over time, and pure efficiency change index, which captures 
managerial efficiency, in the case of the Nigerian electricity industry, contributed 
more to the productivity growth than technological improvement. The implication is 
that the current electricity policy, which focuses on the physical capacity, captured by 
technological change index neglect the organisational and motivational aspects of 
electricity provision. 
Apart from efficiency and productivity measurement, and how the former can be 
improved by utilising the information obtained from the DEA models, the 
decomposition of productivity indices was used in simulation exercises from which 
direct policy inferences can be drawn. 
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Chapter 6 Measurement and Sources of Technical 
Inefficiency in Nigerian Electricity: An Application of 
Stochastic Frontier Method 
6.1 Introduction 
NEPA is the main producer and supplier of electricity in Nigeria. NEPA's ability to 
provide electricity to the whole country and to ensure the development of electricity 
has been on the decline since the 1980s. The frequency of power outage started to 
increase in the 1980s and has not abated. This decline coincided with the change of 
government. Centralisation of public services became the norm, which effectively put 
bureaucrats and military administrators at the helm of control of the public 
enterprises. The decline, as the result of the non-parametric analysis of the previous 
chapter indicated, coincided with the general economic decline. This caused the 
revenues from electricity supply and the subvention from the government to dwindle, 
consequently, the gap between electricity supply and demand widened. 
It was against this background, given the importance of electricity to the activities of a 
modem economy, that the government of Nigeria adopted World Bank sponsored 
programmes and policies aimed at raising the production of electricity and the 
efficiency of electricity industry. These programmes gave prominence to the 
generation activity of NEP A due to the substantial investment that had been put in 
place and the fact that a substantial part of installed capacity (World Bank, 1993) was 
unavailable for generating electricity. 
Following the evaluation of technical efficiency of the Nigerian electricity industry 
relative to other developing countries, we attempt to estimate the technical efficiency 
of electricity generating plants because the efficiency of electricity production is 
directly related to the overall productivity of NEP A, and hence, the electricity 
industry in Nigeria. Additionally, we also seek to investigate the influence that some 
basic firm-specific and input variables have on technical inefficiency of production of 
the generating plants. To the best of my knowledge, stochastic frontier method has not 
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previously been used to estimate electricity production in Nigeria. The 
recommendations arising from the study should indicate some issues that the 
government's reform programme and policies should take into consideration. 
6.2 Stochastic Frontier Method 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) independently 
developed the estimation of technical inefficiency by stochastic production frontier. 
This method involves an observable random variable associated with the technical 
inefficiency of production of individual firms, in addition to the random error in a 
traditional regression model. Different models of the technical inefficiency effects are 
proposed in the literature. 
Early attempts to explain technical inefficiency such as Pitt and Lee (1981) used two-
stage approach. The first stage involved estimating technical inefficiencies assuming 
that they are identically distributed and are not a function of other variables. The 
second stage involves regressing the estimated technical inefficiencies against a set of 
independent variables to explain the differences in inefficiencies among firms. This 
approach set the standard for efficiency analyses. For instance, Pollitt (1995) used a 
similar methodology to examine the efficiencies in a cross-country study of electricity 
industries. 
Recently, however, authors like Huang and Liu (1994), Battese and Coelli (1993) 
have questioned the theoretical underpinning of the two-stage approach. Their 
criticism of the two-stage method centres on the assumptions of distribution of the 
technical inefficiency component. In the first stage, the technical inefficiency effects 
are assumed to be independently and identically distributed random variables. In the 
second stage, however, the predicted technical inefficiency effects are regressed 
against a number of explanatory variables. The implication of this is that they are not 
identically distributed. Battese and Coelli (1993) argue that this contradicts the 
assumption of identically distributed inefficiency effects in the stochastic frontier. The 
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single-stage procedure, however, does have its own drawback, namely, multi-
collinearity. 
The model used in this analysis is that proposed by Battese and Coelli (1993). 
Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli (1993) 
propose stochastic production functions where technical inefficiency effects are 
expressed as an explicit function of a vector of firm-specific variables and a random 
error. Thus, technical efficiency of individual sample firms can be predicted from the 
panel data analysis. 
A stochastic frontier production function can be defined as follows: 
6.1 
where 
i = 1, ... , N and t = 1, ... , T 
Yit denotes the logarithm of output of the ith firm in the tth period; 
Xit represents a (1 xK) vector whose values are functions of inputs and other 
explanatory variables for the i-th firm in the t-th time period; 
f3 denotes a (Kx 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; 
the Vit are symmetric random error terms and are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with mean zero and unknown variance, a;, this term is 
assumed to account for measurement error and other factors that are not under the 
control of the firm; and, 
the Uit are the asymmetric non-negative random error terms associated with the 
technical inefficiency of production, such that, for the given technology and level of 
inputs, the observed output falls short of its potential output. They are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed as truncations at zero of the N (fn;t' a;) 
distribution, where 
6.2 
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where Zit is a (1 xM) vector of explanatory variables identifying the sources of 
technical inefficiency; and 8 is an (Mx 1) vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated. 
The parameters of the stochastic frontier and technical inefficiency models defined by 
the above expressions are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood using the 
computer program, FRONTIER 4.1. Using the parameterisation suggested by Battese 
and Corra (1977), we replace and with and 
r = (7~ / ((7~ + (7~). This is done with the calculation of the maximum likelihood 
estimates in mind. The parameter y must lie between zero and one to obtain a suitable 
value for an iterative maximisation process. 
The above model specification proposed Battese and Coelli mutatis mutandis 
encompasses a number of model specification as special cases. For instance, by 
setting T equals to one, and Zit contains the value one and no other variables, that is, 
only a constant term, the model becomes the truncated normal specification proposed 
by Stevnson (1980), where 80 will have the same interpretation as the J1 parameter in 
Stevnson (1980). 
Frontier 4.1 (developed by Coelli, 1996b) is capable of calculating individual firm 
technical inefficiencies from estimated production frontiers. The measures of 
technical efficiency relative to the production frontier defined by (1) can be expressed 
as follows: 
6.3 
where EFF;, denotes the technical efficiency of the ith firm, .r;* is the output of the ith 
firm, which will equal .r; when the dependent variable is in original units and will be 
equal to exp(Y;) when the dependent variable is transformed into logarithms. EFF; 
will take a value of between zero and one. This value depends upon the value of the 
unobservable U; being predicted. This is achieved by deriving expressions for the 
conditional expectations of these functions of the Uj conditional upon the observed 
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value of (Vi - U;).79 The resulting expressions are generalised forms of the results in 
10ndrow et al. (1982) and Battese and Coelli (1988) are provided in (Battese and 
Coelli, 1995). 
6.3 Functional Form and Variables 
As this analysis is concerned with the factors that affect efficiency, a flexible 
functional form, namely, translog stochastic frontier production function is considered 
alongside with a Cobb-Douglas type function to represent the production of electricity 
in Nigeria. Output, which is gross electricity produced (measured in kWh), is assumed 
to be a function of three inputs: labour, taken to be the number of employees in 
generation, capacity available for generation (MW) and fuel used in generating 
electricity (measured in British thermal units). Technical change is permitted to be 
non-neutral. The error term is assumed to have two components with properties as 
specified in Battese and Coelli (1993). That is, production is assumed to represented 
by: 
~G=~+A~4+A~~+A~~+W+A~4+~~~+A~~+~~4~~ 
+ I1J ~4t ~I\t + Ao ~I\t ~F;t + Alt2 + A2 ~4tt + A3 ~F;l + A4 ~I\l + Vii - 11;t 
6.4 
where Q, L, K, and F are output, labour, capital and fuel, respectively. The error terms 
are as defined above. A noteworthy point is that the distribution of the asymmetric 
error term is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal distribution with mean mit 
and variance a; where the inefficiency component of the model is defined as 
6.5 
79 The technical efficiencies are predicted using the conditional expectation of exp( -Uit), given the 
composed error term of the stochastic error term of the stochastic frontier. The technical inefficiency 
effects are modelled in terms of various explanatory variables, which could include functions of firms 
and management characteristics and period of observation. Battese and Coelli (1995) state that the 
general frontier model may include intercept parameters and period of observation in both frontier and 
the model for the inefficiency effects, provided that inefficiency effects are stochastic and not merely a 
deterministic function of relevant explanatory variables. That is Uit = Zi,tS cannot be estimated for all 
choices if Zit and Xit· 
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where 
M represents maintenance factor, calculated as the proportion of maintenance cost to 
generating capacity; 
S represents the average size of the installed generating units; 
CF represents capacity factor, which is the extent to which installed capacity is used 
in generating capacity; 80 
D represents the dummy variable included to capture production technology, 
assuming a value of one for hydro-facility and zero for thermal generating facility. 
In this empirical analysis, the limited observation period precludes the investigation of 
different regimes on electricity production. The f3s and 8s are the parameters to be 
estimated. 
The inclusion of the firm specific factors in the translog specification model allows 
the mean of the technical efficiency error terms to shift. The significance of these 
factors on technical inefficiency of electricity generation in Nigeria can be tested by 
invoking the restriction that all the 8s with the exception of 50, are equal to zero. 
Failure to reject this hypothesis equates the model to one in which the inefficiency 
term has a truncated normal distribution (Stevenson, 1980).81 
It should be noted that the four firm-specific factors included in the analysis are not 
the only factors that could possible impact upon efficiency. A variety of management 
factors such as the experience of managers and the degree of bureaucratic and/or 
union constraints upon management could also be expected to influence technical 
efficiency. 
The technique is applied to a panel data set of the eight electricity-generating plants 
under the aegis of NEP A over a period of 7 years from 1989/90 to 1995/96. From the 
mean technical efficiencies of NEP A's generating plants it is possible to evaluate the 
industry's average technical efficiency. The descriptive statistics of the statistics used 
so Capacity factor is synonymously referred to as load factor, and it is calculated by the following 
expression: CF = (Gross output (kWh) x 1000)/Installed Capacity (MW) x 8760(hours)). 
slIn that case, Do corresponds to the J.l parameter defined by Stevenson (1980). 
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in this analysis is given in Table 6.1. The full data set used is provided in Appendix 
E2. 
A joint test implying that the random and deterministic components of the 
inefficiency error term are insignificant requires invoking the restriction that 
r=60=61 =62=63=64=0. The implication of not rejecting this hypothesis is that the 
inefficiency error term Uit ought to be removed from the empirical model. This 
reduces the model to the typical average production function in which technical 
efficiency is implicitly assumed. 
The translog production function is a more flexible functional form. It permits the 
analyses of substitution, scale and technical change possibilities than the Cobb-
Douglas functional form. It is more demanding than the latter in that more parameters 
need to be estimated. If a simpler functional form can represent the underlying 
production technology, then the estimation of more parameters is superfluous which 
may result in inefficient estimates. Thus, a number of hypotheses based in various 
restrictions of the translog function will be tested. 
6.4 Results and Discussion 
Frontier 4.1 can be used to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of a subset of 
stochastic frontier production and cost function which have been proposed in the 
literature. The program can accommodate panel data, time-varying and invariant 
efficiencies; cost and production functions; half-normal and truncated distribution; 
and functional forms that have a dependent variable in logged or original units of 
measurement. The program cannot, however, accommodate exponential or gamma 
distributions, nor can it estimate systems of equations. The common assumptions 
made for the error terms, therefore, are normal and half-normal for the symmetric and 
asymmetric error terms, respectively. 
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6.4.1 Hypotheses Regarding the Production Function 
Frontier 4.1 was used to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters 
of the translog stochastic frontier model defined above. For the maximum likelihood 
estimation, the program uses a three-step procedure. First, ordinary least squares 
estimates of the functions are obtained. The estimated coefficients are unbiased 
estimates of the Pi coefficients, with the exception of Po which will be biased because 
of the non-zero expectation of the Uit. 
The second stage evaluates the log-likelihood function for a number of values of r 
between zero and one. The & are set equal to zero and the values of Po and cI are 
adjusted according to the corrected ordinary least squares formulae for the half normal 
model. The corresponding maximum log-likelihood estimates of the second step form 
the basis of the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell iterative maximisation, which forms the 
third step of the estimation to obtain the final maximum likelihood estimates. 
Table 6.1 Summary Statistics for Electricity Generation in Nigeria 1989/90-95/96 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Output (kWh) 1803779 1300205 380 5358350 
Labour 465.2679 164.2929 122 850 
Fuel (Btu) 11345733 84455636 21 6.32E+08 
Capital (MW) 335.5507 200.1492 4.54 726.94 
Maintenance 449653.5 1291034 1615 7820999 
A verage Unit Size 95.86375 61.9566 16.68 220 
Capacity Factor 28.50749 15.29952 0.065036 58.99775 
The maximum likelihood estimates and their t-ratios (in parentheses) of the translog 
model defined by the two equations above are reported in Table 6.2. The software 
also gives the asymptotic standard errors of the coefficients, although not reported in 
the table. Starting with the estimates of the coefficients associated with the production 
inputs and technical change, most have t-ratios larger than l.96 in absolute values. 
This suggests that the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at 
the 5 percent significance level, which indicates a reasonable fit. 
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There are two caveats when interpreting t-ratios. First, the size of the tests will not be 
equal to five percent when more than one test is conducted in sequence. More 
importantly, multi-collinearity resulting from the inclusion of squared and cross 
products may contribute to the high standard errors observed. Thus, t-test may lead to 
the omission of some coefficients, and consequently lead to model mis-specification 
(Coelli, 1996c). Thus, more appropriate testing entails using the likelihood ratio (LR) 
test to ascertain the significance of groups of coefficients.82 To test the validity of the 
a priori restriction, the LR test obtains the following statistic: 
A = 2(ULLF - RLLF) 6.6 
where ULLF is known as the unrestricted log-likelihood function because a priori 
there are no restrictions imposed on the parameters, and RLLF is known as the 
restricted log-likelihood function because it is estimated with a priori restriction. The 
idea behind this test is straightforward. If the a priori restrictions are valid, the 
restricted and unrestricted log-likelihood function should not be different, in which 
case A will be zero. But if that is not the case, the two likelihood functions will 
diverge. 83 
A test of the null hypothesis of Hicks-neutral technical change84 was conducted. This 
hypothesis required the imposition a priori restriction of zero coefficients on the 
interactions between the inputs and the time trend. The maximum likelihood estimates 
of the parameters of the restricted model are reported in the third column of Table 6.2. 
The log-likelihood functions of the models also reported in Table 6.2 and are used in 
Table 6.3 to derive the statistics for the hypotheses testing. 
A test statistic of 6.28 was obtained which is less the tabular value of 7.81 (the critical 
value from the xi distribution). Thus, the hypothesis of Hicks-neutral technical 
82 Detailed description of the tests used in this analysis are given in Coelli (1996). 
83 If the null hypothesis is true, then A has approximately a chi-square (or mixed square) distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the di~fere~ce bem:een the parameters estimate~ u~der.HI and Ho, 
respectively. The sample size involved In thiS study IS not very large and so the distributIOn of the test 
statistics may tum out to be poorly approximated using asymptotic theory. 
84 See Appendix 
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change cannot be rejected. The inference that can be draw is that technical change has 
not favoured anyone factor input over another. 
The second hypothesis considered is whether any technical change occurred over the 
sample period. Essentially, this test entailed invoking the following restriction, 
{J4={J11={J12=/lJ3= /l14=0. The result of this test is reported in the fourth row of Table 
6.3. The test statistic of 24.36 exceeds the x; critical value of 11.07 at the 5 percent 
significance level. The implication is that we can confidently reject the null 
hypothesis of no technical change. 
The third hypothesis considered is to see whether a Cobb-Douglas functional form is 
more appropriate than the translog functional form estimated. Accepting the 
appropriate null hypothesis would considerably simplify the estimation and the 
inference we can draw from the analysis. The hypothesis involved the test of the 
following restriction, /ls /l6 P, fJ8 /39 fJlO /lll fll2 fl13=fJI4=0. We obtain a LR test 
statistic of 47.44, which exceeds the X120 critical value of 18.31 at the 5 percent 
significance level. The null hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas functional form is rejected in 
favour of the translog functional form. Thus, the preferred specification is the translog 
functional form with Hicks neutral technical change. 
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Table 6.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model 
Coefficient Translog Translog (HNTCt Cobb-Douglas 
Constant -33.01 -44.23 6.99 
(-0.34) (-46.17) (6.44) 
In L 15.11 15.45 0.43 
(15.35) (32.04) (2.88) 
In F 1.43 1.00 0.036 
(3.05) (2.04) (4.47) 
In K -3.83 1.94 0.028 
(-2.65) (3.34) (14.78) 
t 1.07 -0.016 0.028 
(2.72) (-0.31) (1.86) 
(In L)2 -1.39 -0.90 
(-7.04) (-51.82) 
(In F)2 0.006 0.008 
(2.43) (3.64) 
(lnKi -0.26 -0.031 
(-3.15) (-1.34) 
(In L)(ln F) -0.29 -0.31 
(-4.37) (-4.29) 
(In K)(ln L) 1.07 -0.33 
(3.43) (-4.34) 
(In K)(ln F) 0.043 0.13 
(1.35) (4.84) 
t2 -7xl0-4 0.008 
(-0.09) (2.03) 
(In L)t -0.25 
(3.42) 
(In F)t 7xlO-3 
(1.78) 
(In K)t 0.077 
(3.20) 
(32 0.189 0.20 0.49 
(3.82) (6.47) (3.78) 
Y 1.000 1.000 
0.97 
(3829) (3898) (56.52) 
Intercept [801 2.27 1.83 2.53 
(6.99) (5.61) (5.84) 
Maintenance 2.6xlO-7 1.7xlO-7 3.25xl0-
7 
(3.48) (2.18) (4.05) 
A vg. Unit size 7.6xlO-3 3.67xl0-3 1.70xlO-
3 
(-1.84) (1.26) (0.64) 
Capacity Factor -0.087 -0.098 -0.14 
(-10.38) (-8.59) (-11.7) 
Hydro/Thermal 1.28 0.59 -0.69 
(3.55) (1.69) (-3.09) 
Log-Likelihood 23.7 20.56 -0.02 
Note: (a) HNTC = Hicks-neutral technical change 
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6.4.2 Hypotheses Regarding Technical Inefficiency Effects 
An inspection of the t-ratios associated with rand 8s show that they are significant, 
with the exception of two coefficients which have t-ratios that are larger than one in 
absolute value. This shows that the inclusions of the firm specific factors are 
significant additions to the model. Although multi-collinearity is unlikely to be of 
major concern regarding the coefficients, as was the case with the f3 coefficients, 
nonetheless, we conduct a few LR tests to confirm the observation. 
Table 6.3 Hypothesis Tests 
Model Restrictions Log- Likelihood X2 Critical Decision 
Description Likelihood Ratio Statistic (A) Value (5%) 
Translog None 23.70 
Translog (Hicks- fi12=fiJ3=fiJ4=O 20.56 6.28 7.81 Accept 
Neutral Technical Ho 
Change) 
Translog (No fi4=fin=fi12=fiJ3 11.52 24.36 11.07 Reject 
Technical Change) =fiu=O Ho 
Cobb-Douglas fi5=fi6=fi7=fi8=fi9 -0.02 47.44 18.31 Reject 
=fiJO=fil1=fi12= Ho 
fiJ3=fiJ./=O 
Translog (OLS) ,00=0}=02=03= -13.58 68.28 12.59 Reject 
04=0 Ho 
Translog (No Firm- 0}=02=03=04=0 0.87 39.38 9.49 Reject 
Specific Factors) Ho 
The first test we examine is to evaluate the level of technical inefficiency involved in 
generating electricity by NEP A. If the null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency is 
accepted, then the error term, Un, ought to be removed with the resulting model 
appropriately estimated using ordinary least squares method. The omission of Uit is 
equivalent to imposing the restriction, F~=51=~=~=54=O. The LR test statistic was 
calculated to be 68.28, which exceeded the tabular xl critical value of 12.59. This led 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis and the conclusion that a model that accounts 
for technical inefficiency is appropriate. 
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A test to see whether the firm specific factors significantly influence the technical 
inefficiency of the generating plants entailed invoking the restriction 00=0]=02=03= 
84=0. A LR test statistic of 39.38 was obtained. This statistic exceeded the tabular 
xl critical value of 9.49 at the 5 percent significance level. The null hypothesis that 
the four firm specific factors do not have any influence on technical inefficiency was 
also rejected. 
6.4.3 Economic Plausibility of Results 
6.4.3.1 Production Structure 
After taking the results of the above hypotheses into consideration, the preferred 
model appears to be that defined by equation (6.4) and (6.5) with Hicks-neutral 
technical change imposed. The complexity of the translog functional form makes a 
direct economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients difficult. This problem 
can, however, be circumvented by differentiating the equation and then calculating 
more easily interpreted estimates (Coelli, 1996c). The estimates of the production 
elasticities of the three factor inputs, returns to scale elasticity and the annual 
percentage change in production due to technical change, are all listed, with 
Expression 6.4 evaluated at the sample mean. Following the method used by Greene 
(1993) the approximate standard errors of these estimates are calculated and listed in 
parentheses. 
The estimated production elasticities all have the right signs, with the exception of 
labour elasticity, which has a value of -0.94, which is not significantly different from 
zero at the 10 percent. The elasticity of capital with respect to output is 1.62. This 
does have the right sign but the magnitude is quite high. Fuel elasticity prima facie 
does have both the right sign and seems to be of the right magnitude. These results 
have similitude to those obtained by Coelli (l996c) save for the aforementioned 
nlagnitude. 
187 
A study of III private electricity generating plants in the US by Schmidt and Lovell 
(1979) obtained production elasticities which are insignificantly different from zero 
for labour and also close to one for the elasticity of fuel. Kopp and Smith (1980) in 
study of 43 public and private coal-fired electric utilities omitted labour input from 
their analysis. They argued that "capital and fuel appear to be most important inputs 
to the production technology" and labour "appears to bear a direct relationship to the 
scale of the plant." Thus, it appears that our elasticity estimates are similar to those 
obtained in other studies, and more, importantly, the insignificant labour elasticity is 
not unusual in electricity generation. 
Table 6.4 Key Estimates from the Translog Model with Hicks-Neutral Technical Change 
Description 
Capital Elasticity 
Labour Elasticity 
Fuel Elasticity 
Return to Scale Elasticity 
Technical Change 
EstimateS5 
1.62 
( 0.579) 
-0.94 
( 0.402) 
0.346 
( 0.091) 
1.026 
( 0.684) 
0.03763 
( 0.0188) 
Note: Approximate standard errors reported in parentheses 
The estimated returns to scale elasticity of 1.026 indicates "marginal" increasing 
returns to scale. 86 Given the approximate standard error, an asymptotic (-test of the 
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale, that is, a scale elasticity of one, results in 
the rejection of the null hypothesis. When the estimated returns to scale elasticity is 
85 The elasticities of the mean output with respect to the factor inputs, returns to scale and technological 
change are estimated at the mean values of the different inputs, using the ~~imum likel~ood 
estimates of the parameters in the preferred model. For example, the elastICity of output With respect to 
capital is calculated using the following expression: 
GKf) = d In Q = /h, + 2 P, In K + flJ In L + f3t 0 In F 
\! dl K -
86 An estir:nate of returns to scale elasticity equals to, greater than, or less than one indicate constant, 
increasing or decreasing returns to scale, respectively. 
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small when juxtaposed against those obtained in previous studies Kopp and Smith 
(1980) for instance reported values ranging from 1.142 to 2.131. This is not 
particularly surprising given the disappointing performance of NEP A and erratic 
capacity usage. 
Technical change is estimated at 0.03763,87 which indicates that NEPA's generation 
activity has experienced a rate of technical progress of 3.763 percent over the sample 
period. The implication is that with the estimated rate of technical progress, a 
hypothetical plant could produce 26.34 percent more output in 1995/96 than could be 
produced in 1989/90, using the same set of inputs. 
6.4.3.2 Technical Efficiency 
In this sub-section, we consider rand 8; which are the parameters associated with the 
inefficiency error term, Uit. The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are 
reported in Table 6.2. The interpretation of r of 1.00 is not as clear in this model as it 
is in the half-normal stochastic frontier. In the latter, all the 8; are zero, and the r can 
be shown to be a function of the ratio of the variance of the error term to the sum of 
the variances of the two error terms. For the model estimated in this analysis, it can be 
broadly interpreted as being indicative of the amount of unexplained variation in the 
technical inefficiencies effects, relative to the sum of this value and the variance of Vito 
Due care ought to be gIven to the interpretation of the signs of the estimated 
coefficients of the firm specific factors. Take, for instance, the negative sign of the 
estimated coefficient of capacity factor. The suggestion, prima facie is an inverse 
relationship between capacity factor and gross electricity generated. In fact, what it 
indicates is that an increase in capacity factor will result in a decrease in the value of 
technical inefficiency effect, which is tantamount to an increase in technical 
efficiency. This is in line with a priori expectation that the more efficient a plant is, 
the higher the capacity factor. 
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The positive sign on the estimate of the coefficient of maintenance was surprising. 
The expectation was that technical efficiency would increase with maintenance as this 
would increase the level of available capacity for generating electricity. The 
countervailing argument is that the estimated coefficient is very small. Nevertheless, 
further analysis will be undertaken. The positive sign on the estimated coefficient of 
the dummy variable associated with thermal production technology was as expected. 
We now tum our attention to the technical efficiencies of the electricity generating 
plants. These efficiencies can be predicted from the estimated model. As stated 
earlier, the technical efficiency of production of the ith plant in the tth year is defined 
by 
TEit = exp (-Uit) 6.7 
The approach suggested by Jondrow et al (1982) is used to decompose the estimated 
error term into the two constituents, Uit and Vit associated with each observation. This 
is based on the conditional expectation of exp( -Uit), given the value of 
eit = Vit - Uit· 6.8 
An operational predictor of the technical efficiency of the ith plant in the tth year is 
obtained by substituting the maximum likelihood estimates for the unknown 
parameters in (6.8). The predicted technical efficiencies will range between zero and 
one since Uit is a non-random variable. A value of one indicates full technical 
efficiency. The technical efficiencies for our model (calculated by the program, 
Frontier) are reported in Table 6.5. 
Technical efficiencies range from 5.4 percent for Ijora in 1991192 to 99.l percent for 
Jebba in 1994/95. The mean of technical efficiencies in the industry is 69.2 percent. 
The inference we can draw is that the generating plants under the aegis of NEP A 
87 Technical change is calculated by differentiating output with respect to time. This can be expressed 
dQ 
as - = f34 + 2f3llt . 
dt 
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produce, on average, 69.2 percent of the maximal output. The mean efficiency score 
of electricity generation in Nigeria is much lower than 92.5 percent estimated by 
Coelli (1996c) in his estimation of Australian coal-fired stations or 84.6 and 94.5 
percent estimated by Kopp and Smith (1980) for steam electric generation in the 
United States. 
Coelli (1996c) suggested that it is not unusual to obtain large mean efficiency for 
electricity generation. This is due to the size of the plants (economies of scale) and the 
resources they have available to them to ensure that they are always aware of and 
using the latest advances in technology. This observation is not borne out in the case 
of the Nigerian electricity industry. 
Table 6.S Individual Technical Efficiencies 
Year Jebba Shiroro Kainji Ijora Afam Delta SapeJe Egbin Mean Weighted Mean 
1990 0.687 0.941 0.428 0.203 0.668 0.575 0.988 0.982 0.684 0.828 
1991 0.950 0.866 0.649 0.064 0.479 0.273 0.946 0.882 0.639 0.796 
1992 0.802 0.993 0.712 0.054 0.544 0.855 0.873 0.749 0.698 0.797 
1993 0.617 0.899 0.585 0.343 0.640 0.999 0.632 0.711 0.678 0.756 
1994 0.866 0.859 0.800 0.218 0.872 0.721 0.987 0.886 0.776 0.850 
1995 0.991 0.804 0.914 0.080 0.522 0.582 0.943 0.652 0.686 0.785 
1996 0.670 0.792 0.667 0.240 0.475 0.648 0.995 0.979 0.683 0.808 
Mean 0.798 0.879 0.679 0.172 0.600 0.665 0.909 0.834 0.692 0.784 
Closer inspection of individual plant efficiencies is illuminating. The means of the 
technical efficiencies of individual plants are also reported in Table 6.5. Ijora exhibits 
the lowest average technical efficiency of 17.2 percent while Sapele displayed the 
highest mean technical efficiency of 90.9 percent. The low technical efficiency of 
Ijora is not particularly surprising given that it is the oldest and the smallest plant in 
the sample. Shiroro, Sapele and Egbin exhibited average technical efficiency that 
exceeded 80 percent throughout the observation period. Again, this is not surprising 
when we consider the facts that these plants are some of the largest using newer 
technology. Egbin, for instance, is based on the more efficient combined cycle gas 
turbine technology. 
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The means of the technical efficiency over the sample period (reported in the last 
column of Table 6.5) shows that technical efficiency fluctuated considerably. A point 
that cannot be belaboured is that the estimated technical efficiencies reported in this 
analysis are relative (to the frontier) measures using a sample of firms from the 
Nigerian electricity industry only. It is probable that the estimates will change 
somewhat if a much broader sample were to be used. 
6.5 Comparison with the Two-Stage Approach 
The parameters of equations (6.4) and (6.5), with the necessary restriction imposed to 
render the production function Hicks-neutral technical change, are estimated 
simultaneously in the stochastic frontier approach. In conformity with the other 
empirical studies (Pollitt, 1995), we also apply the two-stage estimation procedure to 
the data set of electricity generation in Nigeria. 
The first stage entails the estimation of the parameters of (6.4) by maXImum 
likelihood. This requires the imposition of the assumption that the Uit are 
independently and identically distributed as truncations at zero of a N(80,(j~) 
distri bution. 
In the second stage, we regress the logarithms of the technical efficiency predictions 
from the estimated first stage model against the firm specific factors. Following the 
suggestion by Coelli (1996c), the negative of the logarithms of the technical 
efficiency predictions were chosen as the dependent variable for the regression so that 
the estimated coefficients of the firm specific factors would have similar 
interpretations to those in the single-stage model of the stochastic frontier analysis. 88 
Essentially, the estimation involves 
6.9 
88 The way (6.9) is expressed gives an intuitive appeal that makes direct comparison with the single 
stage approach possible. 
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A 
where Effit is the technical efficiency prediction from the first stage model and Wit is 
an error term, such that - wit < ao + a. Mit + ~Sit + ~CFit + a4 Dit . It is perforce to 
limit the range of Wit accordingly so as to ensure that -In(Effit) does not become 
A 
negative and Effit does not concomitantly exceed one. 
The assumptions of non-normality and bounded range of the error term makes the 
limited dependent variable model proposed by Tobin (1958) an obvious choice for the 
two-stage analysis. The fact that none of the predicted efficiencies equalled to one, 
however, rendered the Tobit model inappropriate (see Chapter 5 for an exposition of 
the Tobit model). Thus, for want of a better method and in spite of the possibility that 
the distribution assumption of the error term may render the estimates non-optimal, 
we use ordinary least squares to estimate the parameters in (6.9). The ordinary least 
square estimates are reported in Table 6.6 below. 
Table 6.6 OLS Estimates of the Second Stage Technical Efficiency Regression 
Regressor 
Constant 
Maintenance Factor 
A verage Unit Size 
Capacity Factor 
Technology Dummy 
Estimate 
1.399 
(10.764) 
6.64xl0-6 
(1.473) 
3.316xl0-2 
(0.643) 
-0.0341 
(-6.224) 
0.0517 
(0.431 ) 
The signs on the estimated coefficients are the same as those obtained in the single 
stage estimation procedure for the translog functional form with Hicks-neutral 
technological progress imposed. The (-ratios are all significantly less than one except 
for the capacity factors. The results obtained form the two-stage estimation 
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procedures are not dissimilar to those from the single-stage estimation. The single-
stage is, however, preferred to the two-stage due to its inherent higher efficiency. This 
is due to the consistency in the assumption of the asymmetric error term. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter, along with Chapter 4, contributes to the body of analytical work 
regarding the structure of production and the relative efficiencies on electricity 
generation in Nigeria. Since no previous studies use econometric techniques to assess 
the electricity generation in Nigeria using plant level data, this analysis shed some 
light on the sources and causes of inefficiency in the electricity industry. 
The main inferences that can be drawn form this analytical study include the 
preference for a non-homothetic production structure, translog function, over a Cobb-
Douglas functional form for electricity production in Nigeria. Further, the results 
show that the electricity industry in Nigeria was characterised by a Hicks-neutral 
technical progress and "marginal" increasing returns to scale. Average technical 
efficiency for the electricity generation is estimated at 69.2 percent while the mean 
technical efficiencies of the plants varied from 17.2 percent to 90.9 percent over the 
sample period. Of the firm specific factors, maintenance and capacity factors were 
found to have significant influence upon technical efficiency. 
With the planned reform of the electricity industry in Nigeria, analyses of the 
electricity generation will be very important in assessing the type of restructuring that 
would improve overall efficiency. There are some aspects of reform that could not be 
analysed due to paucity of data set. Although there are certain aspects on which we 
can compare the single-stage procedure of the stochastic frontier methodology to the 
two-stage estimation process, such as the efficiency of the estimates, the two methods 
provide different ancillary results. For instance, the stochastic frontier approach 
cannot directly estimate scale efficiencies. As such, rather than view the two 
approaches as completely exclusive to each other, more stands to be gained by 
treating them as complementary. 
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The robustness of efficiency analysis can only grow with a much richer data set. 
Ways in which the analysis can be extended include, collating an international sample 
of electricity generating plants with different attributes including ownership into the 
data set to examine how the ownership effect influence electricity production. The 
construction of variables that captures different management styles; and, the inclusion 
of cost data will enable the scope of the analysis to be extended to allocative 
efficiency. 
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Chapter 7 Reform of the Nigerian Electricity Industry: Will 
it Solve Problem of Electricity Supply? 
7.1 Introduction 
The disappointing performance of the electricity industry in Nigeria started in the 
1980s. A fact bore out by the results of the two previous empirical chapters. In 
addition to the analyses of efficiency of the last two chapters, whether the 
government's intervention has staved off or exacerbated the near collapse of the 
system cannot be ascertained a priori. A thorough normative analysis of the 
arguments for government involvement (see Section 3.2.1 on the rationale of public 
involvement) is required. The case can be made that some of the externalities that the 
government intended to solve were exacerbated by the pursuit of non-economic 
objectives. 
Given the disappointing performance of NEP A since the mid 1980s, there is no doubt 
that the industry as a whole needs to undergo restructuring with respect to ownership, 
organisation and regulation. The general expectations surrounding privatisation need 
to be tempered with caution. Although attempts are made to eschew treating 
privatisation as a panacea89 to rectifying the various problems that beset NEPA, the 
general trend of the reform, given the history of NEP A's performance and the 
structure of the industry, will be away from direct public participation and monopoly. 
To put privatisation and the expectation from it into perspective, we look at what the 
process entails both from a theoretical perspective and in the context ofNEPA. 
While the Nigerian electricity industry remains a public monopoly, the constant 
shortages and lack of investment have triggered the debate for reform. In 1992, the 
government instituted a series of laws, decrees and regulation addressing the status of 
the public utility, tariff policy, and setting up the Utilities Charges Commission 
(UCC). The general trust of this chapter is to analyse the form of restructuring 
89 This caution stems from the inadequate fmancial markets, limited industrial infrastructure and major 
shortages of management and technical skills. 
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necessary to overturn the disappointing performance that has prevailed In the 
electricity industry in Nigeria over the past two decades. 
To justify the various types of reform, we need to address the question whether the 
disappointing performance of NEP A per se is the only consideration in the reform 
debate or whether other factors, such as revenue, the assimilation of new ideas or 
international pressure, are driving the reform debate. McGowan (1993) pointed out 
that the reform of electricity industry is a consequence of more than a simple need to 
improve performance. Although the impetus for change may be multifaceted, the 
importance of performance cannot be overemphasised (as shown in Chapters 5 and 6). 
Additionally, we look at reform of the Nigerian electricity industry from a broader 
perspective, namely, what will make reform successful. 
As the main purpose of this chapter is to analyse aspects of the current debate and 
proposals to improve the performance of the Nigerian electricity industry, against the 
results obtained in Chapters 5 and 6, particular attention is paid to ownership and the 
organisational structure of the industry. The various impact of privatisation on 
operational efficiency, increase capacity and output are examined. As public 
ownership is regarded as the bane of effective performance of the Nigerian electricity 
industry, the main objective is to analyse the effect of ownership on electricity 
production. Which entails comparing the outcomes of both public and private 
ownership, also the importance of incentives on efficiency are also considered. 
Consequently, this chapter is in four main parts. Section two summarises the issues 
and problems experienced in the Nigerian electricity industry. Additionally, a 
summary of the theoretical approaches pertinent to the reform of public enterprises 
such as public choice theory is provided. This provides the heuristics for our analysis. 
Section three outlines a modification of the benchmark model developed by Vickers 
and Yarrow (1988) to examine the interactions between ownership and efficiency. 
The fourth section examines the concept of privatisation by assessing different reform 
types, the UK and the French models, and liberalisation. Section five examines 
aspects of privatisation and regulation that will make restructuring successful in the 
Nigeria electricity industry. 
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7.2 Issues and Problems 
A thorough analysis of reform of the electricity industry requires an understanding of 
the issues and problems responsible for NEPA's disappointing performance (see 
Chapter 3). The salient problems observed that have come to characterise the Nigerian 
electricity industry can be summarised as: (i) financial insolvency;90 (ii) dismal 
operating efficiency and poor system performance; (iii) poor investment decisions that 
have distorted the structure of the industry; and (iv) severe institutional constraints 
that restrict managerial autonomy. 
Despite measures taken to address operational problems, for instance, maintenance91 
and the change of NEPA's objective to align with commercialisation, the unreliable 
and inadequate provision of electricity continues to exacerbate the economic problems 
in Nigeria. This is due to unwillingness on the part of the government to restructure 
industry and curtail expropriation of autonomy. The situation is worsened as 
consumers use scarce capital and fuels for self-generation of electricity. Overall, there 
is no equivocation that the performance of NEP A has deteriorated, and that the need 
to address the problems cannot be ignored. Whether it is due to public ownership or 
the structure of the industry is something that needs to be ascertained. 
To understand this, we need to consider the factors that have directly contributed to 
the above listed problems, and hence, deterioration of the performance of the Nigerian 
electricity industry. These include rising capital cost due to macroeconomic 
disequilibria, poor utility management, inappropriate investment criteria, centralised 
administration and excessive bureaucratisation. 
On the issue of financial insolvency, the consequences of inadequate cash flows 
include cuts in maintenance, training and necessary investment in transmission and 
distribution networks. These manifested themselves, in the case of the Nigerian 
90 Barnett (1993) ascribed this to inability contain costs and the restriction to raise revenue to cover 
~roduction cost. Increasing tariffs is politically difficult. 
1 US$1.5bn went on rehabilitation program between 1992 and 1998 (World Bank, 1993) 
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electricity industry, in unreliable electricity supply, and an unwillingness of the 
customers to pay for declining service. 
The authority's view of the problem is that it is transitory in nature and wholly 
associated with the adverse macroeconomic conditions that set in in the mid-1980s. 
Whilst the argument for reform within NEP A is accepted, the problems are seen as 
outside the realm of control of NEPA's management.92 More so, when we take into 
consideration the extra pressure NEP A is under, both from the government and the 
public, to extend access and availability of electricity to all and sundry. 
The World Bank enunciates a contrasting perception of the problem.93 The World 
Bank's view of the problems encountered by the electricity industry in Nigeria is that 
it is long-standing. The World Bank's perspective vis-a.-vis solution is a reappraisal of 
the relationship between the utilities of developing countries and their governments. 
This position is characterised by the shift in the Bank's position from project-based 
lending to policy-based lending (Barnett, 1993). 
The real source of the problems experienced by NEP A lies somewhere between the 
two opposing views. The World Bank's approach to reform is encouraging in that it 
emphasises transparency between the government and NEP A. Despite the evaluation 
of policies and practices that have been cultivated, however, the Bank fails to take the 
inherent conflict between the realities faced by the Nigerian government required to 
manage the economy and the demand of its people into consideration. This leads us to 
the question of whether there is optimality between allocative and operational 
efficiency. 
As capital inflow into the electricity activities started drying up in the late 1980s with 
the mounting debt crisis, inappropriate tariff policy which did not allow scope for cost 
recovery further compounded the problems. During the 1980s, in spite of economic 
difficulties, government did not increase tariffs. The reasons that are cited for this 
92 These problems are high interest rates on exiting debt, ability to raise wages or tariffs restricted by 
macroeconomic policies, inability to attract new capital. 
93 The World Bank remains the largest single source of capital to the electricity industries of 
developing countries and as such, is capable of exerting considerable influence derived from its 
financial and technical hegemony on reform programmes. 
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inertia was to control inflation and the inability of the poor to pay the economic cost 
of electricity supply (given the objective of universal access to electricity). There is 
consensus among the authorities that acquiring financing to expand the system is one 
of the primary problems that besets NEP A. Others include structural arrangement and 
pnclng. 
The global trend of the privatisation and deregulation in the electricity industries of 
the last decade have inspired, and influenced, the reform of electricity industry in 
developing countries. Now, privatisation and private participation are regarded as 
central to long term investment goals in the sector. We can examine countries that 
have implemented reform to see lessons that can be drawn for Nigeria. Caution must 
be exercised in the quest for change in that we have seen reform of electricity 
industries in developing countries that can be described as partly successful. For 
instance, Mendonca and Dahl (1999) on a study of the reform of the Brazilian 
electricity industry pointed out that the reform is successful as far as privati sing the 
distribution utilities are concerned. Monopolistic rent, however, was observed to 
accrue along with a failure as far as attracting the private investment required to 
increase the generating capacity. 
The last point is very important because it is one of the salient arguments in the debate 
of restructuring NEP A. Expansion of the system capacity is important and, 
necessarily, has to be taken into consideration. Otherwise the risks and incidence of 
blackouts will continue unabated, and the desired competitive market will not be 
realised due to inadequate capacities. A joint effort may, therefore, be required to 
tackle the capacity problem, and an effective regulatory regime with a well-defined 
tariff policy will have to precede privatisation ofNEP A. 
The literature on related subjects of performance of public sector enterprises, 
deregulation and privatisation of electricity industry is growing (Barnett, 1993, Hunt 
and Shuttleworth, 1995, Pollitt, 1995) and provides relevant theoretical heuristics. 
Thus, rather than focus solely on the empirical evidence, more stands to be gained, if 
the process of reform itself is to be understood, by juxtaposing theory with practice. 
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The theoretical heuristics are premised on concepts of property rights, rent seeking, 
regulation which are rooted in public choice literature. Essentially, the justification is 
that to understand why reform occurs, we need to consider the motivations of those 
engaged in the process. From a public choice perspective, therefore, reform is 
perceived as been motivated by self-interest and/or policy convergence due to 
pressure exerted by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. 
Historically, electricity industry was regarded as a monopoly, hence, the trend 
towards public participation. This manifested itself in the concentration of utilities 
under public control, and in some cases, extended to public ownership. The 
economies of scale argument and co-ordination of the various activities involved in 
electricity due to its technical characteristics buttressed the case for national 
monopolies. 
In the case of Nigeria, the question of why industrial rationalisation should have taken 
the form of public ownership is best understood in the context of the country's 
political economy. There was public involvement in the electricity industry from the 
onset, primarily at the local level, as a consequence of the role of the government in 
the provision of municipal services. At the state level, intervention was deemed 
necessary to consolidate the industry so as to exploit scale economies and address 
imbalances in quality and cost of supply. As such, state intervention was seen as 
important to counter monopoly power which the activities in the electricity industry 
involved (Persky, 1991). Further, intervention was perceived as an act of strategic 
planning, using the sector to foster economic development. 
More recently, the trend has begun to change. The changes occurring in the electricity 
industries on the global level mirror broader shifts in the ownership debate. In similar 
circumstances to the period that saw the rationalisation of the 1950s and 1960s 
(Schleifer, 1998), the current period, particularly for developing countries, pose 
problems that need to be solved. Performance, for instance, has faltered, and the 
promised economic development that the integration was meant to galvanise failed to 
occur. 
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Furthermore, poor investment appraisal, particularly in the construction of large 
plants, effectively meant considerable cost of compensation and replacement. The 
industry has been subjected to level of government involvement highlighted by critics 
of public ownership. In Nigeria, poor performance has been magnified and 
compounded by deeper economic crisis. The pertinent question to elucidate this 
concern is how bad is the record of electricity industry in public ownership? 
(McGowan, 1988; de Oliveira and MacKerron, 1992). 
Given the structure of the electricity market, and the limited scope for competition in 
the industry, there is evidence to suggest that public utilities do not perform 
significantly worse than their private counterparts (Pollitt, 1995) if there are no 
information asymmetry and no transaction costs, for instance. Some authors comment 
on market structure (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) and incentives (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991) rather than ownership as the determinant for performance. 
Barnett (1993) contend that the problems experienced by the electricity sectors in 
developing countries are beyond the industry's control. What these studies show, is 
that a number of factors have to be taken into consideration when analysing 
performance of public utilities. 
Thus, while it would be incorrect to say that performance suffered as a consequence 
of public ownership, there are enough instances of problems to prompt a 
reconsideration of structures and reforms. The debate on improving the performance 
of NEP A will necessarily have to focus, in part, on operational efficiency, 
privatisation and structural change. 
7.3 Ownership and Economic Efficiency: A Benchmark Model 
In order to know which type of reform is appropriate for the Nigerian electricity 
industry, we need to examine the interactions between the factors that affect 
performance. Also, we need to investigate the inherent trade off between internal 
202 
(operational) efficiency, which we presume is enhanced by reform (by definition) and 
allocative inefficiency (the cost of privatisation). 
Appropriate reform will necessarily change the residual claim on the profits of the 
public sector enterprises. This could be in the form of privatisation and/or incentives 
to agents. There is ground for concern that allocative inefficiency might be worsened 
particularly if there is information asymmetry. 
The theoretical exposition developed here is based on the Vickers and Yarrow (1988) 
benchmark model in which they examine the issues of ownership and economic 
efficiency within the context of privatisation. We start with the premise that state 
involvement in productive activities is to counter market failures. In the Vickers and 
Yarrow model, mutatis mutandis monopoly and the general lack of capacity to 
develop a competitive market are considered to be as important as the agency problem 
in determining the outcome and, hence, the performance of the electricity industry. 
F or this analysis, we focus on monopoly and the assignment of property rights as a 
way of addressing the operational inefficiency. Although we can derive the level of 
distortions, and examine the scope of allocative inefficiency caused by the 
monopolist's pricing behaviour (Tirole, 1988), we find that an appropriate measure of 
distortion entails comparing the outcomes of private and public monopolies and 
examining the consequent social welfare losses. 
Hence, we start this exposition with a private monopoly, where the managerial 
incentive to engage in cost reducing activity is imperfect due to the existence of an 
agency problem. That is, the manager is rewarded only partially for the benefit that 
the principal receives from cost reduction. Thus, the objective function of the manager 
is postulated as a maximisation problem, 
A( q t ,e t ) = 7r t (q t ,e t ) - (a -1)e t 
= [pC q t ) - c( e t )]q t - ae t 
7.1 
where a measures cost of effort to the private manager relative to the benefit to him of 
greater profit; q is the output level~ and e measures expenditure on cost-reducing 
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activity (effort). When a equals to one, the manager can be said to have the right 
incentives to exert maximum effort consistent with profit maximisation. To develop 
this exposition, we assume, like Vickers and Yarrow, imperfect incentives, in which 
case a is greater than 1. 
In the case of public ownership, the manager is assumed to maximise 
B( q t , e t ) = S ( q t , e t ) + 7r t ( q t , e t ) - (b - l)e t 
= V ( q t ) - c( q t ) - bet 7.2 
where b measures cost of effort to the public manager relative to benefit to him of 
greater social welfare [S(q,e) + n(q,e)]; and V(q) denotes the consumer's utility.94 The 
inequality, b > 1, indicates that the cost exceeds the benefits for the public manager. 
Further, the inequality can be exacerbated by imperfections in the monitoring system. 
If the monitoring systems under the two ownership types are equally effective, then 
we can expect a to equal b. Conversely, if the monitoring system is more effective 
under private than public ownership, then, we will expect a to be less than b. From 
this, we can infer two effects of privatisation. First, it changes the principal's 
objective from welfare maximisation to profit maximisation. Second, it alters the 
monitoring and incentive arrangements. This is represented by the change from b to a 
in the managerial objective function. 
The resulting trade-off is clear. In accordance with economic theory, we expect public 
managers to choose socially optimal level given cost level, and private managers, 
seeking to maximise monopoly's profit will not. Consequently, allocative efficiency 
under public ownership is expected to be better than that under private ownership. 
If a < b, we would expect private managers to achieve greater internal efficiency. The 
overall balance of advantage depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects. 
In the exposition that follows, asterisk denotes public ownership, and circumflex 
94 For expositional simplicity, we maintain the assumptions invoked by Vickers and Yarrow of equal 
weights assumed for the consumer and producer surpluses in the objective function, and no resource 
costs of a transfer to or from the utility. 
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private ownership. When public monitoring system are no less efficient than private 
mechanism, the following results are obtained.95 
* q <q 
* ~ p > p 
* a-:;,b e >e 
* ~ c > c 
W*~W 
From this we can infer that private ownership is superior, at least, in terms of internal 
efficiency but not as allocatively efficient as public ownership. The above intuitive 
result is illustrated below. The intuition, nonetheless, is as follow: private managers 
produce less output (qm), set higher prices (pm) than public managers with similar cost 
levels because they equate marginal revenue with marginal cost rather than equating 
price with marginal cost. 
Me 
A 
MR D 
Figure 7.1 Welfare, Output and Pricing Behaviour of a Monopoly 
95 Although this assumption has been invoked to develop the analysis, caution ought to be shown since 
the institutional structure of the Nigerian electricity industry is characterised by inappropriate 
management policy, lack of training, fmancial insolvency, poor data management, too much 
government involvement. All of these can be expected to adversely influence the monitoring system. 
We can, for the sake of the argument, accept this assumption, since we expect the private monitoring 
system to be equally distorted when exposed to similar factors. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, 
the assumption, and the subsequent outcomes are not infeasible. 
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Theoretically speaking, as publicly owned monopoly produces more, the managers 
should exert greater effort (given the right incentive) to reduce costs since savings are 
enjoyed across a larger volume of output as a result of economies of scale argument. 
This will be the case when public managers are given higher incentives (but a is 
generally expected to be less than b since private managers are generally perceived to 
be given more incentives). 
Public ownership can be expected to be superior to private ownership when the utility 
is stipulated to use marginal cost pricing, along with appropriate incentives. 
Therefore, public managers produce more and make more cost reducing effort, thus, 
social welfare is unambiguously higher.96 
Based on the tenuous assumption that public monitoring system is no less efficient 
than private system, that is a ~ b, it follows from considerations of continuity that 
public ownership is also superior when a < b in the neighbourhood of b. Hence, a 
necessary condition for superiority of private ownership is when a is unambiguously 
less than b. That is, private monitoring and incentive system must be significantly 
better. And the converse holds for public ownership to be unambiguously superior. 
Outlining the model developed by Vickers and Yarrow (1988) further develops this 
exposition. Assuming that the elasticity of demand is independent of price, the inverse 
demand function,p(q), is defined as p = aq-& where cr is a positive constant, and 8> 
o denotes the inverse elasticity of demand. The cost function is analogously defined: 
c = fJe -a , where f3 is a constant, and a > 0 denotes elasticity of unit cost with respect 
to the relevant expenditure (Tirole, 1988). 
1-& 
Under the demand conditions, V (q), which is f6 aq 1-& dq = ~q_ & ,therefore, the 
problem can be expressed as 
96 Privately owned utility can also be induced to improve social welfare and perfonnance by stipulating 
price capping. 
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7.3 
The consequent first order conditions with respect to q and e can be expressed as 
aq-e - pe-a = 0 and aqpe-a-l - b = 0, respectively. From these first order conditions 
we can obtain values for q and e.97 The solutions in the case of the private manager 
are 
/&[H 
0-(1- &) 
lja-e-ae 
~ 
e= and 7.4 
l+a/a-e-ae 
0-(1- &) 
q= 
af3 
7.5 
The solutions in the case of the public manager are 
lja-e-ae 
* 
7.6 
e = 
l+a/a-e-ae 
* 
7.7 q =~------~~-------
af3 
We can compare the outcome of the private and public managers. We find that q > q * 
if, and only if, 
97 The algebraic expression and manipulation are given in the appendix. 
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a > (1- &)(l+a)/a 
b 
And e > e * if, and only if, 
7.8 
The second order conditions are satisfied in both cases when, 8> a/(1 + a) (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). By solving the public and private monopoly models and 
comparing the different equilibria, we obtain the following propositions: 
Proposition 1 
Whether if is greater than or less than q* depends on whether (1- 8)(1+a)/a is greater 
than or equal to a/b. 
From the proposition, we can infer about how output and prices, under public and 
private ownership, vary with effort and the efficacy of monitoring schemes. As 
demand becomes more elastic, that is, when & gets smaller, the monopoly mark-up of 
the private firm is reduced, quantity increases, and price becomes lower.98 This 
provides incentives for increase in cost reduction. Consequently, cost may be reduced 
so much that, even with monopoly mark-up, the price is lower under private 
ownership. The importance of a is shown, which measures the scope for cost 
reduction. If a is small enough, public ownership certainly implies lower prices. 
Proposition 2 
With respect to the comparison between cost-reducing activities, whether e is greater 
than or less than e * depends on whether (1- &)1/& is greater than or less than a/b. 
98 The welfare loss does not necessarily decrease with the elasticity of demand, even though the relative 
mark-up does. The monopoly situations for which we observe strong price distortions correspond to 
those in which demand elasticity is low, so that consumers decrease theory quantity demanded only 
slightly in response to a unit price increase. Consequently, in precisely these situations, price changes 
do not affect consumed very much; rather, they elicit a large transfer from consumers to the firm. 
Hence, we cannot conclude that the welfare loss is monotonic in the elasticity of demand. 
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Similarly to Proposition 1, the importance of E is observed. For any a and b, if the 
elasticity is sufficiently low, that is, close to 1, then we can expect e* > e . In which 
case, costs will be lower under public ownership. In the limiting case, lime~o(1-&)l/& 
is lie = 0.3679, and therefore, a must be significantly smaller than b for it to be true 
that e > e * , no matter how elastic demand may be. 
When the assumptions a < band & > al(1 + a) are invoked, Propositions 1 and 2 imply 
that 'if 2 q * which in tum implies that e > e *. That is, if private firm produces more 
than public firm does, then it achieves more cost reduction because the private 
incentive system is keener. Conversely, if e < e *, then 'if < q *, this implies that if the 
public monopoly has lower cost, then it produces more than the private firm does. 
The results from the above propositions can be stated as corollary. 
Corollary 1 
If alb 2(1- &)1/& then Proposition 2 implies that the cost reducing expenditure in 
publicly owned firm, e *, is greater than that of a privately owned firm, e. 
Consequently, the level of output under public ownership will be expected to be 
greater than private ownership, that is, q * > 'if , and it follows that the welfare will be 
greater under public than private ownership, W* > tv. Thus, alb 2(1-&)1/& is a 
sufficient condition for social welfare to be higher under public ownership. 
Corollary 2 
alb ~(1- &)(l+a)/a IS a sufficient condition for social welfare to be higher under 
private ownership. 
The importance of ex and E, the fundamental parameters of technology and demand are 
shown. For example, if E is interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition 
faced by the firm, and if a is interpreted as a measure of efficiency in production or 
the rate of technological progress, then the analysis supports the notion of 
restructuring. For instance, privatisation will be easier in protected capital intensive 
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industries such as generation where competition is potentially effective but market has 
been stifled by excessive government involvement. 
The interpretation given to this analysis should be tempered with caution given the 
static nature of analysis and assumption of only one firm. Further, as only unregulated 
private firm is considered, incorporation of regulation would introduce new policy 
instrument into the model, involving a trade-off between internal and external 
efficiency, and can generally be expected to lead to results that are more favourable to 
private ownership than obtained in the above analysis. 
Although regulation is unlikely to change the central implication of the above 
analysis, which is that privatisation is likely to improve social welfare only if it 
provides keener managerial incentives than does the control system for public 
enterprise, we consider the impact of regulation in Section 7.5 below. Before that 
however, we consider the alternative structural forms for the electricity industry in 
Nigeria. 
7.4 Alternative Structural Forms 
Having outlined the outcomes of privately and publicly controlled firms, the pertinent 
question is, Is there an ideal structure for the Nigerian electricity industry to adopt? 
Essentially, this is the question we are concerned with in this section. As there are 
broad characteristics of reform which electricity industries undergoing restructuring 
might adopt, we can speak of reform models. Basically, there are two main models: 
the UK model and the French model. The constituents of the former include re-
organisation, competition and privatisation. As the constituents imply. this model 
entails a significant re-orientation of the industry from its historical trajectory. 
The second model is generally referred to as the French model. The salient 
characteristic of this model is 'perfecting the system'. The basic structure of the 
industry is kept intact but new internal mechanisms are devised to improve 
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performance. As the name implies, this model draws from the practices and 
experience of the French state-owned utility, Electricite de France (EdF). 
As we are mainly interested in the type of reform that will alter the assignment of 
property rights, a summary of the French model will suffice.99 The model essentially 
entails restructuring the internal management of the utility through a mixture of 
yardstick competition and incentive schemes. The main aspect of the French model is 
the centralisation of the activities with respect to economies of scale in operations, 
despatch and planning with the concomitant introduction of aspects of a decentralised 
system, for instance, greater autonomy. 
Both models entail some restructuring. This restructuring affects the incentives of 
both principal and agents. This effect, as shown in preceding section, has implications 
for operational efficiency and the general outcome of different ownership types. In the 
remaining part of this section, I will consider the types of reform that may deliver the 
necessary improvement to performance of NEP A. Rather than consider liberalisation 
and privatisation as competing paradigms, we regard the former as sine qua none for 
the latter to be effective forming an integral part of the necessary reform process. This 
is due to the existing limited scope to develop a truly competitive market. 
There are two studies (Tenenbaum et al. 1992; Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996) that 
consider how electricity industry can be restructured such that competition is 
introduced. The two studies focus on ways of restructuring electricity industry in 
terms of degree of competition. The quintessence of these two, that is liberalisation 
and a move towards more competition, are summarised in the table below. 
99 The requirement of this model both in tenns of infonnation and co-ordination is very de~anding. 
When the poor experience of government with planning is taken into consideration alongsld~ the 
failure to successfully emulate the French model, Guinea-Bissau for instance, then the adoptIOn of a 
model similar to the UK model becomes overwhelming. 
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Models 
2 
3 
4 
Tenenbaum et aL Model Hunt and Shuttleworth Model 
Traditional structure characterised by No competition 
vertical integration, private ownership with 
a well-defmed concession region. 
Maintains the traditional structure if Model 
1 but allows competitive acquisition of 
generation, and as in the US where the 
utilities are required to purchase output of 
independent generators. 
An extension of Model 2 but requires 
common or contract carriage. Owners of 
high voltage lines are required to provide 
transmission service to all wholesale 
electricity generators or suppliers and 
buyers. 
Proposed UK model requires the separation 
of generation, transmission and distribution. 
The salient feature of this approach is the 
independence of the despatch company. The 
company will have the obligation to wheel 
electricity to all buyers and sellers, and 
control the necessary despatch function. 
Single buyer to choose from a number of 
producers to encourage competition in 
generation 
Allows distribution company (which owns 
distribution network and retail electricity) to 
choose suppliers. This introduces 
competition into generation and wholesale 
supply market. 
Allows all customers to choose suppliers. 
The implication is that there is full retail 
competition. 
If we consider most electricity industries from a historical perspective, we see that 
they can be classified under Model 1 with most being exclusively publicly owned. 
Even in the US where the both public and private ownership co-existed, concessions 
were given to utilities which effectively granted them status of local or regional 
monopolies. As such, Hunt and Shuttleworth in their analysis of different types of 
reform models did not focus on the models solely from an ownership perspective. 
The dissatisfaction with allocative inefficiency (in the case of private monopoly) and 
internal inefficiency (public monopoly) precipitated the need for reform. The reform 
took the form of deregulation (in the US) and liberalisation and privatisation (in the 
UK). Hunt and Shuttleworth used UK experience to support argument that re-
structuring to allow full competition is technically and economically feasible and 
conclude that Model 4 is the most economically efficient model, because it has the 
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· . k 100 . 
most competItIve mar et structure. They pOInted out that this model is ideally 
appropriate for countries with well-defined electricity retail system with mature 
market institutions. 
Despite the positive effects of competition, there are certain aspects of the electricity 
industry that cannot be ignored or left to a decentralised structure. These include 
market power and despatching or market co-ordination. In a country like Nigeria 
where generating capacity is limited and the interconnecting grids require substantial 
extension of transmission lines, careful analysis to evaluate whether Model 4 of Hunt 
and Shuttleworth is indeed feasible is required. 
Basically, we cannot regard privatisation as the panacea to restructuring NEP A - a 
holistic approach of all the services is required. Care has to be taken as divestiture 
may be a success financially, which may not be indicative of the overall reform 
success. As Mendonca and Dahl (1999) showed, privatisation has not delivered the 
increase in generation hoped for in Brazil. Failure in attracting investment to 
generation can be adduced to two main reasons. 
First, current pnces paid to generators are under mInImum break-even cost of 
electricity production. Second, there is significant difficulty in getting sufficient 
financing (macroeconomic renders good projects infeasible). Other issues include ill-
conceived tariff policy, which may exacerbate problems by allowing utilities to 
exploit their market power. 
The majority of utilities are poorly managed with low operational efficiency and large 
financial losses. The inappropriate tariff policy of the Nigerian electricity industry 
should not be underestimated. Its significance is realised when juxtaposed against 
structural issues and lack of competition. Prognosis with respect to tariff policy: 
100 Green (1995, 96) analysed UK experience for lessons applicable to other countries. Concluded that 
competition possible in generation, competition in supply to large customers conferred benefits but that 
UK experience should not be regarded as unqualified success since unregulated competition ushers in a 
different set of problems. Concluded analysis by pointing out that privatisation has commonly been. 
associated with "greater operating efficiency, but is almost certainly neither a necessary nor a suffiCient 
condition for it." The benefits of privatisation are well documented - see Littlechild, 1996. 
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internal policy distortion does not compensate investment in generation and allows 
monopolistic rent. 
Bacon (1995) in his analysis of reform of electricity industry provided an overview of 
world experiences and demonstrated that no unique and simple recipe, panacea. 
Factors that have to be taken into consideration include restructuring objectives, local 
conditions, and the nature of system (size, plant mix and growth). Essentially, some 
centralisation is required, where the characteristics of the activity do not permit direct 
competition. Where this is the case, benchmark competition enforced by regulation is 
a possibility. Regulation is the subject of the next section. 
7.5 Privatisation and Regulation 
Privatisation can be regarded as the most advanced part of reform. The general 
perception is that re-organisation of generation, transmission, distribution of NEP A is 
a prerequisite for system reform. How will privatisation increase capacity and 
investment? We cannot expect private investment to go to generation before financial 
recovery and/or appropriate pricing and financing issues have been resolved 
liberalisation of sub-sector given the intrusiveness of government in the activities of 
NEPA. 
Since the privatisation of the electricity industry in the UK, a number of countries 
have emulated the British experience. The Nigerian government is considering the 
privatisation and regulation of electricity industry as a way of restructuring the 
industry in order to reverse the disappointing performance of NEP A. Two main 
arguments are advocated in favour of privatisation. First, the privatised utilities are 
assumed to be more efficient than their public counterparts. Second, governments find 
the revenues raised by selling the utilities to be useful for a number of political 
reasons. 
Privatisation, however, does entail costs. The privati sed firms often enjoy a significant 
degree of market power enabling them, potentially, to appropriate rents. This presents 
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the government with a dilemma. If they choose to regulate the utilities, and then 
monitor them to enforce compliance with the regulations, they can ensure that at least 
some of the efficiency gains benefit consumers. However, greater monitoring reduces 
the level of monopoly profits that may be earned, which in turn reduces the prices at 
which the government may sell the utilities. This section is concerned with solving the 
inherent problems that arise with privatisation. 
We examine the case where there is asymmetric information. At the outset of the 
sequence of privatisation the true costs of monitoring are private information to the 
government. IOI The private sector, which may purchase NEPA, cannot observe, and 
do not know the true costs of monitoring. They must, therefore, make inferences 
about monitoring costs from observations on post privatisation profits. In choosing the 
level of monitoring in each period, the government is aware of the inferences that the 
private sector will make and the implications this has for the sale price of future 
privatisation. In this sense the government has an incentive to monitor strategically. 
While stylised, the model developed here explains several of the features observed in 
real world privatisation process. Consistent with observation, the model predicts that 
typically monitoring and, consequently, the level of effective regulation will rise over 
time. Initial profits for privatised utilities will start high but ultimately fall as 
monitoring increases. Initial equity offerings in the privati sed utilities may be sold at a 
significant discount but will rise rapidly in value before converging to their long run 
equilibrium levels. 
To put this analysis into perspective, we review the literature on regulation and 
privatisation. This is followed by the exposition of a simple static model of the 
optimal monitoring of a privati sed utility. Typically, optimal monitoring implies less 
than full compliance to the regulatory standard. 
10) This is because information is obtained in prior periods when its agents had administered the 
utilities. 
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7.5.1 Relationship to the Existing Literature 
In constructing a model of the privatisation of a sequence of publicly owned 
enterprises we need to specify both why the government will choose privatisation, and 
then the relationship between the government and the private utility. The literature is 
quite extensive. 
7.5.1.1 Privatisation 
It is assumed that firms are privatised for two primary reasons: to promote efficiency, 
and to raise revenue. The revenue-raising motive is controversial. Rather than 
privati sing a utility a government could borrow against the future returns that would 
be earned if the firm remained in public hands. For this reason Vickers and Yarrow 
(1991), dismiss the validity of privatisation for revenue raising purposes for industrial 
countries. In a similar vein, Mansoor (1988) argues that the long run fiscal impact of 
privatisation is the same as issuing debt equal to the sales revenue of the public firm, 
provided that the firm is sold competitively. Moreover, it is usually observed that 
most public firms are sold at a discount relative to the initial market valuation, which 
again seems to undermine the revenue-raising justification for privatisation. However 
there are explanations for discounted sales. For example, Perotti (1995) argues that 
the government's ability to give a discount in share prices signals a commitment not 
to interfere in the firm after privatisation. However his paper does not offer clarity 
with respect to justification of privatisation as long as borrowing is a cheaper option. 
Why, therefore, privatise rather than borrow? The preference for privatisation is 
premised on the notion that there is a positive difference between the value of a firm 
in private and government ownership. The difference could come from elimination of 
X-inefficiencies (Leibenstein, 1971) after the introduction of competition by 
liberalisation and privatisation. This argument can take several forms. Boycho et al. 
(1996), construct a model where privatisation results in efficiency gains because it 
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makes it more costly for politicians to interfere. Haskel and Sanchis (1995) argue that 
public firms are social welfare maximisers, but that privati sed firms maximise profits 
which consequently reduces X-inefficiency.t02 The resulting potential improvement 
into profits will be incorporated in the private sector's valuation of public enterprises 
before privatisation. If the firm is worth more in private hands there will be mutual 
gains from privatisation. 
Provided that the government can sell the firm at a price greater than its value to the 
private sector, privatisation becomes a better option for the government than issuing 
debt against the future profits of the firm. Similarly, provided that the private sector 
can buy the firm at a price less than its value in private hands, the public will strictly 
prefer buying the firm to purchasing government bonds or any other financial asset. 103 
7.5.1.2 Regulation and Monitoring 
In this analysis the relationship between the government cum regulator and the 
privati sed utility is one of principal (the regulator) and agent (the utility) as in the 
standard literature. There are two main mechanisms that the principal can adopt to 
induce desired behaviour from the agent. First, the principal offers the agent an 
incentive contract as for example in Baron and Myerson (1992), Sappington (1982 
and 1983) or Laffont and Tirole (1993). Or, secondly, the regulator establishes a set of 
rules the agent must follow, then monitors the agent's actions and punishes any 
detected lack of compliance, see Greenwald (1984), Baron and Basenko (1987). 
102Kay and Thompson (1986) have taken the view that, as far as a monopoly is concerned, there is no 
difference in (at the very least allocative) efficiency between private and public ownership. 
Nonetheless privatisation have been taking place on the global level and the general observation is that 
there are measured efficiency gains after privatisation (Kikeri et at. (1992)). 
103 Despite the efficiency gains from privatisation, the value of the firm in public hands could still 
exceed that in private hands. This depends on the public's beliefs about the regulatory regime and the 
intensity, with which it will be enforced, that is, the efficacy of the monitoring system. This may hinder 
the privatisation process. However, provided the total expected privatisation revenue from sales of all 
firms is greater than the total sum of the values in government hands the government will go ahead 
with the privatisation. Kikeri et at. (1992) highlighted the popUlarity of privatisation They repo~ed that 
after 1980 there were around 6800 privatisation world-wide) suggests that there are many occasIOns 
where this requirement is satisfied. 
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Which of these options a principal would choose depends on their respective costs. In 
practice when a public utility is privatised, a regime of regulation and monitoring is 
typically chosen. Further, the regulation often takes a simple forms such as price cap 
regulation in the UK or rate of return regulation in the U. S. Considering this to be the 
pattern that might be followed in Nigeria, we concentrate on regulation and 
monitoring. 
It has been pointed out in the regulation literature that there are problems of 
credibility and inconsistency. Greenwald (1984) shows that the regulator's temptation 
to renege on its announced price regulation after cost-reducing investments are made 
will result in under-investment. Similarly, Baron and Basenko (1987) show that any 
new information obtained about the cost structure of the regulated firm will change 
the regulation regime. When privatisation revenues are at stake, the government can 
increase privatisation revenues by promising a lenient regulatory regime ex-ante but 
regulating toughly ex-post, as in Price (1994). Likewise, the government may attempt 
to achieve the same ends by specifying long lags between periodical price reviews. 
But once the cost reductions have been instituted, the government will review sooner 
than announced in order to let consumers enjoy lower prices. 104 
If the regulatory regime itself is the chosen instrument of regulation, the government 
may be tempted to renege on any announced regime. Price (1994) notes that "at 
review, the original political considerations for flotation no longer apply and one 
would expect regulation to be tightened." The drawback of changing the regime is 
that it is as easily observed by the private sector as changes in price regulation. The 
private sector should anticipate the toughening of the regulatory regime over time as 
the privatisation program nears its end and the consequent reduced valuation attached 
to future streams by the private sector will be reflected in depressed values of firms 
being privati sed from the outset. 
104 Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) argue that, for a given price regulation regime firm will minimise 
costs in order to achieve productive efficiency. However, Sappington (1980) shows that although 
longer periods for price reviews will encourage firms to reduce costs, as the review date comes closer 
(or the review periods are shorter) the firm will increase its costs strategically to influence the next 
price review. 
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This time inconsistency issue is central to an effective regulatory regime. We argue 
that the government will have an incentive to "announce" low levels of monitoring 
prior to the sale of a utility but to then renege ex-post and monitor more intensively. 
This seems an intuitively appealing form of this problem, as many types of 
monitoring activity are very difficult for the public to observe.! 05 
7.5.1.3 A Simple Static Monitoring Problem for a Representative 
Firm 
This section derives a straightforward model of optimal monitoring of the firm's 
compliance where monitoring is costly to the government. The model is based on 
Nomer et al.. (1997). In this model, compliance with the regulation is assumed to 
reduce the firm's profit, while being caught not complying results in the firm being 
fined. The expected value of the fine being higher the greater the intensity of 
monitoring. 
First, we define the profit function of the utility. A utility's profit at time t, 7ft (mt, 5 t ) 
can be written as: 
7.6 
P( Ct) is a profit function of a utility with market power where Ct, is the level of 
compliance to an existing regulatory regime (0 ~ Ct ~ 1). P( Ct) is similar to an indirect 
profit function in that it gives the maximum profits for given levels of compliance. 
We assume that regulations are such that full compliance, C = 1, eliminates all super-
normal profits, that is, P( 1) = mincP( C) = 0 and the maximum profits are earned when 
CI = 0, that is, P(O) = maxcP(C). Also assumed are Pc < 0 and Pcc < O. 
T( CI, mt) is a penalty function that represents the expected fines the firm will pay, this 
depends on the levels of compliance, C, and monitoring, mI' Let T(C"mJ = k(C)r(m) 
105 Although price regulation can be achieved easily, there are other areas of regulation that needs to be 
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where k(C)106 is the imposed fine as a negative function of compliance. Further, k(l) = 
0, 8k/8C < 0 and 8
2 
k/ 8C
2 ~ 0, and rem) is the proportion of non-compliance caught 
by the regulator or the probability of catching the non-compliant, given monitoring 
technology with 8r/8m > 0, and 82r/8m 2 = 0 for 0 s C, m s 1.107 
Profits are also affected by an independently and identically distributed shock, &t ' the 
distribution, h{&t ), of which is known to everybody. &t is a plant and time specific 
shock that affects the utility at time t. 
Since the firm can observe monitoring but cannot know 8
t 
, its expected profit 
function is: 
+00 
E j1[t (mt ) = f (P{Ct ) - T{Ct , mt ) + &t )h{&t )d&t 
-00 
+00 
=P{Ct)-T{Ct,mt )+ f &;h{&t)d&t 
-00 
7.7 
where Ef is the expectation formed by the firm, T(C,m) is constructed such that only 
non-negative expected profits can be earned, that is, E fICt (mt ) ~ ° for 0 s C, m s 1. 
The next consideration is to define the government's objective function. In this static 
problem the government's objective is to improve efficiency via compliance with 
regulation. Monitoring is implemented in order to verify the level of compliance. The 
government faces an increasing monitoring cost function, and therefore its objective 
function can be written as; 
monitored constantly, and where the level of monitoring is difficult to observe. 
106 The parameters of the fme function k( C) are assumed fixed. In principle the fine function k( C) could 
also be a decision variable. It might seem that the government could ensure full compliance by 
selecting infinitely large fines. Bankruptcy laws, however, bound below the liability of firm, so an 
infinite fine cannot actually be levied. Further, even if an infinite fine were feasible, it would not be 
optimal if there was any possibility that a finn could be mistakenly adjudged to have engaged in non-
compliance. For this reason, a fixed fine function is regarded as a good working assumption. 
107 • h I I If· . It is not clear whether rem) should be convex or concave. The notIOn t at at ow eve so momtorIng 
of non-compliance is easily avoided suggests that r(m) should be convex. Alternatively the idea of 
diminishing returns to monitoring activity suggests rem) should be concave. 
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7.8 
where E(Ct)=V(q)-C(q) (Section 7.3) is the overall efficiency (as measured by 
consumer surplus) obtained by compliant firm. The greater the compliance, the 
greater the benefits to the government, Ee(C,) > O. This happens at a diminishing rate: 
a2E/aC2 ~Owith Ec(O) = 00 and Ec(l) = o. H(mt) which is equivalent to be (see 
Section 7.3), is the cost of monitoring which is unknown to the private sector but is 
perfectly observed by the firm and is known to the government. As usual, aH / am > 0, 
a2 H / am 2 > 0 and Hm(O) = 0, HmO) = 00.108 
Derivation of the solution is as follows. In a one period setting, the firm optimises 
subject to the given level of monitoring, that is, it maximises (7.7) with respect to Ct 
to get the first order condition, 
7.9 
the optimal level of compliance is thus a function of the level of monitoring, Ct = 
C(mt).109 Totally differentiating the first order condition gives, 
7.10 
so that, 
C = dC = Tem(C,m) 
m dm Pee (C) - Tee (C, m) 
7.11 
O llOTh . Since Tern < ° and Pee - Tee < 0, we have Crn > o. We also have Crnrn <. at IS, as 
108 The government may hire a regulator to whom greater incentives have to be paid to induce him or 
her to monitor more. 
109 Our earlier assumptions on the functions P(.) and T(.) are sufficient for a unique solution in C. 
av rYJ D--N-
110 To get Cmm differentiate (5) with respect to m to get emm = an D2 an < o ,where, 
N = Tern = kc rm < 0, and D = Pcc - Tee = Pcc - kcc rem) < 0, therefore, 
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monitoring increases, compliance increases but at a decreasing rate. 
We can confirm that monitoring reduces both expected as well as observed profits. 
Substituting C(mt) into the firm's (expected) profit function (7.7) or (7.6) and 
differentiating with respect to mt gives; 
= (Pc - Tc)Cm - Tm, 
using (4), 
= -Tm [C(m), m] < O. 
Since Tm(m) > 0 profits will fall with increased monitoring. 
7.12 
The government, on the other hand, takes the reaction function of the firm, substitutes 
it into its objective function (7.8) and maximises with respect to monitoring, mt, to get 
the first order condition 
The solution to the first order condition m *, defines the optimal monitoring in the 
static problem. III 
Corollary 3 
The optimum monitoring level, m *, is socially optimal in the sense that it maximises 
efficiency subject to the monitoring cost function. Of course this is not the first best 
solution which would only be achieved if monitoring was costless so that the highest 
efficiency (C = 1) is attained. 
ON tJD 
- = k r = 0 , and - = -kccrm < 0 . an c mm Om 
III The second order condition is satisfied since fW(m) = EccC,;, + EcCm", - H",,,, < 0, which 
7.6 Summary 
The effort to create competitive market and attain economic efficiency is desirable, it 
should, however, be borne in mind that the possibility of creating a competitive 
market has limitations. Littlechild (1996) pointed out that some sectors in the 
electricity industry are not viable for competition where regulator must protect 
customers against monopoly power. Further, he suggested that it is not feasible to 
privatise a public monopoly and transform it into a fully competitive industry in one 
phase. The restructuring, if necessary, will have to be in stages. This will allow the 
regulators the ability to evaluate the impact of proposed changes and make amends, if 
need be. Hence, the consideration of the impact of ownership on performance, 
privatisation and regulation. 
To build on the changes that began in 1992 with the change in objective to 
commercialisation and to establish guidelines for electricity industry the industry must 
be liberalised to allow other utilities apart from NEP A to operate in generation and 
distribution of electricity. The objective of reform should focus the activity of the 
government on its roles as policy maker and regulator, transferring the responsibility 
of operations and investment to the private sector. 
In this analysis we have sought to understand some of the phenomena associated with 
the privatisation of public utilities. We argue that the crucial characteristic that 
explains many of the observed events is that there is an information asymmetry 
between the government and public over the cost of monitoring a firm's compliance 
to the post privatisation regulatory regime. The government knows the costs of 
monitoring, but the public can only make inferences based on a noisy signal, observed 
profits. The government, aware of how the public update their beliefs about the 
monitoring costs, act strategically in choosing the level of monitoring for the utilities 
that are already privatised. 
The motivation for this behaviour is supplied by the assumption that the government's 
follows from Ecc ~ 0, Cm > 0, Ec > 0, Cmm < 0, Hmm > O. 
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objective function contains both a revenue and efficiency objective. Lower 
monitoring (perhaps even initially declining) in the early stages of the privatisation 
process causes the public to upwardly revise their expectations of future profits and, 
hence, the price that they are willing to pay for equity in future share flotation. 
The model predicts that monitoring levels will typically rise along the time path of 
privatisation with the implication that profits will be initially high but then fall with 
this pattern reflected in the prices of successive utility sales. This is what happened in 
the UK. As discussed earlier, it is, however, possible that monitoring can fall at some 
points in the privatisation sequence. This is most likely in the early stages where the 
chances of combinations of extreme realisations of the random variables are highest, 
and when the incentives for the government to trade off less efficiency for higher 
future privatisation prices are at their greatest. 
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Chapter 8 Summary and Conclusion 
8.1 Summary 
In this thesis, we have made an initial attempt to assess the performance of the 
Nigerian electricity industry. Particularly, we focused the attention upon two aspects: 
efficiency and productivity assessment, and structural reform that is required to 
improve the performance of NEP A. We have also sought to understand some of the 
phenomena associated with reform of public utilities such as liberalisation, 
privatisation and regulation. 
Our results are straightforward to summarise. First, we found that the presence of 
government involvement in electricity industry reduces substantially the operational 
efficiency of electricity production in Nigeria. This finding conforms to the prediction 
of public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971). Second, in conformity with the precepts of 
X-efficiency theory developed by Leibenstein, we found that the way NEPA is 
structured excludes it from necessary external pressure, such as competition for the 
attainment of efficiency. The consequence of this is the non-maximising behaviour 
and the prevalence of non-allocative inefficiency. Using both parametric and non-
parametric frontier analyses, we found the excessive use of labour, lack of autonomy 
and sub-optimal use of capacity to be strongly correlated to efficiency and 
productivity . 
In line with what theory suggests, we found that the disappointing performance of 
NEP A can be attributed to the agency problem which is often amplified in publicly 
owned enterprise, due to the conflicting objectives of the agent and the principal, 
which exacerbates the performance. This argument supports the need for reform of 
electricity industry in Nigeria. In addition to this argument, technological progress 
and our understanding of the electricity industry has come to reveal that generation 
and supply cannot be regarded as "national" monopoly, but more as regional or local 
monopoly although has some elements of monopoly, can be exposed to yardstick 
competition. As such, the economies of scale and integration argument put forward 
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for public intervention loses relevance. This explains the dominant structure observed 
in electricity industries all over the world, that is, liberalisation and privatisation. 
Thus, in this study a considerable amount of effort is concentrated on performance 
assessment. This addresses two questions: First, "what is the level of inefficiency that 
plagues electricity production in Nigeria?" Second, "how can the level of performance 
be improved?" 
Two different approaches, positive and normative, are used to address the two 
questions. The positive approach is essentially empirical. For the second approach, 
considering that the idea of privatisation is still being discussed, we investigate the 
impact of different ownership structures on efficiency. 
We used both non-parametric and parametric techniques to measure the efficiency 
and productivity of NEPA vis-a.-vis the electricity industries of a selected sample of 
developing countries. From the calculations of technical efficiency, significant scope 
was found for NEP A to reduce cost of production by around 40 percent while 
maintaining the current level of output production without reducing the level of input 
used. Alternatively, with the current factor inputs, electricity generation can be 
increased by 100 percent. Taking the importance of energy resources to the Nigerian 
economy into consideration, improving the technical efficiency that attends the 
activities ofNEPA would be tantamount to savings in resources. 
The empirical evidence does suggest that government involvement that curtails 
managerial autonomy might be an impediment to efficiency, and hence, performance. 
This finding is in line with the tenets of public choice theory that the managers of 
publicly owned enterprises will favour expansion of factor inputs over cost-
minimising decisions. If nothing else, the results do suggest that the restructuring of 
the industry with the creation of NEP A in 1972, which increased government 
involvement impacted positively on scale economy. The shift from a proliferated to a 
concentrated industrial structure was attended by the construction of large generating 
capacities - to exploit economies of scale argument. Thus, we can conclude that the 
creation ofNEPA positively impacted on the scale efficiency of the industry. 
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Contrary to the belief of the authorities, the results also showed that increasing 
generating capacity, at the expense of operational efficiency, is not necessarily the 
most appropriate way of improving efficiency and productivity in the Nigerian 
electricity industry. The yields direct policy implication for the electricity authority in 
Nigeria. Since NEP A was established in 1972, the policy that has been consistently 
pursued is that of capacity expansion. This finding is further substantiated by the 
various productivity indices that show the sources of productivity growth. Thus, from 
the viewpoint of the policy makers, more attention ought to be paid to various aspects 
of the electricity industry, particularly, operation and maintenance. This is borne out 
by the significance of system factor to productive efficiency. 
The restructuring that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, although improved scale 
efficiency, left the industry susceptible to vagaries of inappropriate administration and 
poor maintenance as industry was restructured such that the 24 small to medium 
generating plants were replaced by 8 large plants. As mentioned earlier, although the 
initial plan was to exploit economies of scale and improve co-ordination of the 
various activities, the lack of competition that deprived the industry of much needed 
investment capital, became inimical to performance. This was promulgated by the 
pursuit of conflicting objectives and inappropriate policies. 
To increase the efficiency of electricity production in Nigeria, the results from the 
DEA models are indicative of which efficient industries NEP A could emulate. The 
analysis was taken a step further by examining productivity growth of the generating 
plants under the aegis of NEP A. The advantage of the Malmquist productivity indices 
used is that it can be decomposed into its various constituents. Data limitation 
restricted the panel data analysis to the period 1990-1996. For the industry as a whole. 
productivity growth deteriorated by 1.8 percent. Decomposition of this index revealed 
the source of the deterioration to be scale efficiency change (5.6 percent) and 
technical efficiency change (5.3 percent). Technological change index, which captures 
the shift in frontier increased by 3.8 percent over the sample period. The other 
component of efficiency change index, pure technical efficiency index, increased 
marginally by 0.3 percent. 
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To further elucidate on the performance of NEPA, this study also estimated the 
production function parameters and technical inefficiency for the power plants using 
stochastic frontier method. The advantage of this method, apart from providing a 
comparison for the non-parametric technique, enables the direct consideration of the 
upderlying production structure. The results obtained by the single stage procedure 
are not dissimilar to those obtained by two-stage procedure but the former is preferred 
to the latter because of the consistency in the assumption of the asymmetric error term 
from which the inefficiency estimates are obtained. The hypotheses testing that is 
possible with the stochastic frontier method has policy implications particularly when 
assessing the types of restructuring that can improve the overall efficiency of 
electricity production in Nigeria. 
We would expect the low efficiencies that attend the activities of the Nigerian 
electricity industry and the impeding reform of the industry to have spurred studies on 
NEP A, particularly performance assessment and the search for an appropriate 
structure for the industries. Alas, there are only a few studies, and they are focused 
more on devising appropriate tariff structures (Taiwo, 1986, Lee and Anas, 1996). To 
address the question of appropriate structure, this thesis also considered efficiency and 
different ownership types. We found that the appropriate structure will have to take 
the objectives and motivations of the agents and principals into consideration. 
From a theoretical perspective, we found that which ownership type is more 
appropriate is a function of the internal structure of the organisation. We took the fact 
the government has the intention of privati sing NEP A as part of the analysis and 
considered the appropriate mechanism that the government will have to put in place to 
induce behaviour compatible with overall efficiency. From this analysis, we can infer 
that the proposed structure of the Nigerian electricity industry will necessarily have to 
introduce competition particularly in electricity generation and distribution. 
If the government does indeed go for a more competitive system, then the external 
governance, namely regulation will have to replace direct internal control. An 
important point that has to be taken into consideration is the sequencing of the 
necessary reform programme. Going by the experience of countries that have enacted 
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extensive reform, such as the United Kingdom, it is important, as it is far easier. to 
restructure the industry while still under public ownership. 
8.2 Policy Implications 
The policy implications of the quantitative and qualitative analyses have been 
discussed in the appropriate chapters, it will, nevertheless, be useful to summarise the 
various points here. The policy implications of this thesis can be grouped under three 
main heading: performance improvement, reform and structure of the industry, and 
management and regulation. 
8.2.1 Performance Improvement 
The importance of operational efficiency that attends electricity production and 
distribution cannot be overstated. Operational efficiency, or productive efficiency, as 
more commonly known in standard economic theory, is one of the three components 
required to economic efficiency. The other two are allocative efficiency and scale 
efficiency. Much attention has not been paid to allocative efficiency in this thesis, as 
we are primarily concerned with efficiency in production. 
A number of factors account for technical inefficiency. The main ones are related to 
investment and inappropriate operational policies. The preponderance of the 
investment in the 1970s and 1980s that went into the electricity industry went into 
electricity generation. This skewed the structure, causing a major bottleneck in the 
system. The macroeconomic problems experienced by Nigeria, and a host of other 
developing countries, effectively dried up investment and capital for operation and 
routine maintenance. This problem was exacerbated by the inappropriate tariff and 
input policies. The cornerstone of these policies was subsidisation. As neither the 
input prices nor the electricity tariff reflected the true economic cost of inputs and 
electricity, respectively, decisions were distorted. 
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8.2.2 Structure of Industry 
This results obtained in this thesis has shown that the current structure of the industry, 
an integrated publicly owned utility, has to be changed if there are to be 
improvements in the electricity industry. Contrary to Ogunkola's (1993) finding, the 
industry should be restructured along the main activities of generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply. The purpose of this is to introduce competitive pressure. 
Although there are arguments in favour of government involvement in a developing 
country like Nigeria, the dynamics of competition is can be said to be quite 
substantial. 
Regarding the sequencing of reform, liberalisation of the industry has to be enacted 
before privatisation. Appropriate liberalisation should create the scope for 
competition. The sequence is important as the necessary changes can be instituted far 
more easily as long as NEP A remains under public ownership. There is another 
dimension to this, namely, it should introduce transparency, which is a prerequisite to 
allay the fears of the private sector and international investors that might be interested 
in acquiring interest in the industry. There are valuable lessons that can be learnt from 
the experience of the electricity industry of the UK. 
In the electricity supply industry of England and Wales, generation was separated 
from transmission and distribution. This justification for this is that with the national 
grid operating as a common carrier, higher levels of efficiency can be expected in 
generation due to competition. 
8.2.3 Management 
If we look at efficiency from the standard perspective of economic theory or from the 
non-conventional X-efficiency theory of Leibenstein, we see that alongside market 
structure, the importance of management cannot be overstated. There are two aspects 
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to management for improvement to occur. The first is external by nature. and the 
second is more internal. 
We have already alluded to the external, that is, the introduction of competitive 
forces. The rigours of the factor and product market should induce the right impetus 
for the pursuit of cost minimisation. For this to take place, the underlying principal-
agent matrix has to be taken into consideration. The agent must be given the right 
incentive contracts to ensure that his objective and that of the firm, defined by the 
objective of the principal, are not in conflict. 
The above is premised on the notion that the restructuring of the industry will curb the 
usurpation of autonomy by the government, with the agents left to achieve the 
objective of the firm, which should be economic efficiency. The practice of direct 
input and product subsidisation will have to be addressed as well. 
8.3 Further Research 
This research has been primarily concerned with the measurement of operational 
efficiency of electricity production, and the necessary structural reform that will 
improve efficiency. For this purpose, this thesis has focused on one aspect of the 
electricity industry. Thus, there are number of ways that this study can be extended. 
First, the paucity of data for a robust analysis can be addressed. With more 
information and data, the analysis can be extended to assess allocative efficiency in 
electricity production. This will ensure a robust performance analysis considering that 
allocative efficiency is the other component of economic efficiency required if 
optimality in production is to be achieved. Second, by collecting ancillary 
information, we can use the non-discretionary DEA model to see how the level of 
efficiency is affected by factor inputs and outputs that are not under the discretion of 
the management. This DEA model is tantamount to the short run analysis of 
efficiency in production. 
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Due to lack of reliability of data, this thesis has been restricted to electricity 
generation, the analysis of the various activities and aspects of electricity production 
will give the study more policy latitude. Analysing electricity distribution and supply_ 
for instance, could be used to assess the holistic reform of the Nigerian electricity 
industry. Frontier analysis can be used as the basis of benchmark regulation. Finally, 
this thesis has necessarily been restricted to the analysis of the supply side of 
electricity production, an extension of the research into demand side management. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Debreu-Farrell Distance Function 
In an approach similar to Fare et al. (1994), the approach adopted for the exposition 
of performance measurement is based on a technological axiom. Debreu (1951) and 
Farrell (1957) introduced a measure of technical efficiency in which they defined it as 
one minus the maximum equi-proportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows 
continued production of given outputs. A score of unity indicates technical efficiency 
because no equi-proportionate input reduction is feasible, and a score of less than 
unity indicate the severity of technical inefficiency. 
For computational convenience, it is desirable to convert the Debreu-Farrell measure 
to equi-proportionate output expansion with given inputs. In order to relate the 
Debreu-Farrell measure to the Koopmans definition, and to relate both to the structure 
of production technology, it is useful at this point to introduce some notations. Let 
producers use inputs x = (Xl' ... ,Xn) E R: to produce outputs y = (YI'···' Y m) E R: . 
Production technology can be represented with an input set 
L(y) {x: (y, x) is feasible} A.1 
which for every Y E R: has isoquant 
L(y) = {x: x E L(y), Ax ~ L(y), A [O,l)} A.2 
and efficient subset 
EffL(y) {x: x E L(y), x' ~ L(y), x' ~x} A.3 
For notational simplicity, the efficiency set is regarded as a subset of the output set, 
which can be denoted as EffL(y) c L(y). Shephard (1953, 1970) introduced the input 
distance function to provide a functional representation of a multiple output 
technology. The input distance function is 
D/(y,x) = max. {A: (xlA) E L(y)} A.4 
Clearly Diy,x) is greater than or equal to 1, and it follows from (A.2) that 
L(y) = {x: DJ(y,x) = 1} A.5 
The Debreu-Farrell input-oriented measure of technical efficiency can now be given a 
somewhat more formal interpretation as 
DF/(y,x) = min{A. : Ax E L(y)} A.6 
DF/(y,x) is less than or equal to 1, and it follows from (A.4) that 
1 A.7 DFJ(y,x) = D ( ) 
I y,x 
and from (A.5) that 
IsoqL(y) = {x:DFJ(y,x) = 1} A.8 
The technical efficiency measurement can be analogously defined as on output 
orientation. 
P(x) = {y: DFo(x,y) = 1} A.9 
can be replicated from the production technology, 
P(x) = {y: (x,y) is feasible} A.10 
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The two technical efficiency measures are illustrated in Figure A.I. In the input-
oriented upper panel, input vectors x4 and ~ can be contracted radially and still 
remaIn 
~ ____ L(y) 
Figure A.I Debreu-Farrell technical efficiency measurement 
capable of producing output vector y, but input vectors xC and x D cannot be contracted 
radially and still remain capable of producing output vector y. Consequently, DFI(y, 
xc) =DFI(y,XD) = 1 which is greater than max. (DF](y,x4), DFJ(y,xB)}. Note also that 
input vector (;tBXB) cannot be contracted radially and still remain capable of producing 
output vector y, even though it contains slack in input X2,. There may be some 
hesitancy in describing input vector (;tBXB) as technically efficient in the production of 
output vector y. No such problem occurs with input vector (;tAx4). Thus DFJ(y, ;tAx4) = 
DFJ(y,;tBxB) = 1 even though (;tAx4) E EffL(y) but (;tBXB) ~EffL(y). Similar remarks 
apply to the output-oriented lower panel. Of course DFI(y, x) :;tlIDF o (x, y) in general. 
Fare and Lovell (1978) showed that DFI(y,x) = IIDFo(x,y) if, and only if, technology 
exhibits constant returns to scale. 
The Debreu-Farrell measure of technical efficiency, a reciprocal of a Shepherd's 
(1970) distance function, is more commonly used in the literature because it has some 
attractive properties for economic interpretation. Some of the properties include the 
fact that it is homogeneous to the degree one in inputs and outputs: it is weakly 
monotonically increasing and decreasing in output and input, respectively; and, it is 
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invariant with respect to changes in units of measurements. 
There are also some shortcomings associated with Shepherd's distance function. Fried 
et al. (1993) commented on one of this: a notable feature of the Debreu-Farrell 
measure of technical efficiency is that it does not coincide with Koopmans' definition 
of technical efficiency. Koopmans' definition is stringent and it requires the 
simultaneous membership in both efficient subsets, while the Debreu-Farrell measure, 
being the reciprocal of a distance function, only requires membership in an isoquant. 
Thus, the Debreu-Farrell measure correctly identifies all Koopmans-efficient 
producers as being technically efficient, and also identifies as being technically 
efficient any other producers located on an isoquant outside the efficient subset. 
Consequently, Debreu-Farrell's definition of technical efficiency is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for Koopmans technical efficiency. 
Both definitions of efficiency are illustrated in Figure A.l. (2BxB) and (ffyB) satisfy 
the Debreu-Farrell condition but not the Koopmans condition, and (2Ax4) and (ffl) 
satisfy the Debreu-Farrell condition and, arguably, Koopmans condition as well. This 
distinction was pivotal in the development of performance assessment as the literature 
addresses the problem by estimating the level of slacks. 
Charnes et al. (1985) proposed a radial Debreu-Farrell measure with an additive 
measure that takes up the slacks. Fare and Lovell (1978) suggested a radial Debreu-
Farrell measure with a non-radial multiplicative measure. Chames, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) suggested measures that combine the Debreu-Farrell radial measure 
and any remaining slacks into a single measure of technical efficiency have been 
proposed. This is the most commonly used. They are, however, with their 
shortcomings (Fried et al. 1993). In the literature, generally speaking, there is little 
attempt to reconcile the difference between the Koopmans definition and the Debreu-
Farrell measure of technical efficiency has been an overwhelming success. The two 
most popular options seem to be to report the radial Debreu-Farrell measure and 
ignore possible slack, or to report a combination measure. If prices are available and 
economic efficiency can be calculated. 
236 
Considering factors that influence performance such as competition, regulation and 
ownership type, there is the possibility that measured inefficiency is a reflection of an 
inability to completely measure quantity and quality of all relevant variables and to 
model objectives and constraints correctly. I 12 More specifically, variation in technical 
efficiency can be attributed to variation in factors under the control of the producers, 
although the search for these factors rarely proceeds very far beyond the allegation of 
variation in the (usually unmeasured) managerial input. In contrast, however, 
variation in allocative efficiency, in the literature has been attributed to numerous 
sources, including a divergence between expected and actual prices, a persistent 
under-valuation or overvaluation of prices, discrimination or nepotism (Kimeniyi, 
(1985) and Boehm and Hofler (1987)), and satisficing behaviour. 
There are, however, some deficiencies with the general methodology used in the 
literature. For instance, there is little attempt to integrate the literature on the theory of 
production under uncertainty (about technology or prices) into the efficiency 
measurement literature. The argument is that if producers are faced with some 
uncertainty about productivity and prices, then the scope for inefficiency becomes 
real. Second, little effort has been directed towards making use of the literature on the 
internal organisation of the firm in developing hypotheses on efficiency variation. 
Williamson (1975, 1985), Leibenstein (1976, 1987), Aoki (1984), and others have 
been developing models of intra-firm organisation, hierarchy, and performance. More 
or less concurrently a huge literature on principals and agents and incentives has 
developed. We attempt to integrate these developments into the methodology used for 
assessing performance in this study. 
112 This is essentially the crux of Stigler (1972) argument against non-allocative type definition of 
inefficiency. 
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Appendix B: Malmquist Productivity Indices 
As already mentioned Malmquist productivity indices are premised in distance 
function introduced by Shephard (1953, 1970). For this exposition, consider the 
.. h t t t m . . 
sItuation were x = (xl"'" Xm) E R+ denote the Input vector that IS converted to 
y' = (y; , ... ,y~) E R: in period t, where t = 1, ... ,T. For x' E R:', the output production 
set can be defined as 
p' = {y' : (x' ,y') is feasible} B.1 
The output set is assumed to be bounded, closed and convex and satisfies strong 
disposability assumptions. l13 The above production set can be expressed in terms of 
Shephard's distance function. The Malmquist index is based on the Shephard's (1970) 
distance function, D6, defined as 
D ~ (x' , Y t ) = min {e : (x' ,y' / e) E p' B.2 
D~ (x t ,yt) :::; 1, if yl = pi and D~ (x' ,y') = 1 which implies that yl belongs to the 
output isoquant, OIt = {yt : yt E pt, Ayt ~ pt, A > I}. The additional two mixed-period 
distance functions, that is, nb+ 1 (xt ,yt) and n~ (xt+l ,yt+l) are defined analogously. 
where in each case the data being evaluated is from a period different from that of the 
technology relative to which it is being evaluated. With these distance functions, the 
Malmquist productivity index can be defined. 
Using the above output distance functions, the Malmquist output-based productivity 
index can be expressed as follows 
( ) 
nt (t+l t+l ) 
M t t t t+l t+l _ 0 X ,y t = 1 T-1 o X ,y ,X ,y - , ... , 
D~(xt ,yt) 
B.3 
113 For the conditions and proofs of the output production set, see Fare et al. (1996). 
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Expression (SA) compares (xt+l ,yHl) to (x t ,yt) by scaling yHI to OIt (xt+l) and by 
scaling yt to OIt (xt). This implies that the technology in period t is used as the 
reference technology. Although D~ (x t ,yt) =:;; 1, D~( xt+l ,yt+l) can be greater than, 
equal to or less than unity, since period t+ 1 data mayor may not be feasible with 
technology from period t. In which case, M~ (x t ,yt ,xHI ,yHI )can assume a value 
greater than, less than, or equals to unity. This indicates positive, negative or zero 
productivity between period t and t+ 1, respectively from the perspective of period t 
technology. 1 14 
U sing the above definition (5 A), the first decomposition of the Malmquist index can 
now be expressed as the product of two indices, L1T(xH1 , yHl), the index of technical 
change between the two time periods, and L1TE(xt ,yt ,xt+1 ,yHl), the index of 
efficiency change. The association between the latter index with technical efficiency 
change is a result of the equality between Shephard's (1970) output distance function 
and Farrell's (1957) output-oriented measure of technical efficiency (Fare et al. 
1997). 
M t (t t HI Hl)= L1T(xHI HI) . L1TE(xt yt xt+l yHl) o x ,y ,x ,y ,y '" BA 
=l D~(xHl,yHl) l·lD~(xt+l,yHl)l 
DHI (HI HI) Dt (xt yt) 
o X ,y 0' 
The second decomposition of Malmquist index comes via the technical change index. 
Fare et al. (1997) and Tatje and Lovell (1997) referred to the constituents of technical 
efficiency change index as the magnitude and bias indices. In conformity with the 
terminology introduced in DEAP, the non-linear programming computer software 
deVeloped by Coelli (1996a), the constituents of technical change index correspond to 
scale efficiency index and pure efficiency index. These are synonymous with size of 
114 The converse holds in the DEAP program as (Xl. /) is compared to ~/+1, /+1 ) using period t+ 1 
technology as reference. 
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production technology and managerial efficiency. The decomposition of the technical 
change index can be expressed as follows: 
B.5 
~T(xt ,yt) measures the scale efficiency change along a ray through period t data. 
PTE(xt ,yt ,xt+l ,yt+l) measures the pure technical efficiency change as the ratio of 
the scale efficiency change along a ray through period t+ 1 data to scale efficiency 
change along a ray through period t data. This decomposition gives an insight into the 
sources of inefficiency, and the information for formulating appropriate policies to 
correct inefficiency and productivity stagnation and deterioration. 
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Appendix C: Hicks-neutral technical change 
Production function relates inputs to outputs of production processes when all inputs 
are used efficiently. Where efficiently implies that no more than necessary input is 
used in production of a given output. 
Technological progress can manifest itself in improved production process (process 
innovation) or improved products (product innovation). In the literature, the former 
aspect is what is assumed. Another way of putting this is that the more efficient input 
mix of the current period will at least subsume, and partly dominate, last period's 
input mix, assuming technological progress has indeed occurred. With respect to 
isoquants, technological progress implies movement towards the origin. 
An important aspect of technological progress is whether it is embodied or 
disembodied. If capital is assumed to be homogenous, then more capital means more 
of the same. The implication, therefore, is that technological progress must affect all 
existing processes. This, essentially, is disembodied technological progress. It makes 
use of existing factor inputs to produce more output. 
Alternatively, technological progress may entail adaptation of existing processes. The 
typical view is that labour can be costlessly adopted while capital cannot. The 
introduction of new production process must, therefore, be accompanied by the 
introduction of new capital. The technological progress is embodied in the new capital 
stock. 
Embodied technological progress has two important implications. First, the efficiency 
in production depends not just on current state of knowledge, but on the rate of capital 
accumulation. The latest set of efficient mix though available to all, can only be had at 
a price - the cost of replacing existing capital stock with new. Second, if we assume 
that the inherent techniques embodied by capital are different, then the homogenous 
assumption of capital is inappropriate. This introduces the concept of vintage 
technology and putty-clay production technology. 
What assumption is appropriate for the technological progress in the Nigerian 
electricity industry? With respect to additional capacity, technological progress is 
embodied, but when we assume intrinsic inefficiency in production, then 
improvement in efficiency is tantamount to disembodied technological progress. What 
accounts for the technological progress then? Change in policy from expansion of 
system capacity to increased utilisation of existing capacity (better operations and 
maintenance policy). 
What is the implication of technological progress on factor inputs? Will technological 
progress reduce the demand for labour rather more than it reduces the demand for 
capital? That is will technological progress be biased or neutral? These are the more 
relevant questions to economic analysis of efficiency in production. There are three 
types of neutrality: Hicks, Harrod and Solow. 
Hicks neutral technological progress is said to occur when constant factor prices 
leaves factor ratios unchanged. That is, K = fa (PK J, where fa is any function. 
L PL 
Furthermore, since for cost minimisation at any level of output PK/PL = dKldL, we 
have dL = f h- 1(KJ. The latter expresses the Hicks neutrality in terms of production dK L 
function without reference to prices. Any movement of the isoquants, which shifts 
them toward the origin while concomitantly preserving the equality, will be Hicks 
neutral technological progress. 
Harrod neutral technological change occurs when constant price of capital leaves the 
capital-output ratio unchanged. That is, K = fb(PK ) , wherefi is any function. q 
Solow neutral technological change, on the other hand, occurs when constant price of 
labour leaves the ratio of labour-output unchanged. This can be represented as 
L follows: - = fe (PL ) . q 
To explore these fonns of neutrality, we consider the translog functional fonn. We 
can introduce technological progress into the translog function by letting the constant 
tenn, Yo = yoemt. Thus, 
If Land K remain constant, then Inqt = mt + Inqo where qo is the output in period o. 
dqt 1 When we differentiate with respect to time, - - = m . Thus, q grows at a constant 
dt q 
rate m percent per year. 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to labour and capital, respectively, 
we obtain PL and PK• Hence, 
PL = K {a l + 2a2InL + riInK} 
PK L PI + 2P2 InK + rIInL 
Since, with technological progress, q grows over time, it is clear from PL and PK that 
this form if technological progress is neither Harrod nor Solow neutral. It could, 
however, be Hicks-neutral if the tenn in the braces were constant. This is the case 
under constant returns to scale since then UI + PI = 1, 2U2 = -YI, and 2P2 = -YI. When 
these are substituted into the above expression, it yields KIL where PrJPK . Hence the 
constant return to scale translog has Hicks neutral technological progress when Yo, 
becomes an increasing function of time. 
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Appendix D: Efficiency Benchmark Model: Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988) 
I-B' 
Under the demand conditions, V(q), which is f6aql-B'dq = aq ,and is, therefore, 1-& 
equal to the revenue of the firm multiplied by _1_. For this to be well defined, we 
1-8 
require 8"* 1, in which case, the effect of the change in objectives is equivalent to a 
proportional shift in the firm's demand curve. 
The utility function of the private manager can be expressed as 
A(qt ,et ) = [p(qt) - c(et )] - ae D.1 
p = aq -£ 
c = fJe- a 
Therefore, the maximisation problem can be expressed as follows: 
A() 1-£ a -a q ,e = aq - q j-Je - ae D.2 
The first order conditions are: 
oA -£ -a 0 
- = a(1- 8)q - fJe = 
ilj 
D.3 
oA a 1 0 
- = aqfJe- - - a = 
& 
D.4 
F or the public manager, the utility function can be expressed as 
B(ql'e) = V(q) - c(q)q - be 
I-B' 
. . () h· h· N I-B'd aq the eJ::ore Under the demand condItIons, V q ,w IC IS Joaq q = 1-&' r 11 , 
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IJB -& pe-a 0 
--aq - -
- -
t1j 
OR = aqj3e-a-l -b = 0 
& 
Solving for q from (D.I) we obtain, 
0'(1- 8) /3 
and this can be further re-arranged as 
From (D.2) we obtain 
afJ 
--q-a l+a - , 
e 
This can be re-arranged in terms of q, 
ae1+P 
q= 
a/3 
Substituting (D.8) into (D.6), 
[a]& /31-& -~a-&-a& a e -
, - 0'(1- 8) 
D.S 
D.6 
D.7 
D.8 
D.9 
D.1O 
D.11 
D.12 
D.13 
D.14 
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It&[H lja-c-ac 
,...., 
e = 
a(l- 8) 
l+a/a-c-ac 
a(l- 8) 
if = --=-----=----
aft 
For the public manager, 
From (D.S) 
From (D.6) 
afJ 
-q=b 
e1+a 
be 1+/3 
q= 
afJ 
eaa=fJ l be'+a r 
afJ 
e
a 
0- = P'-&[! T e&+a& 
.a-c-ac 
p'-&[!T 
e -
a 
D.IS 
D.16 
D.17 
D.18 
D.l9 
D.20 
D.21 
D.22 
D.23 
lja-c-ac 
* e = 
l+a/a-c-ac 
a 
* q = 
ap 
Thus, if > q * if and only if 
l+a/a-c-ac l+a/a-c-ac 
a 
0'(1- 8) 
-=------~~------ > ~------~-------
ap ap 
And after simplification and manipulation, we obtain, 
a > (1- 8) (1+a)/a 
b 
And e > e* if and only if 
p'-e[H l/a-c-ac 
0"(1- 8) 
l/a-c-ac 
D.24 
D.25 
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Appendix E1: NEPA's System Performance: 1972 - 1995. 
Year Installed Peak load System Total Total Reserve Load Factor 
capacity (MW) Losses Generation Consumption margin (%) (%) 
(MW) (GWh) Output (GWh) 
(GWh) 
1972 440 390 433 2185 1752 l3 64 
1973 500 445 539 2578 2039 l3 66 
1974 640 527 526 2869 2343 21 62 
1975 750 629 707 3422 2715 19 62 
1976 851 722 777 4043 3266 18 64 
1977 874 796 909 4536 3627 10 65 
1978 1479 989 1580 5151 3571 50 60.06 
1979 1595 1106 1799 5977 4178 45 64.19 
1980 2171 1181 2246 6899 4653 84 68.34 
1981 2483 l323 2161 7788 5627 88 67.34 
1982 2772 1448 2650 8566 5916 91 67.39 
1983 2857 1434 2607 8713 6106 98 69.17 
1984 3178 1532 3577 9036 5459 107 67.11 
1985 3651 1720 4282 10431 6149 112 69.55 
1986 4318 1811 3390 10765 7375 l38 71.03 
1987 4652 1885 3794 11265 7471 151 69.32 
1988 5088 1952 4390 11593 7203 195 67.69 
1989 5388 2003 3988 12544 8556 169 72.7 
1990 5988 2219 5494 l3364 7870 170 69.14 
1991 5859 2245 6325 14197 7872 72.01 
1992 5881 2382 6117 14834 8717 71.09 
1993 5881 2300 4587 14276 9689 72.45 
1994 5876 2446 5586 14656 9070 68.4 
1995 5962 2452 6025 15845 9820 73.77 
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Appendix E2: Data of NEPA's Eectricity Generating Stations 1990-
1996 ' 
Station Year Y Xl X2 X3 ZI Z2 Z3 Z4 
Jebba 1990 1651764 520 30 453.94 2414.815 96.4 32.59985 
Shiroro 1990 2149011 490 28 368.4 2884 150 40.88682 
Kainji 1990 1151374 580 42 254.07 2017.237 95 17.29413 
Ijora 1990 14353 200 78.898907 8.72 7974 16.68 2.456477 0 
Afam 1990 1107010 424 20170.857 229.27 109905.1 41.23 18.02982 0 
Delta 1990 1097380 674 15455.367 447.86 4032.306 45.6 13.73593 0 
Sapele 1990 1145700 850 1302.1839 111.71 11441.57 102 43.59589 0 
Egbin 1990 4719919 750 632066187 648.53 260731.2 220 40.81845 0 
Jebba 1991 2180329 498 35 474.03 1615 96.4 43.03181 
Shiroro 1991 1997155 492 29 372.18 27678.67 150 37.99762 
Kainji 1991 1752995 575 39 285.22 2372.447 95 26.33073 
Ijora 1991 2960 174 78.2257 10.38 93575 16.68 0.506596 0 
Afam 1991 1273883 385 38617.333 339.59 138813 41.23 20.74767 0 
Delta 1991 570720 672 26973.834 505.48 15229.84 45.6 7.143715 0 
Sapele 1991 827926 749 8958.4577 146.1 56820.1 102 
Egbin 1991 4161960 620 1314631.6 726.94 164255.4 220 
Jebba 1992 1793454 476 29 468.23 22477.91 96.4 
31.50403 0 
35.99315 0 
35.3963 
Shiroro 1992 2288599 485 32 384.21 78980.01 150 43.5426 
Kainji 1992 1977365 582 41 279.41 19003.43 95 29.70087 
Ijora 1992 1320 150 85.423324 9.82 55332.95 16.68 0.225914 0 
Afam 1992 1023321 352 16979.468 250 103797.7 41.23 16.66678 0 
Delta 1992 2006349 612 24123.292 480.25 84639.14 45.6 25.11352 0 
Sapele 1992 1057793 704 2160.396 132.42 81423.75 102 40.25088 0 
Egbin 1992 4562558 530 645171.34 705.43 180763.6 220 
Jebba 1993 1508608 495 27 450.89 14930.56 96.4 
Shiroro 1993 2118875 480 26 450.6 53755.33 150 
Kainji 1993 1621534 560 38 357.6 11177.63 95 
39.45757 0 
29.77447 
40.31345 
24.35613 
Ijora 1993 6650 138 146.23693 12.13 
Afam 1993 1293236 305 24868.673 250 
326425 16.68 1.13813 0 
60287.86 41.23 21.06287 0 
Delta 1993 2493321 450 19206.142 350.67 60433.22 45.6 31.20896 0 
Sapele 1993 583919 627 14696.451 132.8 105544.1 102 22.21914 0 
Egbin 1993 4490549 483 308662.42 673.8 134798.9 220 38.83483 0 
44.05582 
38.96592 
34.6793 
Jebba 1994 2232213 495 27 451.49 75160.75 96.4 
Shiroro 1994 2048049 470 26 548.37 291645.4 150 
408.19 54698.61 95 Kainji 
Ijora 
Afam 
Delta 
Sapele 
Egbin 
1994 2308809 555 36 
1994 1730 128 53.631995 4.54 3104557 16.68 0.296085 0 
1994 774867 294 11202.832 115.66 325075.8 41.23 12.62022 0 
1994 1948954 413 25247.178 334.16 476957 45.6 24.3951 0 
1994 1078483 574 11513.572 136.41 403167 102 41.03817 0 
1994 4160964 484 187402.06 533.37 579165 220 35.98454 0 
Jebba 1995 2708128 492 23 481.42 259802.3 96.4 53.44866 
Shiroro 1995 1939825 450 21 525.68 537733.9 150 36.90687 
Kainji 1995 2671778 525 38 395.96 123369.3 95 40.13125 
Ijora 1995 1322 124 22.008338 12.68 5399451 16.68 0.226257 0 
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Afam 1995 652431 294 8515.5568 156.29 219724.1 41.23 10.62611 0 
Delta 1995 1853287 390 19510.849 373.2 415626.3 45.6 23.19764 0 
Sapele 1995 1389154 550 12637.461 181.14 472288 102 52.85974 0 
Egbin 1995 4563801 485 424591.13 635.9 522997.1 220 39.46832 0 
Jebba 1996 1987069 491 25.03 475 91399.83 96.4 39.21756 
Shiroro 1996 2058587 446 25.92 540 281824.3 150 39.16642 
Kainji 1996 2106802 520 39 350 81392.76 95 31.64507 
Ijora 1996 380 122 24.655635 12.06 7820999 16.68 0.065036 0 
Afam 1996 742209.9 288 11380.681 178.4 139607.5 41.23 12.08834 0 
Delta 1996 2242085 388 27856.703 354.8 199228.1 45.6 28.06423 0 
Sapele 1996 1550461 510 19851.815 172.64 459741.5 102 58.99775 0 
Egbin 1996 5358350 485 52012.903 642.8 549454.3 220 46.33968 0 
YI = Gross Electricity Generated (MWh) 
Xl = labour 
X2 = Fuel (btu) 
X3 = Generating Capacity (MW) 
Z I = Maintenance Costlk Wh 
Z2 = Average Unit Size (MW) 
Z3 = Capacity Factor 
Z4 = Dummy Variable (1 = Hydro; 0 = Thermal) 
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Appendix F: DEA Results - Comparative Study, 1995. 
Table Fl: Actual Input and Outputs 
Output Net. Cap Fuel input Labour 
Congo 439 118 41 1268 
Ethiopia 1308 427 91.9 8377 
Ghana 6159 1162 575 4336 
I. Coast 2313 1173 374 3022 
Kenya 3747 792 625 10186 
Mozambique 563 2245 237 2595 
Nigeria 14483 5841 2330 32000 
s. Africa 186551 34786 43101 39952 
Tanzania 1791 523 214 7500 
Zaire 5006 2145 574 5541 
Zambia 7790 2220 681 4377 
Zimbabwe 8520 2038 2058 7530 
Cameroon 2746 603 253 3050 
Algeria 19714 5515 5900 18896 
Egypt 54833 15715 12081 35000 
Tunisia 7305 1686 1610 890 
Argentina 64312 17810 12760 35432 
Bangladesh 10907 2908 2783 26150 
Brazil 268560 55512 25964 182574 
Chile 27873 5267 3585 4680 
Colombia 45096 10200 6491 27723 
Ecuador 8872 2539 1208 5828 
Guatemala 3013 666 482 8171 
Indonesia 61199 16131 14468 54387 
Malaysia 45453 10040 10243 28500 
Pakistan 53555 12100 10059 13200 
Philippines 27679 7180 8909 47149 
Thailand 79796 14912 16998 64898 
Venezuela 73416 18775 11716 19223 
Mean 37689.62 8656.172 6772.824 24221.9 
St. dey. 59153.04 12032.86 9533.103 35093.48 
Min 439 118 41 890 
Max 268560 55512 43101 182574 
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Table F2: Cross-Country Efficiency Summary, 1995 
CRSTE VRSTE Scale Scale type 
Congo 0.910 1.000 0.910 IRS 
Ethiopia 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Ghana 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Ivory Coast 0.542 0.545 0.995 IRS 
Kenya 0.888 0.907 0.980 IRS 
Mozambique 0.205 0.208 0.985 IRS 
Nigeria 0.558 0.584 0.955 DRS 
South Africa 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Tanzania 0.742 0.748 0.992 IRS 
Zambia 0.755 0.757 0.998 DRS 
Zaire 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Zimbabwe 0.782 0.785 0.997 IRS 
Cameroon 0.984 0.992 0.992 IRS 
Algeria 0.668 0.669 1.000 CRS 
Egypt 0.656 0.682 0.963 DRS 
Tunisia 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Argentina 0.680 0.738 0.922 DRS 
Bangladesh 0.702 0.702 1.000 CRS 
Brazil 0.974 1.000 0.974 DRS 
Chile 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Colombia 0.833 0.868 0.960 DRS 
Ecuador 0.755 0.758 0.995 DRS 
Guatemala 0.850 0.876 0.971 IRS 
Indonesia 0.711 0.730 0.975 DRS 
Malaysia 0.847 0.848 0.998 DRS 
Pakistan 0.833 0.925 0.901 DRS 
Philippines 0.719 0.720 0.998 IRS 
Thailand 0.999 1.000 0.999 DRS 
Venezuela 0.782 1.000 0.782 DRS 
Sample Mean 0.806 0.829 0.974 
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Table F3: Summary of Input and Output Targets 
Output Capacity Fuel Labour 
Congo 439 118 41 1268 
Ethiopia 1308 427 91.9 8377 
Ghana 6159 1162 575 4336 
Ivory Coast 4244.481 1173 374 3022 
Kenya 4131.797 792 385.747 3248.682 
Mozambique 2705.779 769.486 237 2595 
Nigeria 24797.86 5695.794 2330 15999.31 
South Africa 186551 34786 43101 39952 
Tanzania 2395.315 523 214 4434.755 
Zambia 6612.655 1894.332 574 5103.532 
Zaire 7790 2220 681 4377 
Zimbabwe 10858.72 2038 1682.922 5263.897 
Cameroon 2768.667 603 253 3050 
Algeria 29488.23 5515 5900 17528.04 
Egypt 80438.96 15715 12081 31581.43 
Tunisia 7305 1686 1610 890 
Argentina 87170.41 17810 12760 35432 
Bangladesh 15526.22 2908 2783 6197.607 
Brazil 268560 55512 25964 182574 
Chile 27873 5267 3585 4680 
Colombia 51967.77 10200 6491 20284.05 
Ecuador 11698.94 2539 1208 5828 
Guatemala 3441.452 666 321.299 2878.406 
Indonesia 83874.07 16131 14468 27272.77 
Malaysia 53570.19 10040 10243 28500 
Pakistan 57913.96 12100 10059 13200 
Philippines 38445.43 7180 8186.274 10710.53 
Thailand 79796 14912 16998 64898 
Venezuela 73416 18775 11716 19223 
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Table F4: Summary of input slacks. 
Capacity Fuel Labour 
Kenya 0 239.253 6937.318 
Mozambique 1475.514 0 0 
Nigeria 145.206 0 16000.69 
Tanzania 0 0 3065.245 
Zambia 250.668 0 437.468 
Zimbabwe 0 375.078 2266.103 
Algeria 0 0 1367.963 
Egypt 0 0 3418.572 
Bangladesh 0 0 19952.39 
Colombia 0 0 7438.949 
Guatemala 0 160.701 5292.594 
Indonesia 0 0 27114.23 
Philippines 0 722.726 36438.47 
Sample Mean 64.531 51.647 4473.448 
Note: Only countries with input slacks are listed. 
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Table F5: Peer Groups and Weights 
Corresponding no. Peers Peer weights: Peer count: 
Congo 1 1 1 6 
Ethiopia 2 2 1 5 
Ghana 3 3 1 11 
Ivory Coast 4 2, 11,3, 1 0.016,0.471,0.058,0.456 0 
Kenya 5 3, 1 0.646, 0.354 0 
Mozambique 6 11,2,1 0.302, 0.055, 0.643 0 
Nigeria 7 19,11 0.065, 0.935 0 
South Africa 8 8 1 10 
Tanzania 9 2,3,1 0.319, 0.294, 0.388 0 
Zambia 10 2,11 0.1820.818 0 
Zaire 11 11 1 6 
Zimbabwe 12 3,8 0.974, 0.026 0 
Cameroon 13 2, 11,3, 1 0.088, 0.061, 0.315, 0.536 0 
Algeria 14 28,8,3 0.187,0.053,0.760 0 
Egypt 15 19 8 20 0.122,0.146,0.732 0 
Tunisia 16 16 1 0 
Argentina 17 20,29,8,19 0.588,0.153,0.124,0.136 0 
Bangladesh 18 28,8,3 0.001,0.052,0.948 0 
Brazil 19 19 1 7 
Chile 20 20 1 7 
Colombia 21 19,8,20 0.082,0.027,0.891 0 
Ecuador 22 1,20,19,3 0.389,0.129,0.008,0.474 0 
Guatemala 23 3, 1 0.525,0.475 0 
Indonesia 24 20,19,8 0.689, 0.082, 0.229 0 
Malaysia 25 3,8,28,20 0.034,0.046,0.369,0.552 0 
Pakistan 26 29,8,19,20 0.240,0.111,0.006,0.643 0 
Philippines 27 3, 8 0.821,0.179 0 
Thailand 28 28 1 3 
Venezuela 29 29 1 2 
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Table F6: Efficient Projection - Capacity (MW) 
Country Original Level Radial Movement Slack Movement Projected Value 
Congo 118 0 0 118 
Ethiopia 427 0 0 427 
Ghana 1162 0 0 1162 
Ivory Coast 1173 0 0 1173 
Kenya 792 0 0 792 
Mozambique 2245 0 -1475.51 769.486 
Nigeria 5841 0 -145.206 5695.794 
South Africa 34786 0 0 34786 
Tanzania 523 0 0 523 
Zambia 2145 0 -250.668 1894.332 
Zaire 2200 0 0 2200 
Zimbabwe 2038 0 0 2038 
Cameroon 603 0 0 603 
Algeria 5515 0 0 5515 
Egypt 15715 0 0 15715 
Tunisia 1686 0 0 1686 
Argentina 17810 0 0 17810 
Bangladesh 2908 0 0 2908 
Brazil 55512 0 0 55512 
Chile 5267 0 0 5267 
Colombia 10200 0 0 10200 
Ecuador 2539 0 0 2539 
Guatemala 666 0 0 666 
Indonesia 16131 0 0 16131 
Malaysia 10040 0 0 10040 
Pakistan 12100 0 0 12100 
Philippines 7180 0 0 7180 
Thailand 14912 0 0 14912 
Venezuela 18775 0 0 18775 
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Table F7: Efficient Projection - Fuel (106 Btu) 
Country Original Movement Radial Movement Slack Movement Projected Value 
Congo 41 0 0 41 
Ethiopia 91.9 0 0 91.9 
Ghana 575 0 0 575 
Ivory Coast 374 0 0 374 
Kenya 625 0 -239.253 385.747 
Mozambique 237 0 0 237 
Nigeria 2330 0 0 2330 
South Africa 43101 0 0 43101 
Tanzania 214 0 0 214 
Zambia 574 0 0 574 
Zaire 681 0 0 681 
Zimbabwe 2058 0 -375.078 1682.922 
Cameroon 253 0 0 253 
Algeria 5900 0 0 5900 
Egypt 12081 0 0 12081 
Tunisia 1610 0 0 1610 
Argentina 12760 0 0 12760 
Bangladesh 2783 0 0 2783 
Brazil 25964 0 0 25964 
Chile 3585 0 0 3585 
Colombia 6491 0 0 6491 
Ecuador 1208 0 0 1208 
Guatemala 482 0 -160.701 321.299 
Indonesia 14468 0 0 14468 
Malaysia 10243 0 0 10243 
Pakistan 10059 0 0 10059 
Philippines 8909 0 -722.726 8186.274 
Thailand 16998 0 0 16998 
Venezuela 11716 0 0 11716 
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Table F8: Efficient Projection: Labour 
Country Original Value Radial Movement Slack Movement Projected Value 
Congo 1268 0 0 1268 
Ethiopia 8377 0 0 8377 
Ghana 4336 0 0 4336 
Ivory Coast 3022 0 0 3022 
Kenya 10186 0 -6937.32 3248.682 
Mozambique 2595 0 0 2595 
Nigeria 32000 0 -16000.7 15999.31 
South Africa 39952 0 0 39952 
Tanzania 7500 0 -3065.25 4434.755 
Zambia 5541 0 -437.468 5103.532 
Zaire 4377 0 0 4377 
Zimbabwe 7530 0 -2266.1 5263.897 
Cameroon 3050 0 0 3050 
Algeria 18896 0 -1367.96 17528.04 
Egypt 35000 0 -3418.57 3158l.43 
Tunisia 890 0 0 890 
Argentina 35432 0 0 35432 
Bangladesh 26150 0 -19952.4 6197.607 
Brazil 182574 0 0 182574 
Chile 4680 0 0 4680 
Colombia 27723 0 -7438.95 20284.05 
Ecuador 5828 0 0 5828 
Guatemala 8171 0 -5292.59 2878.406 
Indonesia 54387 0 -27114.2 27272.77 
Malaysia 28500 0 0 28500 
Pakistan 13200 0 0 13200 
Philippines 47149 0 -36438.5 10710.53 
Thailand 64898 0 0 64898 
Venezuela 19223 0 0 19223 
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